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Abstract
The study of political leadership within the discipline of the political science has recently
grown into a large, complex, and insightful literature. However, the extensive number of
concepts, theories, and frameworks developed by international leadership scholars have been
underutilized when it comes to developing further understanding of political leadership in the
Canadian context. This thesis attempts to address this gap by focusing on the process by
which individuals are selected to be leaders. I utilizes social psychology and Identity
Leadership Theory to theorize that leaders are successful to the extent that are able to cohere
with broader group processes by articulating group characteristics, establishing individual
prototypicality, and entrenching their policy agenda in pre-existing collective identities and
understandings. The study develops and examines a concise causal relationship and
hypotheses through a case study of the Albertan provincial context. This comprises analyses
of two premiers, William Aberhart and Peter Lougheed, that utilize a set of primary
communicative sources to examine the substantive components of their successful leadership
appeal. Overall, this thesis’s findings suggest that these leaders were successful despite not
meeting the expectations of the analysis’s hypotheses. Consequently, it is concluded that
Identity Leadership Theory is not an accurate or useful means by which to understand
political leadership in Canada.

Keywords
Political Leadership, Canada, Political Psychology, Social Identity Theory, Identity
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis explores the process by political leaders are able to articulate successful electoral
appeals through a case study of the initial election of two premiers in the province of Alberta,
William Aberhart and Peter Lougheed. Through an engagement with conceptual and
theoretical questions pertaining the leadership, it utilizes Identity Leadership Theory (ILP) to
develop a theory of leadership success. The theory argues that leaders, in seeking to gain a
position of authority over a group, are successful to the extent that they are able to base their
appeal in the tendencies of that group’s psychological processes. In particular, leaders find
their influence and success in their ability to direct the direction of those process to the extent
that, by providing answers to the deeper questions of “who we are” and “what we should do”,
they are able to legitimize their leadership and policy agenda through their group
membership. This theory is operationalized into a concise causal framework, and this thesis
establishes a set of two hypothesis to be examined in the two case studies of Alberta. Overall,
it is found that both leaders were successful despite not meeting the expectations of the
hypotheses. Consequently, this thesis concludes that Identity Leadership Theory (ILP) is not
an analytically useful way to understand political leadership in Canada.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1

Introduction

In his foundational 1978 work Leadership, the political scientist James MacGregor Burns
(p.2) lamented that ““we know all too much about our leaders, we know far too little
about leadership.” Burns was expressing a certain foreboding to the discipline of political
science of the time. In emphasizing the influence of broader institutional, social, and
economic forces, the discipline had overlooked the importance of political leadership
itself as a unique, independent, and influential factor in determining political outcomes.
In the years that followed Burns’ call for a greater place for leadership in political
science, the literature was expanded considerably. Today, its study comprises a complex,
dense, and dynamic field of analysis within the broader discipline. As a general scholarly
literature, it has provided insights into a wide variety of political phenomena and the
particular dynamics of specific institutional contexts (Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014;
Hernandez et al. 2011; Uhl-Bien et al. 2014).
Notably absent, however, is the study of political leadership in the Canadian
context, a field that remains underdeveloped and underutilized. This is an unfortunate
state of affairs. Given the particularly prominent place that individual Canadian political
leaders have in both formal institutions and public life more broadly, the study thereof is
especially useful in increasing scholarly understanding of both specific Canadian political
phenomena and the concept of political leadership more generally. Nevertheless, many of
the concepts, frameworks, and theories that have been developed by leadership scholars
elsewhere have not been utilized to better understand Canadian contexts, particularly
when it comes to political processes on a subnational level.
This thesis aims to contribute to the broader scholarly project towards closing this gap
in understanding, partly by applying concepts and theories developed elsewhere within a
Canadian context. It focuses on one important aspect of Canadian political leadership,
guided by the following main research question: how can the researcher understand why
certain individuals are successfully elected political leaders in Canada? While political
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leaders predominately impact political outcomes through the power made available to
them by their role in institutions, they are initially required to gain the support of the
community which they seek to lead in order to attain public office. This process of
aspiring for power in Canada is also predominately done in a context of keen democratic
competition as, given the electoral process, a significant number of individuals seek after
the same position. The primary question of leadership in this thesis, then, is to understand
why it is that certain individuals are endowed with this authority over others.
Through a detailed engagement with the conceptual and explanatory leadership
literatures, this thesis utilizes Identity Leadership Theory (ILT) to explore a potential
answer to this research question. As originally articulated by Haslam et al. (2020) in The
New Psychology of Leadership, ILT draws upon the insights of social psychology to
theorize that the success of political leaders can be explained on account of the way their
appeal to voters takes advantage of broader psychological group processes. Put more
precisely, the theory holds that group memberships will be formed, defined, and
internalized by individuals, thereby affecting the way they perceive and evaluate
themselves and their environments. Leaders find their success in drawing upon and
amending pre-existing group understandings to legitimize their personal leadership and
so mobilize support for their policy agenda. This is done, first, by a leader’s capacity to
position themselves as a “prototypical group member” (Haslam et al. 2020, p.82) and
second, by their ability to communicate and work towards a policy agenda that coheres
with the group’s experiences, needs, history and self-understanding at the time they seek
to govern. Therefore, when translated into concise statements guiding the study’s
research methodology, the ILT theoretical foundation supporting this analysis posits two
specific hypotheses:
•

H1: If an aspiring leader is most effective at conveying themselves as a
prototypical member, understood through the way they articulate the group’s
category prototypes as determined by a meta-contrast ratio, they will then be seen
as a legitimate source of authority.

•

H2: if a leader develops and communicates a salient understanding of the group
identity and future course of action that is consistent with their prototypicality
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while also drawing upon broader and pre-existing characteristics of the group
understanding (the principle of readiness), they are then more likely to be
endowed with formal leadership.
Support for these hypotheses are subsequently examined in two case studies focused
on the initial leadership phase of two successful provincial premiers in the province of
Alberta: William Aberhart, who served from 1935 to 1943, and Peter Lougheed who was
in office from 1971 to 1985. In each case, a collection of primary sources that represent
each leader’s oral and written communications are analyzed in light of the hypothesized
relationships so as to determine if their success in attaining formal leadership can be
accounted for through specific appeals to group identity. As discussed in more detail
below, the cases are located in Canada, a country whose politics are shaped by the
influence of first ministers. Moreover, the province of Alberta was selected partly owing
to the unique and clear group identity shared by its citizens. So, the two case studies of
long-serving and successful premiers offer excellent terrain in which to examine how
leaders appeal to a group’s identity in order to mobilize the support necessary to lead.
However, the textual analysis finds that both leaders successfully attained leadership
positions early in their careers without much evidence of appealing to the identity of
Albertans. In light of the absence of supporting evidence for the hypothesized
relationships, the study indicates that Identity Leadership Theory is not a helpful
explanatory framework for explaining how successful leaders gain the leadership. In light
of this fact, the thesis concludes that while the particular theory applied here is
unsupported, the findings nevertheless contribute to the study of political leadership in
Canada by reporting the lack of empirical basis for this popular, new approach to
understanding leadership.

1.1

Chapters at a Glance

Each chapter of this thesis is dedicated to addressing one or more of the components of
its overall analysis. Chapter Two establishes this thesis within the broader literature on
political leadership. It consists of a general literature review of the study of leadership,
develops a workable conceptualization of leaders and the leadership process, and
discusses a series of frameworks that have been developed to explain the research
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question of why certain individuals become leaders. Chapter Three presents a detailed
articulation of the theoretical framework of Identity Leadership Theory, discussing its
fundamental assumptions derived from the field of social psychology and the way these
have been applied on the context of leadership. From here, the discussion draws upon this
broad theoretical framework to support the specific research methodology employed in
this study. In this section I outline the general causal relationship, present the two core
hypotheses, and discuss key case selection considerations and how the content of leaders’
appeals is established empirically.
Chapter Four is comprised of a review of the broader Albertan context which
shaped how leaders must direct their appeals. By drawing upon scholarly
characterizations of the province’s culture, the province is analyzed through a social
identity lens to reveal some salient themes that make up the broader Albertan group
identity, including a romantic settler image, collective economic reliance on one export
commodity, an individualistic and freedom-based culture, and a common skepticism
towards the interference of outside actors. This comprises the broader and pre-existing
characteristics of the group understanding in which the leaders are expected to base their
appeals to citizens.
Chapter Five and Six investigates the two core hypotheses in the respective case
studies of William Aberhart and Peter Lougheed. Each study is presented in four
sections. First, a brief portrait of the leader, the basis of their aspirational leadership, and
the components of their policy agenda is provided. Second, a summary of the broader
economic, social, and political context surrounding their election is communicated, with
attention directed to the means by which this victory can be interpreted through the
broader group identity theorized in the previous chapter. Third, the chapter briefly
considers conventional and popular approaches to the leader’s success to gain further
insights into additional factors that conditioned their success. Finally, both leaders’
activities as aspirational leaders will be analyzed to determine if there is any evidence in
support of the two hypotheses. Overall, while the findings with respect to the second
hypothesis are mixed, the first hypothesis is found to be unsupported.

5

Chapter Seven concludes the study by providing a summary of its contents, in
addition discussing the implications of the findings reported here. Overall, while the ILT
theory was not successful in its application to these two cases, the study contributes to
broader scholarly attempts to better understand political leadership in Canada through
demonstrating the theory’s insufficiencies and limitations.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review

2

Introduction

The study of political leadership comprises a wide, dense, and complex literature that
remains difficult to properly categorize in a concise and comprehensive form.
Nevertheless, it can be characterized by two broad claims. It, first, assumes that the
concept can be analyzed and accounted for in a relatively systematic and predictable way.
And, second, it holds that leadership ‘matters’ and is relevant to understanding political
outcomes. This applies to the structures of the broader executive institutions themselves
but, more profoundly, this approach suggests that the researcher ought to look at the role
as practiced by individual office holders to develop a full comprehension of this political
phenomenon.
The approach serves to illuminate the workings of both broader political topics
and the dynamics of specific organizational contexts (Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014;
Hernandez et al. 2011; Uhl-Bien et al. 2014). It has, however, remained relatively
underdeveloped and underutilized in Canadian political science outside of structural or
formal-legal analysis. While Canadian political research has developed a coherent
understanding of the formal role played by its first ministers (Hockin 1971; Savoie 1999;
Bakvis 2001; White 2005; Stewart and Stewart 2007; Dyck 1995; Dunn 2016), it has
been less effective in understanding the way the broader parameters of these leadership
positions are understood and used by individual office holders to influence specific
political outcomes. It also, more problematically, has provided little systematic analysis
of the question of how this particular leadership is initially formed and constituted. In
effect, Canadian political science lacks a precise and effective causal mechanism to
account for why some aspiring leaders are more successful at gaining and maintaining
support than others.
This literature review provides a brief overview of the central conceptual claims
and findings of the broader political leadership literature and within Canada specifically.
This chapter aims to argue why this is a worthwhile field of study within Canadian
political science. Through an engagement with the literature, ‘Leadership’ here is
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understood as the exercise of disproportionate authority over the direction of an
organization or social group. It will be argued that this is located in social legitimacy, in
which an individual is endowed with the authority to both issue directives and reasonably
assume they will be followed. The primary question of leadership for Canadian political
science, then, is to understand why it is that certain individuals are endowed with this
authority, especially given the fact that – assuming that high political office is
significantly sought after – they beat other individuals vying for that same power.
The remainder of this literature review examines a set of approaches that have
been developed to address this question, identifying three loose frameworks: the
attributional, the transactional, and the contextual. In reviewing each, the paper will settle
on the latter, particularly the social identity approach, as a useful theoretical framework
to account for the way leadership is constituted within Canadian public life.

2.1 The Study of Political Leadership: An Overview
Leadership, in the words of George Akerlof (2009, p.xiv) is a “subject older then Plato
and as current than Barack Obama.” It has been a constant spot for normative and
analytical introspection, preoccupying a perennial place in the history of thought.1
Several leaders have been extensively studied as individuals, and they are largely
assumed to be an important aspect of understanding what accounts for one outcome
occurring over another.2 ‘Bad’ or ‘a lack of’ leadership tends to be blamed for negative
political events, and contemporary leaders are often given personal credit for positive
trends. Historical examples abound; one could look at the contrast between Neville
Chamberlin and Winston Churchill, the presidential leadership of George Washington,

1

Leadership is, for instance, a concern for Plato (1991, 1961), Confucius (Chan and Chan 2014), and the
Old Testament (Pyschny and Schulz 2018). It can be found in the ancient historical work of Thucydides
(Nichols 2017), Plutarch (Jacobs 2017) and Herodotus (2020), while also motivating the early ‘manuals’ of
leadership by Cicero (2013), Sun Tzu (2019), Machiavelli (1998), and Castiglione (1976). It can be traced
through the progress of more modern political thought, particularly regarding the way it fits into broader
governmental structures and processes such as Montesquieu’s Balance of Powers (1989), Hobbes’
authoritarianism (1994), Rousseau’s ‘Great Legislator’ (2004), and Neitzsche’s ubermench (1974)
2

Napoleon Bonaparte, for instance, is estimated to be the subject of well over 40,000 books.
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Abraham Lincoln, and FDR (compared to figures like James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson,
and Herbert Hoover), or – to use a Canadian example - the impact of Pierre Elliot
Trudeau’s personal philosophy on Canada’s constitutional framework and the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
Nevertheless, social scientists frequently lament the fact that, in the words of
Burns (1978, p.2), “we know all too much about our leaders, we know far too little about
leadership.” “Leadership” as a broad, but precise analytical concept is notoriously
difficult to grasp comprehensively; central to its study is a set of important conceptual
and empirical questions that remain understudied: what leadership is, the impact it has on
politics, and how it can be understood in the context of other causal factors. There has
been, until recently, a general historical neglect of the topic in the mainstream of the
modern discipline of political science (‘t Hart and Rhodes 2014). Here, leadership was
relegated to the place of a relatively minor and irrelevant component of a much broader
force, such as the power relationships of economic conditions (Thompson 1980; Harvey
2006; Jessop 2008), the predictable utility-maximizing determinants of individual
behavior (Downs 1957; Green and Shapiro 1994; Mueller 2003), or the institutional
‘logic’ of a given context and the way it conditioned action (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
Skocpol 1985; March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996). Leadership, therefore,
lacked sustained and rigorous analysis in political science as a unique, independent, and
influential factor in the causal processes that lead to specific political outcomes.
Normatively, the discipline’s theorists tended to minimize the impact of leadership by
their emphasis on the dictates of the social contract, objective policy making structures,
and broad moral values (Rawls 1973; Nozick 1974; Walzer 1983; Foucault 1991; Pettit
1997; How 2003).
But, in recent years, this general neglect has changed. Concerns pertaining to
leadership, both normative and analytical, have inspired an incredibly large, vast, and
dense literature that seeps through an array of disciplines including, among others,
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and organization studies. Increasingly, the broad
term of ‘leadership’ can refer to a large set of separate sub-areas, composed of a diverse
set of ideas, theories, and approaches that continue to become more sophisticated and
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specialized. In their Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership, for instance, editors
R.A.W Rhodes and Paul ‘t Hart (2014) identify eleven distinct ‘traditions and disciplines’
in addition to ten ‘analytical and methodological approaches’ to the concept.3 Indeed, this
disciplinary and conceptual diversity has led many, such as James MacGregor Burns
(2003, p.9) to consider leadership “a master discipline” that “illuminates some of the
toughest problems of human needs and social change.”
An immense degree of effort has been put into developing generalizable
frameworks and typologies to understand the way leadership works, including leadership
styles and their fit in certain institutional and social contexts (Stogdill and Coons 1957;
Mann 1964; Fiedler 1976; Burns 1978; Lord, Fati, and De Vader 1984; Bass 1985; Hogg
2001; Denison, Hooijberg and Quinn 1995; Bono and Judge 2004; see also Hernandez et
al. 2011 for a review). A similar emphasis has been directed to followers, engaging with
the ways they come to support and interact with particular individual leaders (Shamir
2007; Fairhurst and Uhl-Bien 2012; DeRue and Ashford 2010; see also Uhl-Bien et al.
2014 for a review).4
The same can be said about the broader dynamics of specific political contexts.
The American Presidency, for instance, has been extensively studied, producing a welldeveloped understanding of the opportunities and constraints of the office, in addition to
a systemic understanding of the way its office holders have used that role to impact
political outcomes (Neustadt 1960; Barber 1972; Skowronek 1993; Greenstein 2009).

The “traditions and disciplines” consist of Western Political Thought, Theory of Democratic Leadership,
Confucianism, Feminism, Political Science, Public Administration, Political Psychology, Psychoanalytic
Theories, Social Psychology, Rational Choice, and Anthropology. The “analytical and methodological
approaches” consist of Institutional Analysis, Contextual Analysis, Decision Analysis, SocialConstructionist Analysis, Rhetorical and Performative Analysis, Experimental Analysis, Observational
Analysis, At-A-Distance Analysis, Biographical Analysis, Personality Profiling Analysis.
3

4

It can also be said that leadership has been, to some extent, incorporated into most topics that concern
political scientists. In particular, this includes the role leadership plays in the direction of developing states
(Linz and Stephan 1978; O’Brien 2010; Rotberg 2012), moments of crisis (Boin et al 2005; Lebow 1981;
de Clercy and Ferguson 2016), international cooperation (Young 1991) ethnic conflict (Read and Shapiro
2004), electoral outcomes (Garzia 2013; Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt 2011), and the success of certain policies
over others (Byman and Pollack 2001).
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Although less developed, the same could be said of Prime Ministers in Westminster
systems, particularly the United Kingdom and Australia (Walter and Strangio 2007;
Weller 1985; Bennister 2012; Strangio, ‘t Hart, and Walter 2013).
But what is meant by “leadership” in these studies? It is important that at the
current state of our discussion we develop a more precise of understanding of what is
meant by leadership in this broader literature. That, before analyzing the role in plays
within the Canadian political context, one needs to know what it is they are looking for.
There continues to be little consensus on what precisely leadership is as a measurable
concept – Rost’s (1991, p.7) study found as many as 221 definitions in the literature.
Political leadership, at first glance, appears to be synonymous with the positions of power
individuals occupy within institutional structures. First ministers are “leaders” of their
given political context by the fact that they have been elected to fill an office with formallegal powers that allow them to influence the direction their respective governments take.
This, therefore, expresses one major conceptualization of leadership: the idea that it is a
capacity or possession of a “special sense of power” (Burns 1978, p. 8) to direct the
actions of other people or the activities of a broader organization (Stogdill 1953; Bass
1985; Lord and Maher 1991). It is in this way that Blondel (1987, p.3) defines leadership
as “the power exercised by one or a few individuals to direct members of the nation
towards action” and to, as put by McFarland (1969, p.10), make “things happen that
would not otherwise happen.”
But this overlooks the fact that leadership is not synonymous with formal position
or status. It may be the case that the “official” leader of a given context is in fact
ineffectual and irrelevant, as suggested by Gardner’s (1990) observation that “We have
all occasionally encountered top persons who couldn’t lead a squad of seven-year olds to
the ice cream counter.” Real, impactful power could instead come from elsewhere,
whether from an official ‘subordinate’ or someone outside of the formal-legal structure
entirely.5 The “power behind the throne”, for instance, is a common concept, and strong

5

This can be approached in a broader theoretical way, in the sense that officeholders take direction from
broader, more nefarious interests – an example could include the Marxist elite theories of Gramsci.
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personalities can continue to dominate their coalitions after leaving political office.6 For
this reason, several leadership scholars – particularly those in the field or organization
studies – have attempted to make a distinction between ‘leaders’ and ‘managers’, the
latter of which simply perform routine and administrative roles (Zaleznik 1992).7
Instead, it is necessary to include the fact that leadership is also comprised of a
sense of social legitimacy. This is evident in the fact that, while formal-legal authority
and resources are useful to influence outcomes, there are figures who command authority
from what seems to be sheer personality and the voluntary submission of followers.
These are what Tucker (1981) labels as ‘non-constituted’ leaders, who unlike
‘constituted’ leaders do not derive their power from institutional structures, but instead
from a more abstract sense of social and moral rightfulness. Leaders, in these cases, are
endowed with the authority to direct the behavior of some sort of worthwhile cause,
whether this means social justice (Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr.) or the
wellbeing of a given community or nation. In many cases, these figures can use their
preexisting sense of leadership to gain formal-legal authority by mobilizing successful
governing coalitions.8

Alternatively, it can include generalizable concepts, such as ‘political machines’ like New York’s
Tammany Hall. Or one can look at specific examples: Deng Xiaoping’s informal position as the
‘paramount’ leader of China or Cardinal Richelieu’s relationship to Louis XIII. The contemporary US is
particularly perceptive to the influence of Presidential advisors such as Edward M. House, Henry Kissinger,
Karl Rove, Dick Cheney, and Steve Bannon
6

Several executive leaders, although restricted by term limits, could still posses the power necessary to
direct the actions taken by their successors. This could apply to Vladimir Putin’s relationship to Dmitry
Medvedev, or the informal control of former charismatic American governors, such as Huey Long’s control
of the Louisiana government from the Senate or Alabama Governor George Wallace’s decision to have his
wife run as a surrogate candidate when faced with term limits.
7

Joseph Nye, for instance, (2008, p.30) suggests that leadership acts as something that could be gained or
utilized, but not guaranteed, from these positions: it “is like having a fishing license, it does not guarantee
you will catch any fish”. This is evident through comparisons of the different ways US Presidents
interpreted their roles, such as Calvin Coolidge’s voluntary aloofness from domestic policy (Shlaes 2013)
compared to Franklin Roosevelt’s work to push an aggressive policy agenda through Congress (Alter
2006).
See, for instance, the case of Nelson Mandela’s dramatic rise from prisoner to President, the electrician
Lech Walesa’s emergence as the leader of the Solidarity movement in Poland, or even Adolf Hitler’s
gradual accumulation of power.
8
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In evaluating leaders who successfully gain formal-legal positions of authority, it
is difficult to determine the moment a “non-constituted leader” becomes a “constituted
one”. All aspiring executives must in some way be the former. That is, they must
establish themselves as leaders or authorities to justify their endowment with institutional
power, including among their own political organizations (in nomination and leadershipselection races) and the broader public in general elections. This, similarly, must also be
maintained overtime. It is common for leaders to be removed, whether by party revolt or
electoral defeat, when they lose this sense of legitimacy.9
Leadership, then, is primarily sourced from the fact that the individual who is the
leader is seen as having a “particular right” (Janda 1960, p.355) to prescribe behavior
patterns that they can expect others to voluntarily follow. In other words, leadership is
primarily a matter of the legitimacy that certain individuals have over others to direct
their actions. This includes, but does not exclusively contain, the legality accorded to
formal-legal institutions – leaders must also have a source of legitimacy as individuals.
This was an insight initially made by Max Weber (1968) through his concept of
herrschaft (‘authority’) as the component of leadership that distinguishes it from pure
power-wielding. Here, the latter is characterized by the assumption that their commands
will be followed by a “certain minimum of voluntary submission.” To Weber (1968, p.8),
this is formed and constituted through the notion of ‘charisma”, defined as the “quality of
an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or
qualities.” In this way, an individual becomes a leader by virtue of an individual
characteristic that sets them apart from others, thereby legitimizing their ability to
exercise authority over them. Nevertheless, it is also necessary that the individual
distinctiveness is also recognized by and endowed upon that individual by followers on
account of them meeting some sort of need. Exactly where the two meet is unclear, and

9

This could include figures like Kevin Rudd and Margaret Thatcher who were deposed by their own
parliamentary caucus. Alternatively, it is also possible for leaders, despite being able to remain in office,
are unable to render the support necessary to do anything meaningful. Out-going Presidents, as previously
mentioned, are the best example of this.
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work on Weber’s intention remains complex and contested.10 He also gives no real
precise answer in the way of a causal mechanism to account for why particular
individuals over others are specifically seen as charismatic. Nevertheless, it does serve a
useful conceptual starting point by which the source of individual authority can be
understood.
It is also on the basis of this insight that we can identity a second component of
leadership: in that it is the process in which the leader takes a sense of initiative or
creative control over outcomes, in that they are in the position to clarify, communicate,
and “provide solutions to common problems or offering ideas about how to accomplish
collective purposes and mobilizing the energies of others to follow these courses of
action” (Keohane 2010, p.23; Burns 1978; Gardner 1995; Tucker 1995; Nye 2008).
Different scholars conceptualize the exact details of this process differently, but four
broad functions can be identified. First, leaders provide a necessary framework or sensemaking function to a context. This can include identifying the ongoing needs of a given
group, envisioning a set of goals or direction they ought to follow, or potentially
clarifying a specific problem the group faces at the time – including answering the
question of what is causing it and the way things should instead be. Second, leaders
provide solutions, whether understood as the best way to meet a given need, satisfy a
goal, or solve a problem.
The remainder of leadership involves the process of implementing the course they
have set forward. This includes, third, “formulating a plan of action” (Tucker 1981) to
accomplish that goal. This could involve planning significant public movements and
demonstrations, the decision to pursue a specific political office, or support of a certain
piece of legislation. Finally, leaders execute, mobilizing the resources at their disposal to
achieve their goals or solutions. This is, for effective and impactful leadership, essential.
This is because, while capable of communicating moving visions that can get them

10

Given his influence, Weber appears in practically every major work that attempts to conceptualize
leadership. But for focused, extended discussions of Weber see Eisenstadt 1968; Reicher, Haslam, and
Hopkins 2005.
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elected, several executives struggle to implement their broad goals in power, given either
institutional resistance or the fact that they have not been translated into concrete,
practical steps.
As suggested by Gardner (1990, p.15), this process is always done by the “process
of persuasion or example.” Leaders, in executing these functions, must always, first,
successfully communicate that their given program is the right and legitimate option and,
second, maintain their position as the individual with the legitimate authority to make
these pronouncements. Followers must be satisfied, knowing that their needs are being
met or at the very least pursued; other actors must be coopted into plans of action; and
potential challengers and other opponents must be managed. Leaders, in the words of
Schumpeter (1942, p.265), are subject to “the necessity of acting with some people, of
getting along with others, of neutralizing still others and of secluding the rest.”
This function, and its source in social legitimacy, is a useful component of
Canadian political science because – as argued by leadership analysts - leaders provide a
unique, independent, and influential causal variable that impacts outcomes; that, in
understanding why certain outcomes occur over others, researchers have to account,
alongside much broader social, economic, and political forces, for the specific actions
taken by particular sources of authority within a given institutional structure
predominately, but not exclusively, including the place of specific individual
personalities and leadership styles (Caryle 1993; Weber 1968; Hook 1945; Burns, 1978,
2003; Greenstein 1971; Tucker 1995). Thus, in the study of American Presidency for
example, this includes Neustadt’s (1960) argument that political outcomes are contingent
on the individual President’s ability to win over the support of other political actors,
whether through political skills – Eisenhower’s ‘hidden-handed’ diplomacy, Lyndon
Johnson’s legislative prowess – or by projecting public support, such as in the case of
Franklin Roosevelt’s, John F. Kennedy’s and Ronald Reagan’s communication skills.
This, to Barber, also includes their individual emotional and psychological wellbeing,
particularly impacting the effectiveness of Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, and Donald
Trump (Woodward 2018).
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In other words, leadership analysis contrasts with other broad theoretical
frameworks in that it takes a controversial stance on the nature of human agency,
suggesting that the particularities of individual style, personality, ability, and action have
an independent impact not directly attributable to broader, more objective, forces whether
social, economic, cultural, or physical. Leadership analysis, therefore, draws a line in the
sand against semi-determinist approaches that continue to maintain influence in the social
sciences, whether that means the dialectical materialism of Marxism, the objectivity of
rational choice, or the rigid structure of institutionalism. It suggests that leadership does
in fact ‘matter’ and ought to be studied alongside these other variables.
However, the particulars of this causal claim – that leaders are not tightly bound
by their circumstances and can singlehandedly effect change - are weighty and complex,
entailing that they continue to be debated within the literature to an extent that is beyond
the scope of this thesis to discuss fully (Masciulli, Mikhail, and Knight 2009). Whereas
traditional leadership theories, as most famously asserted by Carlyle’s (1993) Great Man
Theory, suggested that individual leaders were fully independent causal forces, the
contemporary literature operates on a loose ‘interactionalist’ consensus which suggests
that the dynamic of leadership resides in the way that individual leaders interact with
broader contextual and institutional forces to produce political outcomes (Fiedler 1976;
Rejai and Philips 1983, 1998; Bass and Bass 2008). Leadership, then, must be understood
within a set of constrains and opportunities that, to some extent, condition their actions.
This could include the constraints of the political institutions themselves, whether formallegal or more so pertaining to conventions and norms (Helms 2005; Rhodes et al. 2009;
Bennister 2012); it could mean the contextual condition the leader is forced to govern in,
such as administrative resources, the state of the economy, moments of crisis, and
governing paradigms (‘t Hart 2014; Boin et al. 2005; Skowronek 1993); or it could refer
to the interdependent web of actors a leader must maneuver: followers, citizens, political
elites, interest groups, and outside actors (Keohane 2010; Bass and Riggio 2006;
Dowding and McLeay 2011; Strangio, ‘t Hart, and Walter 2013).
Thus, in approaching the question of to what extent leadership determines events
or is determined by events, the leadership literature suggests the answer lies somewhere
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in the middle. That, while there exist broader processes and contextual conditions at play,
leaders can shape the particularities of the way they develop (Bass 1985). Nevertheless,
some analysists hold on to the claim that given a historical openness and a particular set
of attributes – “outstanding capacities of intelligence, will, and character” as once put by
Hooke (1945, p.8) – leaders can produce a unique historical influence independent of the
broader conditions that determined the preexisting developmental path. Leadership,
therefore, is relevant to the extent that it reflects a relative contingency to political
outcomes; that while broader social, economic, and institutional forces may entail a likely
or predictable scenario leadership can, to varying degrees, shape the specific outcome in
reality. Here, political leadership scholars emphasize the way political processes are often
marked by openness, ambiguousness, and novelty, entailing that there are no selfevidently ‘correct’ courses of action (Greenstein 1971; Gains 2014; Burns 2003). Leaders
are impactful because they are – by definition - the ones in a unique and powerful
position to make an impact; to formulate, articulate, and implement a specific course of
action moving forward.
Nevertheless, in pursuing this function, leaders are necessarily dependent on the
initiative and wellbeing of others, particularly followers. They must first be – in a
competitive environment of ideas and aspiring authorities – in some sense ‘selected’ by
the broader public as the individual to whom the broader group will listen to. This
complex dynamic in which leaders are just as dependent on followers as they are on them
is commonly referred to the ‘Burns paradox’ (Burns 1978), and points to a compelling
conceptual and empirical question: how are specific individuals selected to be leaders?
Why are some leaders more successful in gaining and maintaining this support more than
others? The answer to this question is important and impactful, suggesting that there is a
relatively systematic and predictable way specific individuals become, and can act as,
leaders. The literature offers a diverse set of approaches and theories to this question, all
of which will be comprehensively discussed in turn. This literature review, however, will
now review the state of political leadership research in Canada, identifying an important
gap in collective understanding.
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2.2 Political Leadership in Canadian Political Science
Within Canadian political science, leadership retains an important but undeveloped
status. Scholars have long recognized the fact that leaders occupy a prominent place in
Canadian political institutions, thereby producing an extensive literature on the role of the
prime minister in government institutions (Hockin 1971; Savoie 1999; Bakvis 2001;
White 2005), the nature of leadership conventions (Courtney 1995; LeDuc 2001; Cross
and Blais 2012; Pilet and Cross 2014), the influence leaders have over their parties
(Clokie 1945; Perlin 1980; Courtney 1995), and the importance of leaders in determining
election outcomes (Siegfried 1907; Bittner 2011, 2018; Aarts et al. 2011). Normatively,
scholars have long been preoccupied with the question of whether the Prime Minister of
Canada is a ‘friendly dictator’ who possesses too much power in federal governance
(Simpson 2001; Savoie 1999).
The broader institutional parameters of first ministerial leadership in Canada are
well understood. Granatstein and Hillmer (1999), for instance, find that a prime
minister’s ‘effectiveness’ is contingent on a coherent national vision, adaptability, and the
proper management of other actors, including their cabinet, caucus, and party. Overall, a
loose consensus argues that given Canada’s regional diversity and tensions, the federal
practice of brokerage politics “creates a vacuum that leadership might fill” (Johnston
2002, p.159) to determine a necessary vison, program, or agenda to an administration
(Clarke et al. 1991; Johnston 2002; Carty 2015). Here, “realities created a need for the
leader as broker rather than as visionary or hero” (Mancuso, Price and Wasaberg 1994,
p.10), entailing that Prime Ministers are evaluated on the basis of their ability to reduce
conflict and maintain national unity (Azzi and Hillmer 2013). Several scholars have also
noted the increasing ‘personalization’ of politics and the importance on the leader’s own
personal ‘brand’ in justifying government policy (Karvonen 2010; Marland 2016;
Lalancette and Raynauld 2019).
This also applies to the literature on the provinces, which often involve
applications of inferences made at the federal level to their context. Provincial premiers
are just as, if not more, powerful as their federal counterparts, and there is a modest
amount of work that looks at the same role provincial leaders play in the policy-making
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and electoral process (Bernier et al. 2005, Stewart and Archer 2000; Stewart and Stewart
2007; Dyck 1995; Dunn 2016; White 2005; Lewis 2012; Thomas and Lewis 2019).
Although less developed, the same type of inferences have been made into the broader
‘playbooks’ of effective provincial leadership – including Atlantic Canada’s emphasis on
traditionalism and patronage (Stewart and Stewart 2007; Diepeeven 2018); Quebec’s
national self-determination (McRoberts 1988); Ontario and Manitoba’s expectation of
competent, pragmatic governance (Collier and Malloy 2017; Wesley 2011),
Saskatchewan’s communitarianism (Leeson 2001); Alberta’s populism (Tupper and
Gibbins 1992); and British Colombia’s ideological contestation (Carty 1996).
This work, however, remains relatively limited to more objective formal-legal
structures and processes. Political leadership, understood as the contingent nature and
impact of particular “persons who, by virtue of occupying a particular public position,
engage in activities that attract the support of citizens who permit them to make decisions
on their behalf” (Mancuso, Price, and Wasaberg 1994, p.6) remains underdeveloped, as
“Canadian scholars have tended to avoid the subject” (Pal and Taras 1988). This is
especially the case for the provinces, as the discipline’s understanding of leadership at
this level suffers from the additional problem of a general neglect of provincial topics in
general. While the constitutional debates of the 1970s and 1980s ensured a “high tide”
(Wesley 2015) of research on the provinces, this had largely petered out by the mid1990s. The provinces were perceived as either parallel to the federal level or too
parochial entailing that, by the time of Dunn’s (2001, p.441) critique, “the literature in
some areas is now so dated that any generalizations are becoming dangerous.” However,
in recent years, this has changed. Scholars not only recognize that provinces have become
increasingly relevant political actors, but that their relative formal-legal similarity
presents an opportunity for “laboratories of comparative analysis” (Wesley 2015).
There are some Canadian political leaders, both federally and provincially, that
are exceptions to this general rule. William Lyon Mackenzie King, regarded as the
paragon of the brokerage model, is one of the most well-studied figures in Canadian
history (Courtney 1976; Whitaker 1978; Henderson 1998). Canadians in some ways
continue to be enamored with the leadership of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, leading to work on
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the charismatic appeal of ‘Trudeaumania” (Litt 2018; Wright 2016) and his own
individual impact on Canada’s development, particularly in terms of its constitution
(English 2009; Smiley 1987; Laforest 1995). John Diefenbaker’s tenure has been studied
as a case study of the failure to properly manage cabinet and caucus (Newman 1989).
Interest in Mulroney has grown in recent years, much of which draws attention to the
direct impact of his specific personality and leadership style (Malloy 2010; Blake 2007;
Hampson 2018). Stephen Harper’s strict control of government policy and
communications has also been well-noted, in addition to his early attempts to implement
an agenda of institutional reform (Jeffrey 2015).
Provincially, this includes Joey Smallwood’s – ‘the last Father of Confederation’ personal role in Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation, followed by his semiauthoritarian leadership as Premier (Marland and Kirby 2016). National preoccupation
with Quebec’s place in Confederation has led to interest in Rene Levesque’s leadership
over the sovereigntist movement (Fraser 1984). In the West, significant attention has
historically been given to the leadership of the third-party movements that took power
(Laycock 1990; Kendle 1979; Rolph 1950; Irving 1959); of these, Tommy Douglas is
given considerable credit for Canada’s publicly funded healthcare system (Marchildon
2016; Johnson 2004). Several premiers heavily involved in the ‘mega constitutional
politics’ of the 1980s and 1990s – Peter Lougheed, Bill Davis, Clyde Wells among others
– feature significantly in analyses of the period (Russell 2004; Wood 1985).
Nevertheless, this work – especially when compared to cases like the US
Presidency – remains predominantly empirical, narrow, and erratic, lacking sustained and
systematic analysis of political leadership itself as a unique and important causal force.
Only a small subset of research in Canadian political science utilizes and attempts to
apply the broader political leadership literature developed elsewhere (Courtney 1976;
Brown et al. 1988; de Clercy 2005; Harasymiw 2014; Malloy 2010; Broschek 2018; Azzi
and Hilmer 2013; Mancuso, Price, and Wasaberg 1994; Pal and Taras 1988). In effect,
this means that while a significant amount of inferences have been made about political
leadership in Canada, they often surmount to vague stereotypes. It is true, for instance, to
note that individuals can become successful leaders if they are ‘accommodative’
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(Granatstein and Hilmer 1991) – but this alone does not tell the political scientist much.
What makes a leader accommodative, or how are they perceived to be so? How do
leaders utilize this trait or perception to gain positions of power and influence political
outcomes? There, in effect, needs to be more precise and measurable causal mechanisms
to link these processes together.
The absence of this type of research can be attributed to the discipline’s general
methodological deemphasis of leadership; that while Canadian political leaders “may act
out important dramas” within institutions or policy-developing processes, “they are not
seen as setting the stage or even inventing the major themes in the plot” (Pal and Taras
1988, p.7). Canadian political science continues to emphasize broader economic,
institutional, and social processes as determining political outcomes, skewing most
analyses towards the direction that the same factors condition leadership (Cairns 1977;
Pal and Taras 1988). That, to put it more precisely, the outputs of leadership, whether in
terms of style or policy outcomes, are – with broader forces considered – inevitable and
in some sense predetermined. This renders the study of specific leaders – their style, their
policy preferences, the basis of their support – idiosyncratic at best, and far from key to
understanding the causal relationships that characterize Canadian political life.
The highly influential school of political economy, for instance, suggests that
political outcomes are the product of the incentives and power relations within Canada’s
export commodity economy (Innis 1930; Watkins 1963; Richards and Pratt 1979; Laxer
1989). Political authority is predominately the purview of economic elites, who will
direct political outcomes that line up with their own interests. For the Canadian context,
this generally meant the continual expansion of resource extraction, developing a ‘semicolonial’ dynamic between the central Canadian ‘core’ (where manufacturing, capital,
and profits accumulate) and its ‘peripheries’ (the areas that work to extract resources) that
continues to characterize tensions within Canadian federalism (Innis 1930; Laxer 1989).
Leadership analysis has also been deemphasized by a historic preoccupation with
the place of institutions in Canadian political life (Smith 2005). Here, an assortment of
approaches shares the assumption that institutions, however conceived, are independent
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variables that – through a set of constraints and opportunities – shape the actions taken by
political actors. This includes foundational and ongoing work on the consequences of the
formal-legal institutions themselves, whether parliamentary government, federalism, the
electoral system, or the constitution (Mallory 1971; Cairns 1977; Simeon 1990; Savoie
1999; Manfredi 2001; Rocher 2019). Alternatively, a more contemporary foursome of
‘new institutionalisms” provides an alternative set of conditions. Rational-choice
institutionalism suggests that political outcomes are based on the way institutions
structure the strategy of utility-maximizing actors. To this, historical institutionalism adds
a temporal dimension: theorizing that political actors follow the direction of long-term
path dependencies. For both, political leaders tend to factor in only as a component of the
case being studied; their behavior a product of these broader processes (Flannagan 1998;
Godbout and Hoyland 2011; Broschek 2012).
As the third framework, sociological institutionalism points to the power of
abstract cultural institutions, arguing that actors act according to ‘logics of social
appropriateness’ that enforce accepted norms, values, expectations, and the roles that are
prescribed to individuals (Basta 2020). Finally, discursive institutionalism emphasizes the
way political outcomes are shaped by the accepted conventions of communicative
discourse (Schmidt 2008; Alcantara 2013).
For these more recent institutionalisms, analysis of political leadership tends to
coalesce around the broad rubric of political culture (Elkins and Simeon 1979; Stewart
2002; Wiseman 2007; Wesley 2011). The concept, while incredibly contested (Cochrane
and Perrela 2012), loosely refers to the common assumptions, attitudes, values, and
norms of a political society forming the political views of its members, affecting the
components of its institutions, and determining its general style of politics. For Canadian
researchers, the central use of the approach lies in its claim that each of the provinces (or
‘regions’) form their own separate ‘cultures’ that uniquely impact the way political actors
behave.
These political cultures are historical constructs, shaped by an interrelated set of
factors such as a shared history, socio-demographic factors, economic conditions, and the
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constraint provided by formal-legal institutions. Yet, at some point their frameworks
coalesced: acting not as responses made by actors to events but constituting a broader
milieu – “something like the air we breathe” (Wiseman 2007, p.13) – that shapes and
conditions the a priori political understanding of the individuals that belong to it. For
leadership, this is relevant in so far as it structures public understandings, informing
expectations for the way leaders are supposed to act. Wesley (2011), for instance, argues
that provincial political cultures form a discursive “code” that leaders must evoke to be
successful.
More than the other approaches considered, political culture provides an unclear
place for political leadership. If, on the one hand, we consider political culture to be
transmitted through a broader entrenched, socialization process, leadership provides little
independent impact once we consider the way that the individual leaders themselves are
products of this same process. Yet, alternatively, political culture could be conceived as
something contingent. Wesley (2011, p.12), for instance, suggests that election
campaigns can be treated as “rituals that offer dominant political actors the opportunity to
renew their communities’ core values every four years” in that aspiring leaders draw
upon conventional concepts to legitimize their authority and bolster support. This view
puts more of an emphasis on leadership, especially given how broad these cultural codes
are and the way specific leaders have interpreted them differently. This is further
recognized by Wiseman (1988, p.178), who notes that while “to be successful, political
parties must advantageously lever the distinctive symbols and characteristic vocabularies
of their province” they still have direction in the way they decide to “affirm their
autonomy, assert their authority, and embed their status in the minds of the populace.” If
anything, this suggests that political culture acts as one of the contextual variables with
which leaders must necessarily interact.
But, to Wesley’s (2011) own admittance, this does not get to the central
mechanism of leadership. It provides little insight to the question of why (given that all
aspiring individuals draw upon these codes) individual leaders can gain the popularity
necessary to gain and maintain the legitimate authority necessary to exercise leadership.
What emerges from this review, then, is a clear gap in the literature: there exists little
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systematic knowledge of the way specific Canadian leaders manage to gain and maintain
their legitimate authority, in addition to the way it is utilized to affect political outcomes.

2.3 How Do Canadian Political Leaders Gain Authority?
How then do we work to overcome this lack of understanding? A proper understanding of
Canadian political leadership requires grounding in precise and measurable analytical
frameworks. For this, the leadership literature offers a diverse set of approaches that here
will be categorized within three groups – attributional accounts, transactional accounts,
and contextual accounts. These constitute different ways to conceive of the causal
relationship, emphasizing certain causal variables over others and proposing different
hypotheses. They also each aspire for near universal application, rendering that – given
the fact that many of have been developed elsewhere – the following section finds it
necessary to review each framework broadly in addition to analyzing its fit to the
Canadian context in particular. In the next sections I review the three groups of
approaches toward illustrating how they can be used to inform research on how Canadian
leaders gain authority.

2.3.1

Attributional Accounts

Attributional accounts, in analyzing and attempting to explain outcomes pertaining to
leadership, suggest that results are contingent on the characteristics of the individual
themselves. They assume that the leader as a political actor is in some sense unique,
possessing a set of attributes or characteristics that make them more likely to gain
positions of authority over others - the sense of a ‘special something’ that sets them apart
in their ability to influence and direct. Put more precisely for our purposes, it
hypothesizes that if an individual possesses a set of characteristics or attributes conducive
to effective leadership, they are then more likely to gain positions of first ministerial
authority.
This is the original approach to leadership, tracing back to the earliest accounts
(Plato 1991). But it was from the 1940s onward that scientific effort was made on the part
of researchers to understand what that ‘special something’ was. The personalities,
motives, and capacities of leaders were thereby extracted and measured; generalizable
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inferences and statements were sought after, pertaining to what sort of people became
leaders, how they operated, and what made them successfully influence outcomes
(Stogdill 1948; Jenkins 1947; Kahn and Katz 1953; Stogdill and Coons 1957; Mann
1959).
Another strand of research engaged in psychoanalytical attempts to develop
generations pertaining to the personality psychology of leaders, based on Harold
Laswell’s (1962, p.38) assertion that there was a clear “political personality or type.” This
body of work operated backwards and speculatively: observing semi-regular behavioral
patterns, determining an explanation for that behavior, and attempting to find its
psychological source in that person’s experience (Greenstein 1971), entailing that
childhood socialization and development provided key explanatory value in
understanding who become leaders. Overall, the pattern that emerges are broken homes,
particularly in the individual’s relationship with their parents. Several prominent leaders
have been noted to have lost at least one of their parents at an early age (Csikszatmihalyi
1993; Simonton 1994). Alternatively, future leaders could express devotion to one
(typically overprotective) parent, whilst abhorring the other – whether through the
product of abuse, a domineering attitude, personal rejection, or estrangement (Ochse
1990).
This, as a result, produced the necessary set of psychological concepts, tendencies
and self-understandings that made individuals more likely to be leaders, such as the need
to compensate for childhood trauma, to demonstrate one’s worth, to be accepted, or the
need to dominate (Berrington 1974). Thus, in George and George’s (1964) influential
analysis of Woodrow Wilson, for instance, it is suggested that his relationship to his
father – a demanding yet emotional distant authority figure – accounts for Wilson’s
ambition to achieve ‘great deeds in comparison” as a political leader, in addition to his
inflexibility in accomplishing those ends. Similarly, to use a Canadian example, Esberey
(1980) suggests that William Lyon Mackenzie King’s early childhood, particularly the
death of his doting mother, explains both his need for spiritualism and heroic social
leadership. Much of this work takes on a negative tone, equally concerned with the way
such psychological factors can lead to destructive leadership. Thus, many leaders of
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destructive political movements have been diagnosed with a range of clinical disorders
(Bion 1961; Waite 1977; Halperin 1983).
Psychobiological research of leaders, however, has been dealt considerable
criticism in that it relies on a set of untestable and unfalsifiable precepts, arrived at by
speculation. Overall, its reliance on a vague set of psychoanalytical concepts means that
any number of psychological conditions and causal mechanisms can be extrapolated from
an individual’s life. Recently, attempts have been made to ground psychological
inferences in genetic factors, but this has had difficulty finding generalizations of the
individuals that are more likely to become political leaders (Arvey et al. 2006).
Trait theory also met little success. In his review of the trait literature, Stogdill
(1948) was able to conclude that five general traits – capacity (intelligence, awareness),
achievement, responsibility (dependability, initiative), participation (activity, sociability)
and status (socio-economic status, popularity) – are is some way linked to leadership.
However, in terms of predicting the individuals that became leaders, these proved to be
quite limited. There was no clear magic bullet, no clear ‘special something’ that leaders
had that others did not: “no single trait of group of characteristics has been isolated which
sets off the leader from the member of his group” (Jenkins 1947, p.74). “Leadership” said
Stogdill (1948), “is not a matter of passive status, or the mere possession of some
combination of traits.”
Instead, it became clear that these traits were largely contingent on broader
contextual factors or, more precisely, the way they interacted within a given setting.
Popular leaders in one scenario can be rejected in others, pointing to the need to consider
the way the attributes of given individuals ‘fit’ into the circumstance they seek to
command authority over.11 This, therefore, lead to a set of ‘contingency approaches’ that
suggested leaders and their contexts must necessarily line up to some extent, including

Winston Churchill’s loss in the 1945 UK Election is perhaps the most-famous example of this
phenomenon. Generally, it is explained through the British electorate’s perception that Churchill – a brash,
intemperate, and stubborn personality – was not as well suited to the needs of post-war Britain as he was to
wartime.
11
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the specific needs, interests, and ideas of followers (see Fiedler and House 1994). This, in
many cases, effectively flipped the nature of the causal relationship: suggesting that
contexts determine the sort of individuals that become leaders. Here, those who gain
positions of authority do so because of “situational favorableness” (Fiedler 1964); in
effect, being the right person at the right time.
Acknowledging the importance of contextual factors, however, doesn’t
necessarily entail the fact that the Canadian leader themselves cannot still be considered
the main causal variable of the dynamic. Attributive theory responded with the ‘neo-trait
approach’ (Kirkpatrick and Locke 1991; Bono and Judge 2004; Judge et al. 2002)
arguing that individual attributes comprise necessary ‘preconditions’ to successful
leadership, given their link to important mechanisms that make them both more effective
and appealing to potential followers. Work drawing on the Big Five personality traits, for
instance, argues that conscientiousness, extraversion, openness, and emotional stability
are associated with leadership (Bass 2008; Hollander 1985; Judge et al. 2002). Some
findings of this approach present something of a physical determinism, in the fact that
one’s attractiveness (Eagly et al. 1991; Senior 2018) and height (Nye 2010) correlate with
leadership. Other findings, however, suggest that the individuals who genuinely want to
be leaders will become leaders, indicating that one’s ‘powerful tendency’ (Heymann
2008, p.141), understood as an innate need for dominance, combined with assertiveness,
confidence, and ambition is necessary to attain positions of authority and devoted
followings (House 1977; Conger and Kanungo 1987; Blais and Pruysers 2017; Allen and
Cutts 2018). Some scholars also suggest that a willingness to engage in Machiavellianism
– understood as putting ends above means – to also be useful (Deluga 2001; Bailey
1988).
Nevertheless, there is an assumption here that one must possess a set of objective,
fixed, and measurable traits in order to be truly effective. This includes, first, an innate
degree of mental wellness and stability. While leaders need to have a strong need for
power, they require an internal capacity for restraint (Franson, Haslam, Steffens and
Boen 2020; McClelland and Burnham 2000). Additionally, leaders can be explained on
the basis of their contextual intelligence. They must, in other words, both understand
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what is required of them in a given situation and be capable of taking advantage of trends
to accomplish their given goals for political outcomes (Mayo and Nohria 2005: Kingdon
2003). As a result, one’s personal willingness to be flexible and adapt to what the
situation requires is a predictor of leadership (de Hoogh et al. 2004; Oreg and Berson
2015; Phaneuf et al. 2016; Denison, Hooijberg and Quinn 1995). The vast majority of
this work, however, has emphasized the importance of emotional intelligence or, more
precisely, the individual’s ability to know and meet their follower’s set of needs
(Goleman 1998; Salovy and Slukyir 1997; Prati et al. 2003; Greenstein 2009; Antonakis
2003). This therefore continues to produce a growing set of typologies directed to
understanding how particular needs are met by receptive leaders, including Distributed
leadership (Spillane 2005), Respectful leadership (Van Quaquebeke and Eckloff 2010),
and Inclusive leadership (Hollander 2008). A final, most recent, strand of the attributive
approach emphasizes the innate moral and ethical standing of individuals as the source of
their legitimacy in making authoritative pronouncements (Messick and Bazerman 1996;
Brown, Trevino, and Harrison 2005; Kane 2001).
But these approaches do not solve the central problem: that “while studies might
find a certain trait to be significant, there always seemed to be considerable evidence that
failed to confirm that trait’s importance” (Bryman 1996, p. 45). There are, in effect,
exceptions to every rule. These given capacities may entail different mechanisms in
different contexts, to the point that a useful trait in one situation could be detrimental in
another. Agreeableness (McClelland and Burnham 2000) for instance, may be useful in
situations that involve a diverse set of interests and norms that provide significant de
facto influence of subordinates. This seems to be expressed through the brokerage model
that Canadian political leaders are said to have to work through. However, in situations of
crisis – particularly involving violence or conflict – such a trait could be detrimental, due
to the fact that it interferes with both the leaders decisiveness in pushing a path forward
(despite contrary viewpoints within a government caucus) and effectively fighting sworn
enemies. It would not be true to suggest that leaders like Rene Levesque and Pierre Elliot
Trudeau attained their positions of authority because they were the most agreeable of
their peers. Such points to the reality that too much of any trait may in fact be a bad thing
(Antonakis and Day 2018). Agreeableness can lead to a bleeding heart; clarity of vision
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can lead to stubbornness. Different combinations of traits may also ensure different
outcomes in terms of behavior, to the point that a relatively ‘positive’ trait could be
cancelled out (Kerr and Jermier 1978).
Effectively, to maintain the position of individual traits as a key causal variable,
the theorist is required to expand the definitions of these traits to the point that they are
both conceptually meaningless and empirically imprecise, distracting from focus on what
main mechanism underlies leadership success. If, for instance, it is said that leaders must
be broadly receptive to the novel needs of the followers, the researcher cannot be content
with merely concluding that individuals are successful because of this trait. Instead, it
begs the question of what these needs are and how they factor into the relationship. And,
if anything, it would appear that the needs themselves – more precisely, whether they are
met – to be far more causally consequential than the individual meeting them. Haslam et
al. (2020, p.10) add to this by identifying the potential circularity of emphasizing broad
traits. Here, in making a causal claim, it suggests that “the reason X is an effective leader
is because they have psychological characteristics that lead them to engage in effective
leadership behavior”; the main question, left unanswered, is what makes that given
characteristic objectively conducive to effective leadership.
Thus, attributive accounts, in some sense, identify a necessary condition to
successful leadership: that the aspiring leader must in some sense be ‘good’. The
problem, however, resides in the contingency of that factor: there is no one clear and
measurable ‘good’ that a leader must have a priori to any interaction with followers.
Leaders themselves also cannot be treated as an objective set of traits. They do not have
the characteristics of a static, immutable, and independent causal variable necessary for
analytical precise, measurable, and generalizable inferences (Turner, Reynolds, Haslam,
and Veenstra 2006; Fischer, Dietz, and Antonakis 2017). Leaders themselves are people:
complex, contingent personalities that can change over time and place. Supposed traits
necessary for successful leadership can grow stronger or weaker over time, and each
leader always has “some toxic chinks” (Lipman-Blumen 2005, p.6). For this reason,
attributive accounts as considered are not a useful framework for understanding political
leadership in Canada.
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Instead, it is necessary to incorporate the fact that leaders are intensely reliant on
other actors. Attributional accounts put too much emphasis on the leader as the key
power broker of the relationship, in that they assume a given individual with a necessary
set of traits will inevitably be able to be dominate others. This is at the very least
conceptually imprecise and – at worst – normatively problematic.12 Instead, any account
of leadership must take into consideration the fact that the dynamic is still, in many ways,
established on the initiative and with the on-going consent of followers or the governed.
It becomes necessary to incorporate their own reasons, justifications, and motivations for
selecting certain leaders over others. In effect, it becomes imperative to conclude that, in
some way, leadership success is contingent on the degree to which leaders ‘fit’ into a
given context, particularly the follower’s sense of who a leader ought to be and what they
ought to do. The difficulty, however, comes from having to determine precisely what this
fit is.

2.3.2

Transactional Accounts

Transactional accounts argue that leadership is the product of an interactive, mutually
beneficial process. Leaders are endowed with their legitimate authority precisely because
it is recognized by followers to be within their best interest. In this way, the strength of
that exchange can be understood as the independent variable: leadership popularity, and
by extension leadership success and influence, is contingent on the degree to which
leaders are able to provide ‘goods’ to their followers (‘t Hart and Uhr 2008). Put as a
hypothesis, it argues that if an individual effectively meets and satisfies the demands of
followers better than their challengers, then they will gain and maintain the support of
followers to express legitimate authority.
Transactional accounts theorize that leadership – understood here as the
endowment of disproportionate authority to one individual - can be effectively
conceptualized as a public good or utility. More precisely, it is seen as necessary for a

12

It only takes a few logical steps to conclude that leadership is therefore the purview of a small elite that is
set apart from the rest of the community. Followers, given their innate inferiority and natural position as the
ruled, have little ability to challenge their leaders, making the latter unaccountable and above criticism.
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given group to accomplish a set of tasks or solve a problem (Steiner 1972; Heifetz 1994).
It is in this sense that, “to understand leadership at its most basic level” Keohane (2010,
p.18) prompts one to “consider a group of individuals otherwise unconnected with each
other who want to accomplish some common purpose.” This has long been recognized as
a necessary component of political life by political theorists (Plato 1990; Hobbes 1994;
Dahl and Neubeaur 1968). In the liberal tradition to which Canada belongs, it is
emphasized that individual and collective needs – such as security and freedom but also
industry and material wealth – are only possible with the coercive authority of the
sovereign.
The need for individual initiative and authority is similarly emphasized in the
politics and public policy of modern democratic states. Michels (1911) emphasized the
‘mechanical and technical impossibility of direct government of masses” suggesting that
through an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ the direction of organizations will always fall into the
control of a small group of elites. Similarly, ‘t Hart and Uhr (2008, p.3) note that several
necessary elements of policy-making “are not performed spontaneously be a polity’s
public institutions, organizations and routines” necessitating the need for political
leadership “in order for a polity to govern itself effectively and democratically.” In
Canada, this is most emphasized within the context of federalism. Provincial Premiers are
often expected to advocate for the interests of their polity at the expense of the rest of the
country, leading to conflicts over jurisdictions. Most recently, this is placed in the context
of a growing interconnectedness between governments; that, to address the particularly
pressing policy problems of the day, leadership that crosses jurisdictional borders is
necessary
Thus, when it comes to selecting leaders in a democratic and political context,
citizens evaluate potential and contemporary leaders on the degree which they provide a
given set of goods or meet needs. To most explanatory frameworks in the political
leadership literature, this is understood in one of two ways: either from the perspective of
rational utility-maximization or some sort of psychological process. The first
predominately relies on the broader conceptual assumptions of conventional rational
choice theory (Frolich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971; Flannagan 1998). Leaders and
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followers are drawn together out of some sort of objective mutual enrichment: leaders get
benefits from office (whether understood as the power, the prestige, or the material
benefits) and followers have their needs met. Of these, the economy is an influential, and
well-studied example. Research suggests that political leaders are evaluated based on
ensuring good economic and material conditions. (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019)
Several frameworks emphasize the rationality to lie primarily in the broader
conditions of the interaction. Thus, for instance, leader-member exchange (LMX)
emphasizes an overall sense of ‘quality’ to the transaction, suggesting that challengers
who demonstrate a more beneficial interaction will be successful in replacing incumbents
(Graen and Ul-Bien 1995). Similarly, Equity theory (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid
1978) suggests that leaders lose their ability to govern once the outcomes are perceived to
be inequitable, producing a sense of tension or equilibrium that will be balanced, such as
with a new leader.
However, in applying this perspective to political leadership in Canada, there are
two central problems. First, as is the case with most rational choice theory, one needs to
define the precise set of ‘needs’ or ‘utilities’ that followers have in mind when they
assess potential leaders. Leadership scholars of this approach, particularly drawn from
broader organization studies, suggest that one look at the leaders’ role in properly
articulating, working towards, and incorporating followers into accomplishing the
organization’s overarching goal or purpose (Avolio, Kahai and Dodge 2000; Hersey and
Blanchard 1982). But this cannot be said about politics. It is, as mentioned before,
incredibly contingent, complex, and open-ended. Citizens will not only always disagree
on what sets of problems or needs ought to be prioritized, but how they ought to be
accomplished. These concepts of ‘goods’ and ‘utilities’ are also significantly elastic, to
the point in which – without a precise definition – each and every behavior can be
conceptualized as utility-maximizing (Bruins, Ng and Platow 1995). Citizens hold weak,
frequently changing opinions on given policy issues and the supposed needs that must be
meet (Stimson 2004). These problems become more paramount once we attempt to
understand these needs in the context of leadership competition: what makes one aspiring
leader more likely to be successful then their opponent? Is it their ability to better meet
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the needs of their constituents? Or is it their ability to meet the needs of more
constituents?
The second problem with this approach comes from the fact that it seems to
neglect the primary claim and nuance of leadership literature: that leaders have a unique
ability for persuasion and transformation. That rather than simply meet the needs of
followers, they have to ability to influence, direct, and ultimately change them (Hook
1945; Greenstein 1971; Tucker 1995). Hollander (1958) suggests, in a way to address this
issue, that this transformative power is to be understand as something that comes once a
leader meets needs. Here, the claim is that in meeting needs, leaders are granted
‘idiosyncrasy credits’, understood as a sort of political capital that allow them to
legitimately impose their personal impact on political outcomes. Alternatively, needsmeeting can be conceptualized as a primary communications-based mechanism. Some
frameworks, such as expectancy and path-goal theory, emphasize the rationality of the
transaction to lie in the certainty provided by leaders (Vroom 1964; House 1971; House
and Mitchell 1974). That, in seeking to gain support, leaders are successful to the extent
that they can communicate the fact that their prescribed course of action is the most
rational way to meet a given set of goals. This, therefore, on the surface seems to give the
leader incredible power to determine what the prescribed courses of action are: the key is
found in being able to persuade others that these best meet their needs. But, again, these
views do not go far enough in recognizing the fact that, when it comes to conceptualizing
a precise and measurable set of needs a leader must meet, the leader has an immense
amount of potential power in determining what those are.
Take, for instance, the ‘objective’ issue of economic growth. While it may be
broadly stated that leaders must meet some sort of condition for material or economic
wellbeing, successful leaders are able to motivate followers from their own
interpretations of what the problem precisely is and the way it should be fixed. This is
even though it may be non-rational. More problematically, these leaders beat the
alternatives, many of which – it could be argued – were in fact objectively better at
addressing the problem of economic growth. This could include each of the reform
movements that influenced governments in Western Canada during the 1930s. While
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each grappled with the same economic problem, they proposed drastically different
understandings of the central problem and its necessary fix (Laycock 1990). Of these, the
leaders of Social Credit – a economic theory demonstrated to not only be arcane but
impossible to implement by a provincial government – was able to gain and expresses
authority (Finkel 1989).
A shift towards understanding leadership as meeting psychological needs may
help to address this issue. Here, it could be noted that leadership is in fact a decidedly
irrational phenomenon, and contingent on the ability of aspiring leader to tap into much
more emotional needs or tendencies. Early advocates of this psychological approach
therefore emphasize an innate human propensity to follow, driven by innate needs for
authority, order, meaning, and structure (Hoffer 1951; Fromm 1941; Burger 2009) - what
Frank (1939, p.343) called “the security of a firm and coercive program in which they
can, by obedience and submission, find their place in life.” Fromm (1941), for instance,
argued that individual freedom can be a burden from its capacity to inspire a sense of
isolation, uncertainty, and aimlessness. There is thus always an innate human temptation
to “escape from freedom” and submit to the direction of an authority.
Leadership success, therefore, can be said to be contingent on the basis to which it
meets needs of meaning. This is evident through the framework of “spiritual leadership”
which emphasizes individual needs for calling and making a difference (Fry 2003). But
one could point to other human needs. Leaders can be successful to extent that they
provide certainty to novel and fear-inducing situations (Nisbet 1950; Cohen et al. 2004;
Popper 2001), or in their ability to address the need for social inclusion and fears of
social death (Baumeister and Tice 1991).
But this suffers from many of its own issues. It, first, is analytically imprecise: it
is unclear, given all these factors, the way a specific need can be isolated from the rest to
be the one that constitutes leader support. And, second, it seems to reach back to the
attributive accounts previously discussed; that, given their emotional and irrational needs,
followers are relatively defenseless against charismatic leaders that provide meaning. As
a result, it runs into similar problems. It tells the researcher that a sense of meaning is an
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important part of the follow-leader relationship, but it does not – on its own – tell us what
makes one appeal to meaning more compelling than another. If anything, it indicates that
meaning is a broad preexisting condition, deeply contingent on the context. Fromm’s
(1941) discussion of the ‘escape from freedom’, for instance, is in many ways a deeply
historical phenomenon - born out of the decline of religion and the social anomie of a
recently industrialized West.
Needs, therefore, constitute a status similar to the individual leader themselves:
they have to in some sense be, or at least perceived as being, met. Canadian leaders will
not be successful unless they are perceived to contributing what is “for the best” of their
community. The problem, however, comes from the fact that these are vague and broad –
anything can be construed as a need. Instead, it becomes necessary to engage with this
question of the broader ways followers perceive their leaders – what makes an individual
more so perceived to be the legitimate source of authority? The person who not only
meets needs, but the person that expresses the privilege to persuasively articulate what
those needs themselves are.

2.3.3

Contextual Accounts

As the third broad framework, contextual accounts argue that the legitimacy of individual
Canadian leaders is derived from the way an individual “fits” into the broader context. To
put it more precisely, leadership popularity is not contingent on the extent to which a
leader meets an objective need, but the subjective way a leader is perceived as good and
effective. This is done by meeting some sort of broader set of expectations, whether
psychological, cultural, or historical, that shapes – a priori – agent expectations of who
leaders ought to be. Put as a hypothesis: if an individual meets a broader criterion
(however defined), they will gain and maintain the legitimacy to direct political
outcomes.
Outside of broader structural factors, this is among the most popular ways to
account for the success of political leaders in Canada. Aspiring premiers of Ontario, for
instance, have historically been said to be successful when they are able to conform to
expectations of “adequate leadership”, particularly from maintaining an “equitable
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balance between the principal interests of the provinces” (Wilson 1975, p.233). Thus, the
leaders of the PC dynasty – particularly Leslie Frost, John Robarts, and Bill Davis – were
successful to the extent that they were able to convey competent and prudent leadership
of this kind. The Premiers of Alberta, in contrast, are believed to be successful on the
basis to which they conform to an expectation of a “selfless superhero” that fights on
behalf of the province’s essential interests, typically expressing itself in brash, populist
leaders that wage highly politicized conflicts with the Federal government (Tupper and
Gibbins 1992).
This general approach exists in the broader literature as Implicit Leadership
Theory, suggesting that citizens have pre-existing notions of what a leader ought to be,
how they ought to act, and what sort of goals they ought to pursue (Eden and Leviathan
1975; Lord, Foti, and de Vader 1984; Lord, Day, Zaccaro, Avolio, and Eagly 2017). In
this way, citizens will evaluate incumbent and aspiring leaders on the basis of their
preexisting categories or prototypes - what Schyns and Meindl (1990) label as their
“philosophies of leadership”. Thus, Lord and Maher (1991, p.132), for example, state that
“someone wanting peace, having strong convictions, being charismatic, and a good
administrator, would be labelled as a leader.”
But the problem with Implicit Leadership Theory is its emphasis on fixed,
immutable conceptions among the public of how a leader ought to act (Lord, Foti, and de
Vader 1984). The general framework seems to predetermine leadership or, more
precisely, attribute the success of certain individuals over others to the broader structural
factor it posits. It is also empirically inaccurate. Currently, as it stands in Canadian
political science, the broad characterizations of leadership expectations in the provinces
do not hold water when applied to reality. In Ontario, the electoral instability of the
1990s, the election of an NDP government, and the occasional success of populists such
as Mike Harris and Doug Ford (Budd 2020), seems to render the success of political
leaders more complex. Similarly, in Alberta, while Premiers have loosely conformed to
this role, it says little about the fact that it has been applied in vastly different ways by
individual leaders – one could contrast William Aberhart, Ernest Manning, Peter
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Lougheed, and Ralph Klein – to maintain success despite different leadership styles and
policy goals.
This problem of rigidity is a general problem of several contextual approaches,
which all seem to either conceptualize an understanding of leadership success that is too
rigid, or one that predetermines individual success on the part of broader structural
forces. This includes, for instance, post-structuralism’s emphasis on the
‘power/knowledge’ regimes that are deeply interwoven into society, to the extent that it
conditions leaders with prescribed ideal type behaviors and dramaturgical selves
(Collingson 2006). Instead, it becomes necessary to engage in the way pre-conceptions of
leaders are constituted in a way that allows them a relative fluidity; determining the
individuals that are endowed with authority, but in such a way that does not strictly
predetermine success. Leaders should still be able to shape and manipulate the broader
context to their liking, thereby meriting a focus on leadership as a causal variable in and
of itself.
Thus, the idea of leadership expectations as the product of a broader linguistic and
discursive process holds promise, as shown by the significant amount of analysis in this
area that continues to grow (Fairhurst and Uhl-Bien 2012; DeCanio 2005). Here, the idea
is that the contextual conditions that determine the success of leaders lies in the microdynamics of communication in interpersonal interactions, including both by the followers
and the leaders themselves. This includes the broader contextual conditions, such as what
Mazlish (1976, p.10) calls the “psychic repository” of “recurrent themes, ideals, values,
fantasies, imagery, symbols, myths, and legends” that constitute ‘language games’
between agents.”
However, discursive analysis – while useful – concerns itself with only one aspect
of the leader-follow dynamic. Instead, it seems useful to incorporate the way leadership is
formed in a much more elemental level of political behavior and self-understanding; to
recognize the fact that the follower-leader dynamic is an interaction that changes both
sides, producing a novel form of political self-understanding. This is a task met by the
social identity approach, which places it’s understanding of leadership in the
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fundamentals of individual psychology (Turner et al. 1987; Platow, Mills, and Morrison
2000; Richer and Hopkins 2001; Hoggs 2001; Haslam et al. 2020). It works on the
assumption that there is an inherent group interpretation of political reality, involving the
shared use of the same schema of interpretation which persists by being constantly
confirmed by the defining acts of others (Berger and Lickmann 1967; Schanck 1975).
Group membership, according to this view, is a necessity of the “looking glass self”;
(Cooley 1902): individuals become themselves through the recognition of how they
appear to others - consciousness of the self is a consequence of reflections given off by
other minds
Thus, leadership is understood through the sense in which the leader and their
followers belong to the same social group or, put another way, are bound by the same
self-understanding. Leadership success is therefore contingent on the degree to which the
aspiring individual can identify themselves as a member of that group and claim their
agenda to be in their best interest. Yet, this does not entail determinism: the view holds
that leaders play a vital role in the perpetual definition and application of this group
identity, thus making their success both highly contingent and uniquely impactful. As
will be detailed in the following chapter, the social identity approach provides a useful
causal mechanism to account for why certain individuals gain leadership positions in
Canada.
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Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework and Research
Methodology

3

Introduction

As demonstrated by our discussion thus far, political leadership in Canada must be
understood in a framework that considers the full scope of the process. In doing so, this
thesis can most effectively answer its central research question pertaining to the way
specific individuals are endowed with leadership over others. Leadership is, as developed
in this thesis, predicted on the undertaking by which a set of followers endow a particular
individual with the legitimate authority to disproportionately affect political outcomes.
Or, to be more case-specific, the power given by the formal-legal position of first
ministers. This is necessarily a two-step process; that, while leaders impact political
outcomes through the authority provided by formal-legal institutions, they must gain the
legitimacy necessary to exercise authority prior to their attainment, as such is necessary
in order to be endowed with that position. It must consider that while the contingent
behavior of individual leaders is relevant, their success is also highly dependent on the
needs, understandings, and values of those they seek to lead in addition to the broader
context to which this relationship is constituted. A proper analysis of leadership must
account for the fact that while leaders are in some sense determined by broader
contextual forces, individuals can have significant causal impact in directing policy
outcomes.
In this chapter, Identity Leadership Theory (ILT) – also known as the social
identity approach – is presented as a framework through which political leadership can be
approached and understood (Haslam et al. 2020). It draws upon the insights of social
psychology to suggest, overall, that the process of leadership lies within the dynamic of
group processes. More precisely, the way that group membership is formed, defined, and
internalized by individual members; the capacity and process by which individuals come
to understand themselves through the prism of a broader social identity. To this view, the
true importance of leadership is the way individual leaders draw upon pre-existing group
understandings to work towards novel policy programs and group characteristics. This is
done, first, by a leader’s place as “prototypical group members” (Haslam et al. 2020,
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p.82) and, second, by their ability to communicate and work towards a policy agenda that
coheres with the group’s experiences, needs, history and self-understanding at the time
they seek to govern.
This chapter provides an extensive overview of Identity Leadership Theory’s
theoretical framework, assumptions, and set of established hypotheses. It begins by
discussing the main theoretical assumptions as developed in social psychology, before
reviewing the school of psychological research – social identity and self-categorization
theory – that are the source of its specific set of causal claims. The core research question
is presented and discussed as well. From here, the chapter translates the theoretical
approach and the research question into a set of testable hypotheses that will support the
study’s effort to understand political leadership in Canada. We now turn to explore the
identity leadership approach.

3.1 Foundation: Drawing upon Social Psychology
The key assumption made on the part of the identity leadership approach is that political
leadership can be understood within the context of a group process. Groups are not
merely a collection of relatively independent individuals, nor something akin to a “hive
mind” that subsumes individual identity. Rather, the collective forms a unique cognitive
framework: that individuals, in developing a special association with others, are in turn
impacted and changed through the way that the nature of that relationship is internalized.
As a result, it follows that their subsequent political choices will be contingent to some
degree on the nature of the group itself, including on the question of leadership.
This broad claim that group processes provide unique contributions to individual
cognition is the dominant approach and framework within contemporary social
psychology (Brewer 1991; DeLamater and Collett 2019). Nevertheless, it is the product
of a dense and contentious historical preoccupation with the nature of the “group mind’.
The field, fully considered, is dense, complex, and well over a century old, rendering it
far beyond the scope of this thesis – itself a work of political science – to cover it
comprehensively. Instead, this section will provide a brief overview of the major insights
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of the field that are relevant to our narrow interest in leadership and Identity Leadership
Theory.
Social psychology’s first wave of theorists – particularly LeBon (1947), Freud
(1921), and McDougall (1921) – emphasized the way that group formation was
comprised of a “deindividuation” process by which individuals diffuse their personal
responsibility and identity into the broader collective.13 These were contrasted by a set of
individualistic approaches, particularly that of Floyd Allport (1924, 1962; see also
Pepitone 1981; Greenwood 2000), which argued that groups are nothing more than the
interaction of independent individuals that cooperate to achieve collective goals. Group
exchanges are to be understood as a relatively straightforward stimuli-response
relationship, with the individual’s core psychology and set of interests in no way changed
by the experience.14
The foundations of identity leadership are derived from a third emergent
framework, broadly known as “interactionalism” (Turner 1987). As compared with the
previous two approaches, interactionalism takes something of a middle position. It holds
that while individuals are not subsumed into broader identity of the group, they are
nonetheless fundamentally shaped by them; that while actors retain their individuality,
the “group concept was needed precisely to explain the nature of individuals” (Turner
1987, p.13). In effect, the behavior of agents cannot be fully accounted for without
incorporating the way they have been influenced by their membership within a particular
culture, social group, and institutional structure. Muzafer Sherif (1936, 1967), for
instance, developed the Gestalt approach to social psychology, emphasizing the way that
the individual parts of a collective concept were necessarily interdependent and
functionally determined by the broader ‘configuration’ of the process. For individuals,
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In drawing upon this work, for instance, Hoffer (1951) suggests that collective political movements are
joined for the purposes of “self-renunciation”; to recognize one’s powerlessness as an individual and to find
a renewed sense of control and meaning by subsuming one’s identity into a broader mission.
14

Though not equivalent, individualist approaches in psychology share much in common with the rational
choice approach that became popular throughout the social sciences. Both assume that individual
preferences are objective, fixed, and exogeneous to a given social context.
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the social group – through customs, rules, standards, values, and other criteria of conduct
- provides a “stable anchorage” (Turner 1987, p.13); a frame of reference by which
individuals can evaluate and compare stimuli in a systematic way. In effect, through
individuals coming to adopt and follow these frameworks, they become entrenched,
developing into something akin to a status quo “common-sense” that is taken for granted.
Similar conceptions were made in, for instance, Solomon Asch’s (1952) notion of an
individual’s “mutually shared psychological field” and Kurt Lewin’s (1935) idea of the
“life space”.
Thus, the approach argues that groups are relevant in so far as they are
responsible for socially produced but psychologically internalized cognitive concepts that
shape individual self-understanding and action. In essence, it is through the group – and
the sense of social confirmation it provides - that the individual gains a full and
systematic means by which to identify themselves, perceive cognitive stimuli, and devise
a course of action. This was further demonstrated by the same researchers through a set
of influential experiments.15 Sherif (1936 p.3), for instance, clearly demonstrated that
individual responses to uncertain phenomena are dependent on a “shared frame of
reference” to perceive and evaluate what one is observing. By relying on others,
individuals internalize the social norms regarding how to understand roughly similar
phenomena, even though the objective reality of that norm may be questionable.
Similarly, Turner (1987, p.22) argues that Asch’s Social Conformity Experiments
demonstrate that individuals will anticipate the fact they will agree with others regarding
how to judge novel stimuli. If not, uncertainty emerges as a “social product of
disagreement” because individuals more often come to doubt their own cognitive
capacity rather than that of the group, thus producing eventual conformity.
But what leads people to form and attach themselves to the groups that they do?
Why, for instance, do individuals come to see themselves as belonging to a national
community that may or may not be affiliated with a state? While group formation is
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Empirical evidence of this basic claim of social psychology is incredibly vast, and far from the range of
this thesis to cover fully. For further detail see Turner 1987.
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understood to be the product of an inherent individual psychological need for a social
reference point, the exact parameters of that eventual identification were considered to be
contingent on other individual-level factors linked to interdependence: mutual attraction,
similarity in attitudes, common fate, shared threat, or the advancement of personal
interests (see Turner 1987, p.19-41; Festinger 1950; Lott and Lott 1965; Shaw 1976;
Davis, Laughlin, and Komorita 1976; Morrison 1999). However, social identity begins by
rejecting the impact of these factors in influencing the parameters of group formation
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1987; Haslam et al. 2020).

3.1.1

The Social Identity Approach to Social Psychology

The social identity approach, which developed as a particular school of social
psychology, forms the more specific foundation for Identity Leadership Theory. The
product of decades of continuing research, it provides the baseline inferences pertaining
to the way groups are formed, the way they impact individual orientation, and the
conditions that shape both their characteristics and salience to members. The approach is
broken down into two separate theories: social identity and self-categorization. In sharing
the same theoretical assumptions, they are best characterized as two ongoing directions of
research.16
The first and foremost claim of this approach is that individuals, regardless of any
other condition, have an innate tendency to form group-level identities with those they
share proximity. This was established through Henri Tajfel’s (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel,
Flament, Billig, and Bundy 1971) ‘minimal group studies’ in which, in an experimental
setting, participants were separated into groups in a way that directly sought to test causal
variables linked to interdependence. In effect, participants were shown to form group
identities based on trivial differences. And, as also further shown in several subsequent
studies, many of the factors considered necessary for the formation of group identity
mentioned were outcomes of the process: after groups were formed, participants
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The fact that a broad approach is named after one of two theories that it comprises strikes this author as
odd and confusing. Nonetheless, in reviewing the literature, the name remains a near-universal and
entrenched means to refer to the framework.

43

consistently expressed higher levels of similarly, favourability, and commitment with
respect to members of their group rather than other participants in the experiment (Billig
and Tajfel 1973; Doise et al. 1972; Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn 1980; Turner, Sachdev,
and Hogg 1983; Platow et al. 2003). The subjects consistently demonstrated a
commitment to their group’s collective goals and awarded more points to members of
their in-group than to participants in other collectives (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel, Flament,
Billig, and Bundy 1971).
Building on this insight, social identity theorists found that groups will come to
define their distinguishing characteristics and social standing (Tajfel 1972; Rosch 1978;
Tversky and Gati 1978; Turner and Oaks 1986). This, according to Tajfel and Turner
(1979), is guided by a need for positive distinctiveness: groups will try to differentiate
themselves from out-groups along the dimensions they value.
For most social identity scholars, this claim directed them to delve into questions
pertaining to the root of group antagonisms, particularly the dynamics between positively
and negatively defined groups in given societal conflicts (Ellemers 1993; Ellemers,
Spears, and Doosje 1999; Haslam 2001; Reicher and Hopkins 2001). It, in effect, become
increasingly concerned with the relationships between groups, rather than the dynamics
within groups. Social identity theory as developed here is, therefore, limited for our
purposes of leadership. It is underdeveloped in terms of outlining the particularly
individual cognitive process by which a group identity is formed and comes to shape
individual action (Turner 1987; Haslam et al. 2020). Thus, social identity theory does not
provide enough room nor detail to fully develop a theoretical understanding of the role
played by leaders, particularly the process by which positions are attained by some
individuals over others.
Here, self-categorization theory was developed as an alternative stream of
research that works to overcome social identity theory’s limitations. Of this, John C.
Turner’s (1987) Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory remains
the central work of the framework. Overall, it utilizes the findings of the original minimal
group studies to argue that group identification is internalized by individual members in a
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way that shapes their own personal identity, understanding of phenomena, and
motivations (Turner 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, and McGarty 1994). In effect,
individuals come to interact with the external world in a way that is influenced by their
group membership: they rely on the group’s broader frame of reference to make sense of
novel stimuli, they incorporate their personal objectives to cohere with broader group
goals, and they use group cues to develop a set of values in addition to an understanding
of who they are themselves. Turner (1987, p. 51) labels this the process of
“depersonalization” by which they are redefined as a representative of that group.
These findings have two important consequences. First, as Turner (1987, p.21)
states, “Social identity is the cognitive mechanism which makes group behavior
possible.” By coming to incorporate themselves within a broader, collective goal,
depersonalization makes it possible for agents to participate in collective action not
directly attributable to their own self-interest. It is because of this that people risk their
lives in wars, engage in aggressive forms of civil disobedience, participate in civil
processes, and rally behind leaders in times of crisis. Second, through a process of ‘selfstereotyping’ (Turner 1987, p.57), individuals come to adopt the broader characteristics
and attributes of the group to the point that they resemble, in their own view, a
psychological representation of the group to which they claim fidelity. If, for instance, a
group comes to value a particular virtue highly, we should see the same preoccupation
reflected in the lives of individual members.
While the characteristics of a group are complex and multifaced, selfcategorization approaches emphasize – if only for analytical precision – that there are a
handful of “category prototypes” that the group uses as the particular means by which to
define themselves as a separate entity (Turner 1987; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994;
Haslam et al. 2010). To put it another way, it is the core set of characteristics that make
them who they are. If, for instance, a person comes to identify themselves as a member of
a very conservative religious congregation that characterizes itself through its hardline
anti-abortion views, they will come to define themselves as “I have hardline anti-abortion
views” and, over time, actually adopt such positions. The use of salience of category
prototypes can also change over time and context. For example, the rapid rise to
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prominence of issues related to same-sex marriage in the 2010s could make the group’s
opposition to this policy a more important characteristic of who they are.
But what shapes the nature and salience of these group affiliations? Every person
holds multiple overlapping and intersecting identities that help to frame their
understanding of themselves, their place in the world, and what actions to take, such as
their identity within a family, their workplace, their religious orientation, their town, and
their country. Group identity, to reiterate a previous point, is first a product of shared
proximity (Tajfel 1970); that, should individuals find themselves in a shared
circumstance or environment, they are likely to form some sort of collective
understanding that applies to that context. Consequently, a group identification of some
sort will be formed whenever there is some element of discernable coexistence: this could
include, for instance, identities on the basis of a geographically-defined political units
(whether federal, provincial, or municipal), an occupation (as in the case of labour
unions), or a shared linguistic or cultural expression (such as with the case of Quebec).
In determining the specific characteristics and salience of that identity, selfcategorization theory emphasizes two key contextual factors. First, is the notion of the
‘fit’ between the group, its characteristics, and the broader context. (Turner 1987; Haslam
et al. 2020). As initially developed by social identity theory, it suggests that the group
will define itself in a way that lets it positively distinguish itself from out-groups. Put
more precisely, self-categorization theory contributes the principle of “meta-contrast
ratio”: that a group categorization will be salient if the differences between the in-group
and out-group are greater than the differences within that group as it is understood
(Turner 1987). In this way, then, the particular social identity evoked can change with
context.
To use an example, this helps to explain how citizens of federal states can
maintain more than one identity concurrently, including sub-state identities that
frequently clash with each other while also, when the time permits, effectively be
overcome for broader, national interests. The principle also accounts for why some – but
not all - provincial identities continue to play a role within intrafederal institutions. For
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instance, inhabitants of a province like Ontario - while often possessing a provincial
group identity during interfederal disputes – do not often apply it as a means by which to
approach political developments at an intrafederal level (see Collier and Malloy 2017,
p.135). This is because, within intrafederal institutions, the differences between Ontario
and the rest of Canada are not greater than the differences within the province.17 This
contrasts with the place of Quebec, where the key markers of its provincial identity –
namely, the practice of a unique francophone culture – is just as salient within federal
institutions because there is a clear point of difference between Quebecers and the rest of
Canada.
Here, it is important to note that the broader the social category the more it will
rely on a higher “level of abstraction” to define itself. (Turner 1986). Thus, while social
categorization between two very small groups of people will tend to draw contrasts based
on very specific personal attributes, notions of a broader group - such as a nation - will
rely on much more vague characteristics and values. This, as a result, makes them much
more contingent, open-ended, and manipulable. It is the reason why, for instance, each
political party claims to speak on behalf of Canadians and align with their core values
despite offering different policy programs and visions.
In addition to the condition of fit, the second contextual factor of selfcategorization theory is that the salience and particular characteristics of these group
identities are contingent on the principle of “perceiver readiness or availability” (Oakes et
al. 1994). That is, that the present demand reflects people’s social histories and prior
expectations, goals, and theories. In effect, if a social identity – and the specific way it is
understood – has a more extensive and salient history it will be more likely to be relevant
for present and future circumstances. Long-established notions of identity are not only
easier to conjure up for a given circumstance but are more secure in that they contribute

Another way to interpret this, consistent with self-categorization theory’s framework, is that federal
Canadian identity is synonymous with that of Ontario. This is a claim that has historically been made by
regional reform movements, particularly from the West. It claims what Braid and Sharpe (1992, p.5)
describe as “the smug belief of Ontario politicians that they speak for all English Canada and that Ontarians
truly care about the nation, while others are self-centered regionalists.”
17
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to a greater enduring sense of self (Haslam et al. 2020). This is not to say that novel
group identities can not emerge or be formed given a suitable ‘fit’ to a given context.
Several Canadian provincial identities for instance, were only formed following the
creation of jurisdictional borders that worked to condition their inhabitant’s sense of
shared proximity. Rather, it is that members – even when faced with novel stimuli – are
more likely to fall back on pre-existing categories of understanding to comprehend the
situation. In observing an act of federal encroachment, for instance, a member of Western
Canada is far more likely to view it cynically given the historical negativity associated
with this behavior (see Tupper and Gibbins 1992, p.67). When faced with novel,
ambiguous, and uncertain circumstances, pre-existing means of evaluation developed by
the group are both easier, given their availability, and more credible given the social
confirmation associated with them. The alternative, a novel way to understand and
evaluate the situation – although not impossible – is far less likely because it not only
requires more cognitive effort but lacks the same degree of credibility and coherence to
one’s social identity.
Here, it should be emphasized that the principle of perceiver availability does not
entail that all individuals will form the same precise means by which to evaluate novel
political phenomena. Rather, group identities are relevant in so far as they shape the
broader position and cognitive framework by which individuals evaluate stimuli and
determine their actions. Given the fact that individuals are still different in terms of their
personal characteristics, it is still possible that members will disagree on the specifics,
particularly regarding the course of action they ought to take. In this way, the process of
group-identity articulation is never fully complete. Rather, groups are required to
constantly reinterpret and rearticulate the nature of their identity as contexts change over
time, including the all-important questions of “who we are” and “what we should do”.
The point here is to emphasize that groups will rely on their collective pre-existing
understandings and history to guide them through this process. Identity leadership theory
suggests that leaders, in legitimizing their personal authority, are the ones who utilize and
direct these group mechanisms to gain support for their devised plan of action. It is on
this main point that the social identity approach can be applied to the topic of leadership.
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3.2 Applying the Social Identity Approach to Leadership
The social identity approach has been applied to a wide variety of political contexts. It
has been historically concerned with providing explanations for the ways group identities
are formed and impact political outcomes, such as the expressive approach to
partisanship, the salience of regional identities, ethnic conflict, and genocide (Reicher and
Hopkins 2001; Schwartz, Luyckx and Vignoles 2011; West and Iyengar 2020). This
approach has always in some sense incorporated leadership. For example, political
psychologists have engaged in probing the ways that leaders can exploit these group
identities and processes to maximize their own power. This includes, for instance, the
phenomenon of scapegoats as a means for leaders to both avoid personal responsibility
and mobilize collective action around their professed ends (Reicher, Haslam, and Rath
2008). Nevertheless, the use of the theory to develop analytically concise frameworks for
understanding political leadership itself is relatively novel. Among a mere handful of
scholars who have followed this novel approach are S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D.
Reicher, and Michael J. Platow. They are disciplinary leaders; and, more than anything,
their New Psychology of Leadership (2020) serves as a cornerstone of this emerging field
of work.
The use of this psychological framework also remains underdeveloped within the
discipline of political science. This is because, in addition to the general lack of
leadership research, the discipline’s dominant use of political psychology is individualist,
focused on the perceptions of individuals as relatively objective and independent entities
(Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2013). Consequently, it is underdeveloped in analyzing the way
that group processes condition and impact both the individual’s perceptions and their
subsequent actions.
Under the framework developed by Haslam et al. (2020), leaders are considered
important because they provide a key role in “articulating the nature of group identity and
its implications for action in context” (Haslam et al., p.54). In effect, the impact of
leaders comes through their ability to personally direct this group process in the way they
see fit. Leaders, first, help to define the attributes of the group through their role as
authority figures. And, second, leaders develop, articulate, and mobilize this group
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identity to legitimize their own personal leadership and also their policy agenda. Gardner
(1995, p.50), for instance, suggests that leaders “fashion stories” which “address the most
essential questions”: those that “continue to endure throughout one’s conscious existence
– issues of self, identity, group membership, past and future, good and evil.” This act of
articulation and definition-giving, the view holds, is expressed by every successful leader.
But how can we understand the process that leads to one particular individual having
more success than the other in gaining supporting and impacting political outcomes? The
identity leadership approach holds that the researcher can account for why some aspirants
successfully gain authority through the way leaders entrench and legitimize their personal
authority within this group process.
First and foremost, this starts from the leader establishing their personal
legitimacy as a source of authority. That is, a sense that they personally are in the
position to clarify and advance the needs of the group; that they are “one of us” - a
member of the ‘in-group’ that they hope to have authority over. To be more precise,
aspiring leaders are successful to the extent that they can appear as “prototypical group
members” that appear “to embody the group identity” (Haslam et al. 2020, p.78). This is
done through what Haslam et al. (2020, p.82) – drawing upon the notion of the metacontrast ratio - label as the “relative influence gradient”; that is, the degree to which the
qualities, attributes, and behaviors of leaders emphasize their similarity with followers
while simultaneously distinguishing themselves from outsiders. Such is necessary for
aspiring leaders to gain the legitimacy necessary to be endowed with the authority to
direct the self-understanding and direction that the group will take. A significant body of
evidence suggests that several of the characteristics of successful leadership, such as
trustworthiness, fairness, and charisma, follow from having this primary condition met
(Giessner and Knippenberg 2008; van Dijke and de Cremer 2008; Platow et al. 2006).
Similarly, experimental evidence suggests that leaders, should they meet the primary
condition of leadership prototypicality, are endowed with considerable leeway to impact
policy outcomes (McGarty et al. 1992; van Knippenberg, Lossie, and Wilkie 1994; Hogg
2001).
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This notion of “prototypicality” is predominately linked to the broader social
context of the group. It is strongly connected to the way the group develops its broader
category prototypes. Haslam et al. (2020, p.85-87), for instance, demonstrate this
principle through a simple model in which a centrist group – understood in this scenario
as the ‘in-group’ of interest – is flanked by distinct right-wing and left-wing out-groups.
Should both right and left be relatively equal in size and influence, the category prototype
and the individual seen as most prototypical will emerge from a position close to the
center, as it is in defining themselves on the basis of that characteristic that the centrist
group’s internal differences are less than the differences between them and both the leftwing and right-wing outgroups. In contrast, should the out-group be predominately rightwing, prototypicality would move to the left alongside with the strength of the latter as,
given the same principle of meta-contrast ratio, it is the best means by which the group
can be distinguished. This general process is held to play out in broader, more complex
political contexts.
However, despite the influence of these broader contextual forces, leaders have
the ability to shape the precise meaning of “prototypical” at a given time. Social identity
theory includes the view that, first, political contexts are abstract and ambiguous (Haslam
et al. 2020). In many cases, it is unclear precisely who the ‘out-group’ is and on what
basis difference is to be drawn between them and the in-group. This view then implies
that social identities and the way the leader themselves are perceived is fluid and
manipulable. This fluidity is most evident in periods of great shock, upheaval, and
turmoil. Take, for instance, the various “options” available to the Canadian public during
the Great Depression that began in 1929. While the established, mainline parties (the
Liberals and the Conservatives) generally held to the status quo, several novel political
movements provided divergent approaches. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
(CCF), for instance, advocated for the total reform of the capitalist system, rendering
central Canadian industrial interests to be the ‘out-group’ that was to be overcome. The
Social Credit party, on the other hand, suggested that the Depression’s solution lay in a
“community directed” economy, characterized primarily by nationalizing key banking
and finance mechanisms. For this group an international cabal of financiers was depicted
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as the “out-group” that conflicted with the interests and economic well being of
Canadians.
Furthermore, leader prototypicality is also not synonymous with individual
averageness or typicality. Rather, ‘to be prototypical is to be exceptional in being fully
representative’ of the group’s shared values and beliefs (Haslam et al., 2011, p. 155).
Leaders can be unique, atypical, or different prima facie as compared to the group over
whom they seek power. What matters is that such leaders are able to link those
characteristics to an emergent identity of the group, connected to both their personal
legitimacy as leaders and their specific policy agenda. Overall, in constructing their
personal legitimacy as prototypical members, leaders have a significant degree of
creativity to reorient a group identity around their leadership. This, as discussed, is
constituted by the degree to which this satisfies the principle of meta-contrast ratio.
However, leaders must also base their appeal on the principle of perceiver
readiness. Leaders must craft their message and policy agenda in a way that reflects the
group’s identity as it exists historically and at the point in time. As put by Gardner (1995,
p.15): “stories need enough background, detail, and texture so that an audience member
can travel comfortably with their contours.” While it is, in theory, possible for leaders to
create identities “out of scratch” –– it is, given the principle of perceiver readiness, far
more likely that leaders will be successful if they evoke identities that have grounding in
the group’s social history. In this way, successful leadership is, as put by Haslam et al.
(2020, p.153) based on “being able to root one’s account of who we are and what we
should do in a common stock of cultural knowledge about the group.” For instance, the
past constitutes a “symbolic reserve” that leaders can utilize to give sense to a situation,
legitimize action, and design futures (Reicher 1993).
In drawing upon pre-existing collective understandings, Haslam et al. (2020)
emphasize two important functions provided by leaders to legitimize their personal policy
agendas. First, through a process of “concretization”, leaders turn abstract ideas into
concrete instances (Haslam et al. 2020, p.176; see also Moscovici and Farr 1984). This is
to say that leaders legitimize their policy programs by framing them as the manifestation
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of the broader, more abstract quality the group believes about itself. The second activity
of “anchoring” refers to the means by which the leader legitimizes their policy program
as part of some pre-existing and well-understood component of the group’s identity.
Here, the leader has an opportunity to formulate their policy preferences as coherent with
the group’s characteristic, thereby legitimizing it as the best course moving forward.
In summary, then, social identity theory holds that successful leadership appeals,
understood as the sort that result in the conferring of legitimate formal-legal authority,
can be accounted for through the way they take advantage of the group process of the
public they seek to lead. This is comprised, first, of successfully positioning oneself as a
prototypical group member and, second, articulating a policy program or course of action
that is consistent with the pre-existing understanding and history the group has about
itself. It is in these aspects that the broad analytical frameworks of social identity and
identity leadership theory can by utilized to articulate a precise theoretical framework and
research methodology for this thesis’s particular analysis.

3.3 Theoretical Framework: Answering the Research
Question
Having reviewed the broader theories of social identity and identity leadership, the
remainder of this chapter will focus on translating these into a specific and concise
framework by which to analyze and account for the research question. This section
outlines a specific conceptualization of the leadership process, establishes a theory of its
causal mechanisms, and posits a set of hypotheses about the way certain individuals
become successful. These will then by operationalized into a research methodology in the
following section.
Overall, in fully considering the social identity approach and its application to
leadership, I posit that the main research question – why leaders are able to gain their
positions of formal leadership – can be answered through the following causal
mechanism: it is the extent to which individuals can communicate that they are a
prototypical member of the group who, through their personal leadership, offer
compelling answers to the group’s understanding of itself, the surrounding world, and the
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actions it should take moving forward. If this condition is met, individuals should be
endowed with the legitimacy necessary for formal-legal leadership.
As discussed in the previous chapter, individual leaders and the broader group are
inextricably linked. Nevertheless, for the sake of a coherent and operational causal
process, an analyst must emphasize one over the other. That is to say that they must
consider leadership as either a concept conditioned by groups or as a role actively shaped
and sought after by individuals. This study will select the latter. In my model, it is
assumed that individual leaders largely fashion their own policy agenda and individual
aspiration for leadership, quite deliberately positioning themselves according to group
categories to gain their authority.
The first and foremost claim of social identity theory is that the process of
leadership operates in the context of broader group processes (Haslam et al. 2020).
Nevertheless, despite this emphasis, most theorists within this approach make no effort to
define the concept (Haslam et al. 2020). This may be due to the broadness of the concept
as articulated within social identity theory, as any collection of individuals in some sort
of shared proximity have the potential to become a group. Here, a full articulation and
definition of the concept is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, for current purposes, I
define a group as a cohesive collective of individuals, as conditioned by the shared
proximity or institutional structure of their formal-legal leadership, that structures the
individual’s physical orientation and self-understanding. Here, “shared proximity” within
this model is comprised of the institutional borders of the formal leader position of
interest.
From here, the process of leadership is defined in this study as the means by
which individuals seek to gain the group-based legitimacy necessary to support their own
formal leadership and policy agenda. I will, as has been developed throughout this thesis,
understand political leadership as the process by which certain individuals come to
legitimately exercise disproportionate authority over a given group or context. This is
predominately constituted by the force of formal-legal positions within institutional
structures of the state. I will refer to these individuals with the ability to
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disproportionately direct government activity as formal leaders. However, to attain these
positions of formal authority, individuals must already possess some degree of personal
legitimacy as leaders, as it is on account of this prior quality that individuals are
conferred with institutional power. I will label these individuals – those who seek formal
positions by building upon their own personal legitimacy and attaining public office – as
aspiring leaders.
The point here is to emphasize that while, according to my theoretical approach ,
aspiring leaders do not have the legitimacy necessary to exercise disproportionate
influence over outcomes, it is on account of what an individual does as an aspiring leader
that determines whether they will become a formal leader.18 Put another way, aspiring
leaders work to develop and build the legitimacy necessary for successful leadership that
is not conferred upon them or made useable until they are selected as formal leaders. It is
via this conferment – attained predominately through democratic elections – that one
moves from an aspirational leader to a formal one.
While one must be an effective aspirational leader to become a formal one,
another aspect of this analysis is that not all aspirational leaders become formal leaders.
Instead, for any given formal-legal position of leadership, there are a number of
aspirational leaders who compete for a position. In this way, the ultimate victor of this
competition – including both electoral challengers and incumbents – is the individual that
successfully built a greater degree of legitimacy than their competitors.
In determining which individual is ultimately successful, I will posit two
overlapping, but nonetheless analytical separate, conditions. These will comprise two
hypotheses that comprise the main expectations of the following analysis. First, the
success of aspiring leaders in becoming formal leaders can be predicted on the basis of
individual prototypicality: that if an individual effectively conveys themselves as a

18

This does not preclude the fact that individuals without formal-legal positions cannot be influential in
impacting future outcomes. Several frameworks, such as Tucker’s distinction between “constituted” and
“non-constituted” make it central to their understanding. Rather, my decision to deny aspiring leaders a
sense of power in this regard is for the sake of analytical clarity.
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prototypical member, understood through the way the articulate the group’s category
prototypes as determined by a meta-contrast ratio, they are then more likely to gain the
legitimacy necessary for leadership.
Consequently, prototypicality comprises the primary necessary condition for
successful formal leadership. However, in my view it is not a sufficient condition to attain
formal leadership. We can expect that all aspiring leaders will attempt to convey
themselves as prototypical. Instead, leaders must also connect their prototypicality with a
compelling message - that their being “one of us” contains within itself an answer to the
group of “who they are” and “what they should do”. I propose that if a leader develops
and communicates a salient understanding of the group identity and future course of
action that utilizes the criteria of readiness, they are then more likely to both achieve
leadership positions and impact political outcomes.
To meet this condition, a leader will draw upon a group’s social history,
understood as their pre-existing expectations, goals, and perspectives of themselves and
the world around them, to add merit to their policy program. Put more precisely, their
policy agenda will be communicated to be the rational and legitimate product of these
underlying group understandings and assumptions. This should be done through the twin
processes of concretization and anchoring. In particular, we should expect that the
leader’s own prototypicality – what their standing as a representative says about the
group – to be an important anchor.
Overall, then, I will theorize this process of an aspiring leader making a
successful appeal for formal leadership as a two-step process. In reality, this likely occurs
simultaneously; that, at the same time a leader is attempting to establish their
prototypicality, they are also articulating a course of action. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of this theoretical analysis, this can be understood temporarily. First, aspiring
leaders articulate a set of group characteristics and establish themselves as prototypical
members on the basis of that articulation as it is from being seen as “one of us” that the
leader then has the legitimacy to articulate a course of action for the group. Second, this
is then used to articulate a substantive definition of identity in which, through a process
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of concretization and anchoring, the leader utilizes group processes to gain support for
their specific policy agenda. Put together, this results in the particular individual
successful attaining a position of formal leadership.
Thus, it is on the basis of these two main conditions that identity leadership theory
can be utilized to answer this thesis’s research question, accounting for why specific
aspiring leaders are selected over their competitors as the formal leader. It is contingent
on their (1) ability to articulate group characteristics and present themselves as a
prototypical group member, and (2) link it to a broader articulation of the group’s identity
in a way that satisfies the principle of readiness. Formulated into a research design, this
entails that we can, in answering our research, posit the two main hypotheses.
•

H1: If an aspiring leader is most effective at conveying themselves as a
prototypical member, understood through the way they articulate the group’s
category prototypes as determined by a meta-contrast ratio, they will then be seen
as a legitimate source of authority.

•

H2: if a leader develops and communicates a salient understanding of the group
identity and future course of action that is consistent with their prototypicality
while also drawing upon broader and pre-existing characteristics of the group
understanding (the principle of readiness), they are then more likely to be
endowed with formal leadership.

From here, the remainder of this chapter will outline a research methodology be which
these operational components can be operationalized and effectively tested.

3.4 Research Method
This section operationalizes the theoretical framework discussed previously into a
concise research methodology that structures the analysis conducted in the remainder of
this thesis. Below I summarize the specific causal mechanism, including the dependent
and independent variables, before turning to the way it will be observed and measured.
From here, it outlines a series of case studies as the specific research design that will
comprise the proceeding analysis.
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As discussed, the causal process this thesis seeks to analyze is how specific
individuals successfully attain positions of formal-legal leadership. Consequently, the
dependent variable is the degree to which the individual gains the support necessary to be
successfully conferred with a position of formal authority. This thesis is concerned with
the binary outcome of whether or not the individual attains the level of support that is
sufficient to attain formal positions, particularly in the way they receive more support
than other competitors.
This outcome of support is contingent on the actions taken by the individual who
seeks after the formal position. Given that the theoretical framework places significant
emphasis on the leader’s ability to articulate a set of group characteristics, this will be
operationalized as a discursive process. Consequently, the substantive components of the
communications, both written and oral, made by leaders to persuade the group to support
their leadership is understood here as the independent variable of this process. Here, it is
important to emphasize that while broader contextual conditions, such as the
understandings, values and interests of the group in question, are relevant in the way that
they condition and shape the options available to individuals, they are not understood
here to provide a direct and measurable causal impact outside of the individual in
question.
The causal mechanism that links the two together, as theorized, is the
psychological response of the individual group members themselves: that, in effect, a
leader’s message will appeal to their innate tendency to support in-group members and
prioritize more salient articulations of the group to which they belong. This is theorized
to occur in a two-stage process, comprising the two main hypotheses this analysis will
examine. First, an aspiring leader will first establish prototypicality in accordance with a
specific set of group characteristics they articulate in their communications. Second,
based on their legitimacy as a member of the group, they will articulate a policy agenda
that acts as a concretization of the pre-existing and abstract understandings the group has
about itself.
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In operationalizing this process, it is initially evident that it cannot be observed
directly within the scope of this thesis. Rather, it can only be inferred from a correlation;
that, in the case to be studied, the successful individual ought to be demonstrability
prototypical and articulative of a salient, corresponding message. In this way, this
analysis will be comprised of an observation of the independent variable – the substantive
content of the communication leaders make towards the group - to determine whether
they satisfy the conditions necessary to meet the hypotheses that have been posited.
In observing these aspects of leaders, we should expect their appeal – understood
here as rhetorical – to satisfy a set of conditions. First, we should expect that the leader
will establish themselves as a prototypical group member. Here, prototypicality will be
measured on account of the meta-contrast ratio: a leader, in their appeal, must emphasize
their similarity with followers while simultaneously distinguishing themselves from
outsiders. But, given the individual’s creativity in establishing their own prototypicality,
we should see a novel, substantive articulation of the group’s characteristics on the part
of the leader. Namely, leaders must demonstrably communicate in their full appeal a
discernable “out-group” and a set of category prototypes that distinguish the group they
seek to lead. From here, as discussed in the second hypothesis, we should expect this
established prototypicality to then lead to an appeal by the aspiring leader that, in
addition to being coherent with the individual’s prototypicality, draws upon pre-existing
and broader means by which the group understands and makes value evaluations of
political phenomena. We should see that the policy agenda is legitimized through and
communicated as a fulfillment of these broader values. From here, in completing this
causal process, we should expect to find that the aspiring individual that meets these
conditions is supported by followers and so successfully endowed with a formal
leadership position. On this finding, we can conclude that the hypotheses appear to be a
causally plausible explanation to the research question.
This causal model aims to focus on the key elements that drive the leaderfollower relationship. At the same time, it is possible that the null hypothesis will be
supported. For example, if an aspiring political leader is found to be successful and also
does not meet the conditions discussed above, or alternatively is unsuccessful despite
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meeting them, we can conclude that this approach does not serve as a useful causal
mechanism for understanding leadership.
This relationship will be examined through the observation and analysis of
primary sources that contain attempts made by the leader studied to communicate,
whether in speech or writing, explicit references to both an articulation of that group’s
main characteristics, and the broader assumptions, understandings, solutions, and values
that attempt to convey their leadership and policy agenda as consistent with the group’s
understanding. This is not to say that qualitative statistical methods are not possible;
social identity scholars have in fact developed typologies by which to determine the
group’s characteristics and what precisely constitutes prototypicality (Steffens et al.
2014). Rather, it is because this method of analysis is more appropriate for the scope of
this thesis and the causal relationship as I have theorized it. First, given the significant
creativity I have granted to individual aspiring leaders, the task of properly and
evaluating concepts like prototypicality is both empirically and conceptually limiting. At
worst, it would impose a rigid structure of prototypicality that would predetermine which
aspiring leaders are successful, a framework this thesis has strongly argued against.
A second consideration is the fact that the causal framework is highly context
specific. A large-scale, statistical analysis seems to lead the researcher away from the
intricacies and nuances of a particular social group. Instead, it becomes necessary to fully
analyze the details of the case to understand leadership and to make any inferences with
confidence. Finally, there are practical considerations. This thesis, given its status as a
component of a Master of Arts program, is unable to gather the amount of resources –
both financial and temporal – that would be required to collect the data necessary for a
precise and comprehensive analysis of the causal mechanism developed in this chapter.
Here, the analysis will draw upon a series of empirical and descriptive materials
that is relevant to the group itself and the individual in a position of aspiring leadership. It
is important to, first, draw upon an assortment of materials to construct the broader
aspects of the group and the general shape of its politics through a social identity lens.
Utilizing pre-existing scholarly work on the context’s political culture, this analysis will
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discuss the literature through a social identity lens in order to arrive at the broader values,
understandings, and behaviors that comprise the group identity.
From here, the analysis will utilize a series of biographical, empirical, and
journalistic materials to construct a brief sketch of the leader’s individual attributes, their
own policy preferences, and the means by which they became aspiring leaders. A set of
primary sources composed of communications made by these leaders to the public will
then be used to form the data evaluated to determine the ways in which this set of
characteristics and policy preferences were communicated to satisfy the hypothesized
conditions of successful leadership. For hypothesis one, we should demonstrably observe,
through an analysis of the individual’s rhetoric, an appeal that effectively emphasizes a
similarity shared among members of the political community while simultaneously acting
as a means by which they can be distinguished from others. We should see a discernable
and repeated set of characteristics communicated by the leader, in addition to a
discernable “outgroup” that they are contrasted from. For hypothesis two, we should see
that this appeal, in addition to forming prototypicality, is justified by the way it is
anchored to these broad, empirically demonstrated aspects of the group’s collective
understanding and communicated as a concretization thereof.
This thesis will utilize the comparative method of research design, consisting of a
set of case studies of individual leaders in one context over time (Lijphart 1975). In
selecting cases, the project utilizes the “most different systems design” in which the
dependent variable is roughly the same despite different values for the independent
variable (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Consequently, the case studies attempt to consist
of two different individuals that despite variance both successfully attained formal
leadership positions. In each, regardless of these specific individual and policy
differences, we should observe draw upon the same broad group characteristics and
understandings to establish their own prototypicality and legitimize their policy agenda.
The value of this research design is twofold. First, by studying a series of leaders
in one context over time, this analysis can better isolate the causal mechanism. While
comparing two or more contexts provides benefits in the way of generalizability and
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external validity, it comes at the cost of precision; that, given the abstract and broad
quality of the concepts used, it may make the course of determining and identifying the
important contextual variables more complex and confusing. Instead, by focusing on one
context, the researcher can better isolate the set of group understandings that are
entrenched and relevant to each of the leaders studied. Second, by consisting of a “thick”
study of case studies it effectively accommodates the ways in which, as theorized, leaders
are in independent and creative positions. By confining the analysis to one context, it can
more compressively parse a pre-existing group understanding and the way individual
leaders utilize it to legitimize their authority.
Given this thesis’s stated interest in Canadian political leadership, this analysis
focuses on the province of Alberta as the context to be studied. Canadian political
scientists have long recognized that politics as practiced federally and in each of the
provinces comprise different “worlds” with separate political cultures, policy interests,
and party structures (Elkins and Simeon 1980). The choice to select a provincial, rather
than federal, context is because of the fact that the gap on leadership in the provinces is
much wider, entailing both a greater need for research and a larger contribution of the
part of this thesis. A province also provides far greater comparative potential for future
research: that the findings of this thesis, when incorporated into the broader literature of
Canadian political leadership, can be applied to develop understandings of leadership in
other provincial contexts, helping to bolster much broader generalizations and sub
disciplinary understandings.
Of all the Canadian provinces, the selection of Alberta is based on the way it
exemplifies the variables of interest. Alberta is regarded as both a very leader-centric
political culture (See Tupper and Gibbins 1992) and expressive of a particularly salient
and distinctive provincial group identity (Tupper and Gibbins 1992). While
consequential, there is no – at least prior to the discovery of oil in 1947 – discernable
distinguishing characteristics when compared to other Western provinces. In this way,
then, unlike a province with a clear and relatively rigid source of group identity – such as
with language in the case of Quebec – Alberta is a useful context to consider the way a
broader province-wide identity is constructed, shaped, and utilized to advance conflicting
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political goals, including the direction of specific individual leaders and the legitimacy of
their policy agendas.
Within Alberta, this analysis focuses on two distinctive leaders: William
Aberhart, first elected in 1935, and Peter Lougheed, first elected in 1971. Each leader was
successfully elected to a position of formal leadership, despite differences in leadership
styles, ideologies, and the pressing public policy problems of the time. Each leader, this
analysis will investigate, may have been able to convey themselves as a ‘prototypical
group member’ and incorporate their policy agenda into the pre-existing collective
understanding of Albertans as a provincial group, providing clarity to the questions of
“who we are” and “what we should do”.
The following analysis is leader centric, as each chapter proceeds from a
consideration of the individual themselves to the broader context. First, relying on
biographical material, each case study begins with an examination of the individual
themselves – their attributes, personality, ideology, policy preferences, leadership style,
and desire for seeking a position of authority – up until the point that they began directly
seeking out the Premier’s office. From here, the case study will consider the broader
context to which this personal aspiration is constituted, in addition to considering
scholarly attempts to determine broader factors that conditioned their individual success.
Finally, these case studies will investigate a set of primary sources to determine if the
leader can be observed to meet the expectations of the two posited hypotheses.
But, before analyzing the personality, policy, and success of these leaders, it is
necessary to establish the broader contextual factors that comprise the Alberta provincial
identity. This, within Canadian political science, is a well-developed conception: that,
although scholars disagree on what precisely causes Alberta to be the way it is, there is a
consensus that there exists a unique identity and political culture in the province. This
will be reviewed and interpreted through a social identity framework. It will be made
clear that the following comprises the pre-existing self-understanding with which
Albertan leaders must cohere.
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Chapter 4 – Alberta Through a Social Identity Lens

4

Introduction

In the last chapter, identity leadership theory was discussed and employed as a useful
way to examine leadership and the way it is constituted (Haslam et al. 2020). Overall, this
theory holds that the individuals endowed with formal leadership are those who best
contribute to group processes, in that they provide legitimate answers to the questions of
“who we are” and “what to do” as conditioned by member prototypicality and the
salience their message brings to the understandings the group already has about itself.
Given the importance of these broader contextual conditions, it is necessary that – before
proceeding to the specific case studies – an overview of the pre-existing components of
the Albertan political identity is presented. It is important to understand the wider, more
abstract characteristics of a group identity to properly analyze the way they are utilized,
articulated, and manipulated by individual leaders to advance policy agendas.
This chapter discusses the broader Albertan context and its implications for first
ministerial leadership through a social identity lens, drawing upon three main aspects that
have been developed within mainstream Canadian political science – Alberta’s economic
conditions, its sense of Western alienation, and its broader conservative political culture.
The goal here is to outline the larger set of societal values and self-understandings within
which an aspiring leader is expected to fit in order to be endowed with formal leadership.
Overall, as will be outlined in what follows, it is argued that Alberta’s group identity was
formulated around the province’s early experience as a settler society interpreted through
a particular individualist lens. This, combined with the province’s economic reliance on
export commodities, produced a collective cognitive framework oriented around the
goals of prosperity, fairness, freedom, and the rejection of an interfering outside agent.
This will comprise the pre-existing framework that successful leaders will be expected to
base their appeals in.
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4.1 The Process of Group Identity Formation
As discussed in the last chapter, social identity theory holds that group identity formation
is the product of a set of individuals who – in sharing some aspect of their experience –
develop a collective understanding of themselves and the world around them (Haslam et
al. 2020). The influence and impact of this collective understanding come from the ways
in which it is internalized by members to impact their own perspectives, motivations, and
behaviors. Here, as previously outlined, the notion of “Albertans” is posited as no more
than the group identity formed to align with the province itself. The creation of Alberta in
1905 produced a geographic entity as well as a political one, because provinces in the
Canadian federation are endowed with much capacity to act unilaterally within the
parameters of the constitution. In this way, Albertan group identity is conditioned by and
predominantly directed towards the province’s political institutions, including individuals
that both reside within its jurisdiction and can contribute to its processes. In contexts
where provincial political processes are relevant, such as the selection of a Premier,
individuals are likely to invoke their identity as a pre-existing conception of an
“Albertan” to make sense of the situation and devise the best course of action moving
forward.
But how can this analysis, though a social identity lens, identify the main
components of the Albertan group identity a leader is expected to draw upon? The
theoretical literature suggests that the top priority of group identities is the need for selfdefinition and distinction (Haslam et al. 2020). That, to put it more precisely, people need
better clarification as to who they are and what makes them that way. As a result, people
prioritize and come to characterize themselves by a series of “category prototypes”. As
discussed last chapter, these are derived from the extent to which they have a high metacontrast ratio: characteristics that are both a source of similarly between in-group
members and a means by which to emphasize differences from others. These category
prototypes, in forming a set of understandings individuals then come to hold about
themselves and others, come to comprise the conceptual framework by which members
make judgements about novel phenomena and decide what course of action to take
moving forward.

65

This, as mentioned in the last chapter, is a historically bound but fluid process.
Group identities begin to form the moment the group itself is established and these
identities develop in accordance with the conditions of that time. From here, these broad
collective understandings are imparted to new members, forming the general basis of the
way citizens understand themselves, perceive political developments, and behave.
Nevertheless, this is open to significant adjustment over time. Given ongoing change in
context, groups are required to constantly reinterpret and rearticulate the nature of their
identity in order to arrive at a clear and practical understanding of who they are in order
to determine how to behave. Nevertheless, the point here is to emphasize that groups will
rely on their collective pre-existing understandings and history to guide them through this
process. Consequently, while individuals are unlikely to consciously contradict or
repudiate the preexisting understanding, a change in context or needs may adjust the
actual meaning of those understandings in all but name. For social identity theorists, the
process is bound by the criteria of “fit”: a group understanding must always be consistent
with empirical reality and the needs of the moment, whilst properly distinguishing itself
from others (Haslam et al. 2020).
Identity leadership theory suggests that leaders, in seeking to legitimize their
personal authority, are an important force in directing these group mechanisms to a
precise self-understanding and devised plan of action. Nevertheless, in understanding
provincial leadership in Alberta, it is necessary to consider the broader group identity that
the province’s citizens have formed, and the way it impacts and influences how people
perceive political phenomenon and make policy choices. Consequently, the next section
will outline the broader parameters by which first ministerial leadership is constituted and
operates in the province, relying on scholarly characterizations. This will comprise the
main contextual and thematical components that will then be interpreted through a social
identity lens. Attention will be directed to the way Alberta’s initial group identity formed
out of its early conditions and needs, tracing the way it was molded and mended by
subsequent generations to match the needs of the time. Overall, it will be argued that
these are the broad set of pre-existing, group understandings an aspiring leader must
appeal to in order to legitimize their authority and policy agenda, and so generate public
support.
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4.2 The Provincial Politics of Alberta
This chapter holds that social identity theory can best explain the process behind this
broader appeal in a way that accounts for the success of specific leaders over others.
Overall, it argues that aspiring premiers have found success by basing their appeals, both
personal and policy, in the understandings, expectations, and needs of the broader
Albertan group identity. This section discusses the set of themes that scholars have
developed to characterize the nature of the values, stances, and behaviors of Albertans
respective to their politics; it identifies and describes three overlapping characterizes –
economic reliance on a small set of resource exports, western alienation, and the
existence of a populist, conservative culture – that condition the factors leaders must
incorporate into their appeals in order to successfully attain formal-legal leadership.
Overall, the first two characteristics will be found to be for the most empirically accurate,
but conceptually incomplete in fully accounting for leadership success. But, in contrast,
the third – while certainly resembling a dominant political force – is often at odds with
Albertan behavior. It will, instead, be interpreted not so much as a coherent political
ideology as a broader, more abstract component of the Albertan group identity that
interprets political phenomenon through a particular individualistic, pro-freedom lens.
Consequently, these three components will be reinterpreted through a social identity lens,
forming the basis of a theoretical sketch of the broader group understandings we can
expect to see successful leaders base their appeals in.

4.2.1

Consequences of Resource Reliant Economy

The first well-noted characteristic of Alberta is its economic structure. More precisely,
the fact that its overall prosperity is reliant on the global profitableness of a select set of
export-based commodities (Macpherson 1952; Mansell and Percy 1990; Adkin 2016).
Over time, this has referred to cattle ranching, mining, wheat farming, and, following the
1947 discovery of oil, the petroleum industry.19 The key characteristic all have shared is
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This forms something of a historical trajectory in which one resource was replaced with the other. Thus,
while Alberta as part of the Northwest territory developed significant ranching and coal industries it had, by
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that their revenue is dependent on the state of the resource’s international market.
Historically, they have been subject to constant “boom and bust” cycles in which periods
of significant prosperity are followed by inevitable crashes, as the demand or price of the
resource in question drops – thereby rendering economic security largely beyond the
control of individual Albertans (Mansell and Percy 1990).
For Albertan provincial politics and leadership, this is relevant in so far as it
forms a common interest and set of problems: that, given its primary impact on their
livelihoods, citizens are primarily concerned with both the success of these industries and
also, more abstractly, seeking out the means by which to get out of their common
economic predicament (Young 1978; Dacks 1986; Tupper 1992). In this way, then,
leaders are successful to the extent that they are both able to ensure the relative success of
these industries whilst also implementing some solution to the predicament. Thus, each
successful premier can be understood via how they sought both economic growth and
some degree of broader structural change to ensure more control over economic security.
The initial success of Social Credit, for instance, can be attached to the party’s message
of monetary reform as a way to transition the people of the province out of the economic
destitution of the Great Depression. In this case, the party articulated a coherent cause to
this problem in that it was the product of exploitation by a broader class of financers and
bankers based in central Canada and elsewhere (Finkel 1989). This common economic
predicament accounts for Peter Lougheed’s struggle over provincial resource control and
his government’s push toward greater economic diversification (Hustak 1979; Wood
1985). Furthermore, the priority placed on economic growth also provides a reason for
why both Ernest Manning and Ralph Klein emphasized laissez-faire economics,
concerned primarily with the removal of government intervention as the key to economic
success (Lisac 1995).
But for this chapter’s purpose, the problem with this common reliance on one
economically unstable commodity is that while it provides a necessary condition to

the first world war, developed into a primarily agricultural economy. From here, the discovery of oil led to
another economic focus. In all of these cases, shifts in economic focus did not produce diversification.
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successful leadership in Alberta, it does not – on its own – provide a reason for why one
particular appeal or solution was successful over others. As demonstrated, each leader
framed the problem separately and posited a different set of solutions. Here, several
approaches would refer back to a broad Marxist or political economy analysis, suggesting
that the success of certain appeals over others can be equated with the interests of the
dominant owner class and their interests (Macpherson 1964; Richards and Pratt 1979;
Melynk 1993); That, in the words of Melnyk (1993, p.34), successful leaders are the
“personification of a class which wishes to rule the state according to its own interests.” It
is in this way, for instance, that Macpherson (1964) interpreted the success of Social
Credit as the expression of the agrarian petite bourgeoisie’s desires for radical economic
change, but in a way that did not challenge their property rights. Similarly, the transfer of
power from Social Credit to the Progressive Conservatives was the inevitable result of
the eclipse of rural power and its replacement by an urban, more cosmopolitan elite
rooted in the petroleum industry (Richards and Pratt 1979).
But while political economic explanations help to provide a more precise
framework, it nevertheless does little to address the fundamental question of why specific
options were more successful than others, especially given the fact that the successful
movements were not necessarily in the economic elite’s best interest. It is still the case,
for instance, that in supporting Social Credit the petite bourgeoisie of Alberta embraced a
vague, untested, and objectively incoherent doctrine (Finkel 1989). The explanatory
framework is also inconsistent with many of the highly interventionist polices of the
Lougheed government, including its significant increase of royalty revenue (Hustak
1979). Instead, it becomes necessary to add, on top of this common economic
characteristic of the province, other factors: the element of western alienation, and the
existence of a broader conservative culture.

4.2.2

Western Alienation

The next characteristic of Alberta politics discussed here is a widespread feeling of
discontent towards the rest of the Canadian political institutions, particularly the federal
government. This comprises a broader construct of “western alienation,” defined by the
eminent analyst Roger Gibbins as a “sense of political, economic, and to a lesser extent,
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cultural estrangement from the heartland of Canada” (Gibbins 1979).20 This is a wellstudied aspect of Canadian political science; indeed, next to the question of Quebec
nationalism, it is historically the greatest regional question of the Canadian political
community.21 It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to review this paradigm and its
associated literature fully.22 Here, only a few general, overlapping understandings
relevant to Alberta and this thesis will be considered.
Descriptions of western alienation emphasize either economic or more formallegal origins. The former understands the disposition to be the direct product of the
province’s economic position, interpreted as the product of a broader system of economic
subordination: what Macpherson (1953) labelled a “quasi-colonial structure”. The point
here is to emphasize that Alberta – alongside the other prairie provinces – was formed for
the purposes of resource extraction which, in being utilized by Central Canadian
manufactures, would bring business elites economic and material wellbeing (Conway
2014; Berdahl and Gibbins 2014).23 This, to political economists, entails a skewed power
relationship between the Central Canadian “center” and the Western “hinterland”: Central
Canadian manufacturers not only control a disproportionate amount of Federal power, but
will use it in a way that always furthers their economic interests (Watkins 1963; Richards
and Pratt 1979; Laxer 1989).When applied to Alberta, this means further resource

A source of contention – far beyond the scope and focus of this thesis to weigh into – is whether the
concept should comprise all “Western provinces” (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British
Colombia) or is really just concentrated in Alberta. For the remainder of this chapter, I will use the
conventional parlance of the “West” but only in the way that it concerns Alberta in particular.
20
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This is to say that, as with the question of managing Quebec nationalism, Canadian elites (understood as
politicians, academics, and intellectuals) have been concerned with the question of how to accommodate
the West’s distinct set of interests. This in part characterized the period of mega constitutional politics,
reaching a particularly pressing point when the Western-concentrated Reform Party emerged on the
message that the “West wants In”. Although this is said to have reach something of a truce from the
electoral success of the amalgamated Conservative party (led by a former Reform leader), it has recently
resurged within the context of environmental politics.
22

Western alienation will comprise a significant portion of any comprehensive work on Canadian politics
or government. But for a more focused, comprehensive look please see Berdahl and Gibbins 2014.
23

For more on this broader political economy or staples approach please refer back to the discussion in the
Canadian literature review section of this thesis.
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extraction operated in a way that ensures the predominate wealth of the resources is
directed to Central Canada.
This is relevant to the way Albertan politics is constituted by the way it is
reflected within the historical experience of “a long history of national economic policy
that…is believed to have failed to reflect Western Canadian interests and aspirations”
(Berdahl and Gibbins 2014). From the point at which the region was settled, there was a
protracted struggle over jurisdiction, control, and independence between the Federal
government and regional political agents (Janigan 2012; Rennie 2004). And, in being
endowed with full provincehood in 1905, Alberta was – unlike the original entrants of
Confederation - initially denied jurisdiction over its natural resources.24 Given the
revenues available to governments at the time, the province’s early lack of an ability to
extract revenue ensured that were unable to fully finance the services necessary for their
citizens, including the infrastructure for a rapidly growing population (Janigan 2012).
But just as important was the way initial federal economic policy impacted the
early, day-to-day economic experiences of Alberta’s workers and farmers. Through the
National Policy, a move designed to generate manufacturing and financial capital in
Central Canada, they were required to pay higher tariffs and freight rates, thereby
disadvantaging their contribution to the world market (Stevenson 2012). This was
particularly stark during the inevitable “bust” periods, such as the Great Depression.
Here, despite falling global prices and livelihoods, these broader financial and economic
structures remained in place; farmers were still required to pay expenses, including
meeting their credit interest payments (Finkel 1989). Although the 1947 discovery of oil
brought about a rush of post-war prosperity, this sense of exploitation was renewed
through further jurisdictional disputes with the federal government over both the control
of resources and the direction of the revenue extracted from them. Of this, the 1982
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Arguably the creation of Alberta itself is the product of federal interests in the region. There was little to
justify the creation of multiple provinces apart from preventing the region of having too much power. Most
of the original political actors of the region – such as Frederick Haultain, the Premier of the original
territory – would have liked the area to have become one large province rather than two (See Janigan
2012).
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National Energy Policy – which sought to distribute the monetary value derived from oil
away from Alberta and to Eastern Canada – stands as the perennial symbol of the federal
economic interference of that era (Wood 1985).
The second major emphasis of western alienation is the widespread belief that the
federal government is unresponsive to Albertan interests on account of more formal-legal
factors, particularly the nature of Canadian intrafederal institutions (Lawson 2005). When
it comes to the majoritarian electoral system for the House of Commons, the significant
population of Central Canada (understood as Ontario and Quebec) in comparison to
Alberta and the western provinces makes it possible to form a majority government
without the support of the West. The same, however, cannot be said for the opposite. For
any party to form government, and thereby gain the power to impact policy outcomes, it
needs the support of either Quebec or Ontario, if not both. In this way, should these two
interests clash it seems likely that most parties and their governments would opt to
support central Canada. This is supported by aspects of the province’s historical
experience, as it is another way to read into the federal policies that have economically
disadvantaged the West. An early example, for instance, is the Liberal party’s support of
free trade and the removal of the National Policy in the 1911 election (Janigan 2012).
While this produced support from the West, the way it went against Central economic
interests delivered Ontario, and the election itself, to the Conservatives (Conway 2014).
What this produced, overall, is a common aversion to the status quo of how
Canadian federalism and representative institutions are constituted and practiced,
expressing itself in a popular support of reform at various moments in Canadian electoral
history. Alberta has, at least in the individuals it elects to Parliament, commonly
advocated some degree of change – whether this is in regard to the nature of party
discipline in the House of Commons, the electoral system, or the composition of the
Senate. This is not to suggest that Alberta does not support mainline parties; in fact,
several administrations, both Liberal and Conservative, have gained electoral support
from the province. Rather, it is to say that are common moments in which the mainline
parties come to be seen unresponsive, apathetic, or contrary to the needs of the province,
producing a shift of support to novel options. In 1921, for instance, the west’s economic
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concerns prompted the province’s voters to move its support of the federal Union
government to the Progressive Party. This was also evident in the 1993 Federal election
when the upstart Reform party, campaigning on a slogan of the “west wants in”, was able
to win 22 of the Alberta’s 26 seats at the time (Tupper and Gibbins 1992).
Overall, then, the claim of this framework is that Western alienation, although it
has economic and political conditions, now represents a broader, more culturally bound
orientation marking Albertans and their politics; that, regardless of the objective value of
the action, Albertans will habitually approach federal initiatives with skepticism, caution,
and a fear that Ottawa does not have the province’s best interests at heart (Gibbins 1979;
Wiseman 2007; Wesley 2011). In this way, western alienation conditions the success of
political leadership by incentivizing premiers to take on confrontational, even adversarial
positions toward the federal government to demonstrate their advocation for Albertan
interests. Here, they must also offer a “way out” of this economic and institutional
subordination however conceived.
Consequently, the salience of Western Alienation provides additional clarity into
understanding the process by which specific Alberta leaders are selected. That, in
advancing a common set of economic interests, leaders must do so in a way that coheres
with the broader disaffection directed towards central Canadian institutions.
Nevertheless, this is still too vague for the main question of this thesis. Aspiring leaders
have all articulated different understandings of concept, including the precise cause, the
identity of the exploiters, and the solution. Here, while many confronted the federal
government as the primary outsider, others have insinuated a broader force at work. It is
unclear, at this point, what determines which of these precise articulations is successful at
a given moment in time.
The inadequacy of Western Alienation in providing an answer to why certain
leaders are selected over others is especially stark given the fact that economic conditions
and western alienation do not properly distinguish Alberta from other provincial
identities in Canada. Saskatchewan, for instance, was created in the same year as Alberta
and – at least until Alberta’s economic shift to petroleum production – shared a similar
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set of economic characteristics and interests.25 The province, similarly, shares in the same
broader feeling of western alienation, supporting many of the same federally based
reform parties alongside Alberta (Berdhal and Gibbins 2014). Nevertheless, each
developed two discernably separate political traditions as Saskatchewan, in addition to
producing a socially democratic oriented political culture, has a stable and well-structured
party system, resulting in a routine exchange of power between two parties (Wiseman
2007). Consequently, it is necessary to consider the final component of Albertan
provincial politics: the salience of a widespread and near hegemonic conservative
political culture.

4.2.3

Conservative Political Culture

The final characteristic of Albertan political culture is that citizens approach politics from
a small ‘c’ conservative or right-wing ideological bent, whether in terms of values,
rhetoric, or policy preferences (Harrison and Laxer 1995; Pickup et al. 2004; Wiseman
2007; Wesley 2011). While a full discussion of the nuances of Albertan political ideology
is beyond the scope of this thesis, the provincial orientation tends to be characterized by a
set of overlapping terms, concepts and emphases, including “conservative”,
“individualistic”, “populist”, “anti-socialistic” and “freedom”. As argued by Wesley
(2011, p.56) it is characterized by more populist and anti-establishmentarian appeals to
“personal responsibility, free enterprise, private-sector development, entrepreneurship, a
strong work ethic, the evils of socialism, and the protection of individual rights and
liberties.”26
This, to scholars, is sourced from Alberta’s initial origins as the “last best west”: a
place which, in being unoccupied and unexploited by Europeans, was believed to have
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Given the attention that has been given to the differences between Saskatchewan and Alberta, several
scholars have argued that there are subtle, but consequential differences between the two. For reference
please refer to Lipset 1950, Thomas 1980, Smith 1991, Wiseman 2007.
26

Populism, itself another highly contentious and complex political ideology, is also commonly use to
characterize Alberta’s politics. As with conservatism, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss
comprehensively. Instead, it will be used in so far as it refers to direct, grassroots, and anti-elitist leadership
appeals.
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held the promise of new beginnings and economic potential for new settlers (Wiseman
2007).27 For Central Canadians, the region was seen as a place of untapped material
resources that – in being extracted and transported to global markets – would enlarge
Canada’s interests, comprising an essential component of early attempts at both Canadian
nation-building and economic development - a “cornerstone of the Confederation
project” (Conway 2014). Thus, from its origins, Alberta was the product of “easterncontrolled, resource-driven expansionist enterprises, translated into eastern desires and
then projected onto Western spaces” (West 2004, p.34). For the province’s original nonindigenous settlers, then, this undeveloped space offered the possibility of a new
beginning and the potential of prosperity; a “promised land…in which all material wants
would be provided and where moral and civic virtues would be perfected” (Wardhaugh
2000, p.8).28 It is believed, therefore, that the frontier of Alberta was and continues to be
not only a challenge but a social leveler: it is through independence, grit, and selfreliance, not tradition, authority or hierarchy, that individuals are capable of building
success. Put another way, “the notions of starting afresh on the frontier and struggling to
survive unleashed a bias against entrenched power, inherited privilege and the haughty
attitudes that went with them” (Takach 2010, p.64). Here, the individual is placed front
and center as the primary unit of society as it through their own self-reliance – with a
particular bent towards contrarianism - that they can bring prosperity to themselves and
their community. As a result, Alberta’s conservatism is particularly populist in nature,
based around notions of fairness, grassroots support, and an emphasis on the “wisdom of
ordinary people” (Banack 2021, p.8).
To most political culture theorists, the development within Alberta of a distinct
“conservative tradition” marked it apart from the other prairie provinces at an early stage.
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In reality, of course, the region was not empty but occupied by a significant number of Indigenous
peoples. However, the myth seems entrenched to the extent that – until at least very recently – they were
not taken seriously as part of the story of Alberta and its people.
An emphasis of this argument is that while other parts of the West – namely Manitoba and Saskatchewan
– also contained this sense of economic prosperity and a “new beginning”, Alberta was the last to be
settled. Consequently, Alberta not only remained underdeveloped longer, but it never lost an association
with the idea of the “mythical West”.
28
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It, for instance, is claimed to comprise a source of difference from Saskatchewan which,
despite sharing a similar set of initial economic and historical conditions, came to
approach them from a more collectivist stance (Wiseman 2007; Wesley 2011). As
discussed in chapter one of this thesis, the exact origin of and process behind this broader
culture is controversial.29 Indeed, the historical portrait of the province’s initial settlement
presented here could be used to describe the histories of the other western provinces,
contributing to a broader problem of what precisely makes Alberta different. In this
regard, most comprehensive analyses of Alberta’s political culture tend to conceptualize
it as the culmination of structural factors, formative events, economic staples, and early
settlement patterns (Wiseman 2007). Nevertheless, the specific factor of early settlement,
particularly Alberta’s large influx of American settlers, stands as the most empirically
substantiated difference between Alberta and the rest of the western provinces. Here, in
being a large portion of the province’s early population, the claim suggests that they were
influential in injecting a more American sense of individualism, freedom, and
conservatism that did not exist to the same degree in Manitoba or Saskatchewan.
Consequently, the claim here is that this sense of conservatism has come to take
on the force of a broader construct that conditions the way Albertans initially approach
and evaluate political phenomena (Wiseman 2007). It, in being formed, is imparted to
future members through socialization, is embedded in institutions, and transmitted over
time by the rhetoric of political elites (Wesley 2011). Consequently, leaders are
incentivized to shape their appeals in a way that corresponds to the broader assumptions,
values, and rhetoric devices within the culture. Thus, in addition to addressing the
previously discussed Albertan economic needs and sense of western alienation, leaders
must do so in a way that is consistent with broader conservative values.
In particular, once this conservative framework was incorporated together with
the economic and political problems of the province, it produced a unique framework by
which the province’s broader predicament was understood. In effect, they become issues
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Please see pages 5-6 in Chapter 2.
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relating to interference by a dominating outside “other” (Barrie 2006, p.14); the
“perception”, as argued by Mansell (1997, p.61) that “the main threats come from the
outside than from within the province.” It is only once this power is removed, with power
and freedom given to the people, that the province’s interests can be met. In this way, for
instance, Wesley (2011, p.55) argues that all successful Premiers abide by a “code of
freedom” in which their policy programs are justified as being favorable to enabling
individual initiative, connected to the will and common sense of the people, and critical
of an outside, interventionist actor.
However, in presenting this broad portrait, the reality is more complex. Evidence,
for instance, suggests that Albertans tend to support high levels of government spending
and interventions to address issues related to poverty, the environment, and
discrimination (Stewart and Sayers 2013; see also Smith 1992; Ellis 2019). The cities of
Calgary and Edmonton – which together comprise over half of the province’s population
– are among the most young, progressive, diverse, and secular cities in North America. In
fact, it has been argued that Albertans are better understood on account of their
community solidarity, as they – among other Canadians – are not only more likely to
identify with their local community more than other Canadians but engage in more forms
of volunteerism and grassroots civic participation (Pickup et al. 2004). Consequently,
Albertans have significant conformist tendencies, expressed by their appeals to traditional
religious values, the province’s history of censorship, and their willingness to defer
authority and direction to political leaders (Epp and Whiteson 2001; Grekul 2009;
Marchildon 2016).
For this reason, a singular emphasis on Alberta’s conservatism - while historically
dominant - neglects the degree to which alternative political visions have impacted the
province, both historically and contemporarily. This broader culture, at least as it has
been expressed electorally, did not emerge until the shift of Social Credit to the right in
the early 1940s. In reality, the province was initially governed by Liberal administrations.
Nevertheless, with the initial moment of populist backlash that occurred in 1921, it
demonstrated that the momentum of the province’s politics was decidedly left-wing. In
gaining the support of agricultural communities, the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA)
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became the first home grown political party to govern the province, committing to a
process of direct-democracy and a broader social democratic basis to policy (Young
1978; Rennie 2004). While the administration would become more moderate in power,
the party membership behind it would always contain radical elements (Laycock 1990).
Similarly, urban areas were affected by a powerful and active labor movement (Finkel
2012). Of note were the radical politics of coal miner associations, providing a foothold
for Communist organization within Alberta for several decades (Jacques 2018). With the
onset of the Depression, several of these forces coalesced into the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF), formed in Calgary on the promise to radically alter
the capitalist economic system and expand the role of government. Even here, William
Aberhart’s initial appeal for leadership and first term as Premier incorporated, especially
in terms of social and education, a policy agenda that can be labelled as social democratic
(Finkel 1989). More recently, attention could also be directed to the large grassroots
organizations advocating more post-materialist values, whether in the name of feminism,
anti-racism, indigenous sovereignty, sexual rights, or environmentalism. By sheer
numbers and activity, these remain among the largest grassroots organizations in Canada
(Harrison and Laxer 1995; Long 1997; Warner 2002; Harder 2003).
Given this level of diversity, it is necessary to note how, despite drawing upon a
broad conservative rhetoric, the degree to which several ‘conservative’ administrations
differ. There have been, on the one hand, very ideological administrations such as Ralph
Klein’s neoliberal project of leaner government and privatization (Lisac 1995). Yet, at the
same time, the Progressive Conservative party has been fluid in its actual policy
commitments, at times forming very centrist, perhaps even left-leaning administrations
(Vivone 2009). This includes how, despite belonging to the same party and utilizing the
same rhetoric as Klein – Lougheed’s administration was highly technocratic and
interventionist in the economy (Hustak 1979; Wesley 2011). Consequently, if truly
interrogated on a substantive level, this conception of Alberta’s “conservative” political
culture losses its analytical precision and explanatory power when it comes to electoral
outcomes. Even Ernest Manning, while basing his administration in a rhetoric of antisocialism, limited government, and free enterprise, presided over the largest public
expenditures of any provincial government at that time (Barr 1974). Indeed, Harrison
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(1995, p.13) goes so far as to criticize the government for building a “larger, more
integrated, pervasive, impenetrable and centralized state” whilst engaged in a limited
government rhetoric.
Additionally, and most importantly, is the 2015 rejection of the governing
provincial Progressive Conservatives in favor of an NDP administration under the
leadership of Rachel Notley. This is especially problematic given the fact that, even if the
NDP’s success is understood on account of Progressive Conservative failures, the party
won despite the fact that the Wildrose party offered a more populist, conservative
alternative (Sayers and Stewart 2013). Consequently, this election result would seem to
suggest that Alberta’s broader conservative culture, if not fictious, is no longer as salient
as it once was. This is the argument made, for instance, by Sharpe and Braid (2016) in the
way they hold that Notley’s victory is indicative of a broader shift in the province’s
culture to more progressive-based values. Nevertheless, this is brought into question by
the subsequent defeat of Notley in the proceeding provincial election of 2019 at the hands
of the then recently formed United Conservative Party under the leadership of Jason
Kenney.30
In effect, then, the existence of a broader conservative culture no longer stands on
its own legs as a precise and necessary component of a successful leadership appeal.
This, however, should not discount the fact that since at least the time of Ernest Manning
“conservatism”, however understood and applied, has been the dominant political force.
It is clear, as demonstrated in scholarly works, that successful leaders have gained
success by entrenching their rhetoric in an abstract set of terms oriented around
individualism, fairness, prosperity, and criticisms of an interfering outsider (Wiseman
2007; Wesley 2011). It is also shown, despite their more nuanced support for certain
policies, in the broad values Albertans have themselves expressed. Albertan group
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The UCP, it should be mentioned, was formed following the 2017 merger of the Progressive
Conservative party of Alberta and the Wildrose party of Alberta, which held a more populist, right-wing
policy agenda. A significant argument that was made in favour of the merger concerned the fact that the
NDP’s election was the consequence of the two splitting right-wing and right-of-centre voters.
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solidarity remains “bordered on a brand of liberaltarianism, with a unique collective
streak” (Banack 2021, p.12). While it is said to be egalitarian, practical, and
accommodative, being a member of the in-group is contingent on one’s willingness to be
hard working and, for the most part, self-reliant (Banack 2021). And, although formed as
an early collective response to a more rural way of life it has – as argued by several
authors – survived despite the increasingly urban character of the population. To Gibbins
(1979, p.164), these “attitudinal features” remain, left with a “nostalgic image of the
beliefs and values of an earlier agrarian society that has been transformed almost beyond
recognition.” In effect, despite the fact that political activities in Alberta may be
classified as collectivist, citizens engage in them – and therefore source successful
leadership appeals – in the belief that they do so as a collection of individuals advocating
for greater individual fairness, freedom and economic prosperity.
Consequently, I will argue that it becomes necessary at this point to shift away
from conservatism as a homogenous, coherent ideology framework to it being the
predominant, though not exclusive, expression of a much broader and abstract grouplevel means by which Albertans understand themselves, evaluate phenomena, and see
themselves within a provincial context. It is from this group-based function that the
broader outlook both finds its origin and is perpetuated by political elites over time. This
is to say that while a leader can be creative in implementing a particular policy agenda or
ideological bent to their government, it must be done in a way that is consistent with the
broader, and highly abstract framework characterized by an emphasis on individualism,
freedom, prosperity, fairness, and a foreboding towards some common “other” that
interferes in economic and political structures. In this way, the success of “conservative”
leaders is contingent not so much on the degree to which they are ideologically consistent
with conservatism, but rather the way they have appealed to broader Albertan values
according to a particularly conservative concretization.
Under this framework, Notley’s success can be broadly understood through how,
given flaws in the presentation of the PC’s and Wildrose, she associated her leadership
with these broader aspects, establishing the NDP as a credible alternative. Ultimately, as
will be articulated in greater detail below, it is the role of the leader to concretize this
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abstract set of values, concepts, and themes into one particular leadership appeal and
policy agenda.
To summarize, these three overlapping themes – economic conditions, western
alienation, and a broader group emphasis on individual freedom and prosperity –
comprise the broad conceptual aspects of Albertan provincial politics. It is evident that, in
forming a successful leadership appeal, aspiring leaders are incentivized to draw upon
these factors. Consequently, they will comprise the main set of components to the
Albertan group identity, as interpreted through a social identity lens.

4.3 Alberta Through a Social Identity Lens
Social Identity theory, as mentioned in the previous chapter, suggests that leaders are
successful to the extent that their appeals draw upon a group identity, comprised of a
legitimate articulation of who the group is and what they should do that is derived from
the pre-existing components that the group has already established about itself. In this
way, a successful leadership appeal is not just in meeting the society’s values, ideology,
or policy stance but by making it cohere with the broader policy program they seek to
advance. The following comprises a descriptive sketch that, while derived from an
empirical discussion and set of psychological processes, remains theoretical and abstract
in its reasoning and scope. While it remains too broad and simplistic to explain or predict
a specific ideological or policy outcome, we should observe that it comprises the means
by which a leader portrays themselves as a prototypical member and legitimizes their
particular policy agenda.
First, it is evident that the main origin of the Albertan group identity, apart from
the existence of the province itself, is its members formative experience in a newly
settled community oriented to the economic purpose of resource extraction. Most of the
province’s population came from elsewhere, and many of these migrants shared a similar
motivation to “start fresh” and seek the potential of prosperity. This comprised the main
means by which Albertans were able to distinguish themselves from others, particularly
the more populated, established, and traditional places from which they came.
Consequently, the abstract identity of a settler or pioneer comprises the first element of
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the collective category prototype. Here, my contention is that this almost romantic
emphasis on the “last best frontier”, including its associated themes of prosperity and
fairness, remains an important component of the way that Albertans as a group perceive
themselves and the political events around them.
Of course, this broader framework is not necessarily empirically precise: Alberta
was never the fair and egalitarian society this cognitive framework suggests that it was or
is. Particularly evident is the way that it completely excludes indigenous people from the
broader narrative it communicates. Instead, the emphasis here is that, given that most
non-indigenous Albertan settlers arrived in the mindset of establishing a new livelihood
and the potential of prosperity, it was an effective means by which the community could
establish a province-based identity on the basis of similarity. From here, this became how
citizens came to evaluate the ends and means of their provincial political institutions.
This impacted the present and future, as it influenced the collective decision-making
process regarding what path of action the province ought to take. But it also redefined
the past. To use a term from last chapter, the past constitutes a “symbolic reserve” that is
utilized to legitimize present activity (Haslam 2020). In this way, in being evaluated and
reinterpreted through a group lens, historical events and processes can became simplified
and romanticized within the broader group cognitive framework. Consequently, a basis of
similarity, once derived from an empirical component of the province, comes to feed into
Alberta’s self-cognition as a reoccurring cycle that continues to impact the way members
interpret and respond to political phenomena.
From here, it is clear that this broad settler image came to be further interpreted
and idealized through a particular individualist lens, that which imagined the
quintessential Albertan settler as a person of strength, ruggedness, and self-reliance. This
is evident, for instance, in the way Van Herk (2001), in her popular history of Alberta,
arrives at the term “maverick” as evocative of the way the province’s citizens see
themselves. Here, Alberta is not only “distinct” from the rest of Canada, but – as argued
by Takach (2010, p.3) - expressive of a unique set of “reoccurring values that remain
associated with Alberta – whether in truth, mythology, or both…opportunity, selfreliance, independence, immigration, riches, industry, and fairness.” Historically, this is
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represented through symbols of early Albertan “mavericks” – the frontiersman, the
rancher, the cowboy, the farmer. Today, it is conferred on more urban entrepreneurs, with
the settler condition reinterpreted “by its bearers as the absence of government, reduced
taxes, fewer regulations and survival of the ﬁttest on the open (both continental and
global) range” (Friesen 1999, p.185).
Here, it can be argued that the prominence of early American settlers, combined
with this settler image, was the original cause of this individualist emphasis.31 However,
social identity theory can be utilized to suggest that the particularly individualist
emphasis of Albertan group understanding served as a further means by which residents
distinguished themselves from others. It could be the case, for instance, that Alberta’s
emphasis on a more rugged individualism contrasts with the more traditionalist Toryism
that was prominent in Central and Eastern Canada (Wiseman 2007). It is also possible
that this became influential because of the way it contrasted sharply with the more
collectivist and social democratic political culture that developed in the neighboring
Saskatchewan (Wiseman 2007). In this way, Alberta’s individualist category prototype
emerged to further distinguish Alberta as a distinct provincial community that was not
synonymous with other prairie communities. Albertan individualism became preeminent
because it was the main means by which Alberta could be distinguished from
Saskatchewan, a province that had the same general demographic history, populist
political movements, and economic interests.
This, it should be emphasized, does not entail the success of one particular
ideological or policy agenda over another, nor does it necessitate the fact that all
members of the society will share the exact same political preferences. Rather, social
identity theory, as it has been theorized here, suggests that the aspiring leader who is
endowed with leadership is the one that most effectively utilizes these abstract group-

It is also worthwhile stating the influence Americans continue to have on the Alberta’s politics, such as
their representation in the province’s early reform movements (see Wiseman 2011 for details) and as the
petroleum industry’s early investors and executives.
31
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level understandings. Here, the point is the say that their own leadership and policy
agenda acts as the concretization, reflected to meet the needs of the current moment.
Nevertheless, given this category prototype of individually directed strength and
prosperity, it is important to incorporate the way it was contradicted by physical,
economic, and political realities. That, in effect, the fact that economic prosperity and
group influence was dependent on a broader set of national and continental forces. In this
way, an important element of Albertan identity formed around an entrenched feeling of
alienation or grievance, contributing to a sense that something was wrong and needed to
change for the province to fully meet its needs and interests. This developed on a
particular path in which, given the fact that Albertans believed themselves to be capable
individuals, the problem could not lie internally within the group itself. Rather, the
problematic position of Albertans was the product of exploitation, the interference of
some malicious “outsider”. This, therefore, formed the collective understanding – as once
put by Morton (1950, p.viii) - that “their region was one with a great potential future if
the hand of the outside exploiter could only be removed.” Here, Central Canada became
the main “outsider” to which this resentment was directed as, given Alberta’s
understanding of itself as a novel, settler society, it became an easy outgroup by which
the latter could be contrasted from.
Overall, then, this portrait of the Albertan group identity and its understandings
present the factors that condition the way specific aspiring leaders are selected over
others. First, it provides the elements by which a leader can convey themselves as a
prototypical group member. Here, they must – in their person – emphasize the abstract
group understanding based in the notion of rugged, self-reliant settlers in a way that
contrasts themselves from the outgroup which, in this case, typically means Central
Canada. By doing this, they personify an abstract image of a “typical Albertan” in a way
that is synonymous with the characteristics and needs of the current moment. From here,
they must articulate a message that, in being consistent with their person, utilizes these
aspects of Albertan group identity to articulate who the group is and what they ought to
do. Should these conditions be met, we should expect these leaders to maintain power for
a substantial amount of time, in that they are able to mobilize the support of citizens on
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the basis of this broader group principle. As will be outlined in the following chapters,
this thesis will analyze successful two leaders to determine if they attained leadership on
account of their ability to base their appeal in their presence as a prototypical member,
while drawing upon the Albertan social identity.
First, William Aberhart, the preacher and prophet of Social Credit, emerged as an
aspiring leader at the time of the Great Depression (Finkel 1989; Elliot 1987). As a
primarily agricultural society, the province had by this point become accustomed to a
boom and bust economic cycle in addition to a broader system of economic subordination
to outside, eastern financial interests. Here, the earlier success of the United Farmers of
Alberta in getting provincially elected had acted as the initial rejection by the Alberta
public of an outside foreign agent in the name of greater regional prosperity.
Nevertheless, the Great Depression entailed an overwhelming and unprecedented level of
destitution, including an incumbent leadership of the province seemingly incapable of
articulating a salient path forward. If both the theoretical framework and sketch of
Albertan group identity is correct, we should expect to demonstrably observe that
Aberhart, first, established his prototypicality by emphasizing a similarity with followers
on the basis on these broader characteristics Albertans define themselves. He should also
have demonstrably communicated a discernable “out-group” that further distinguish the
group he sought to lead. Second, upon establishing his individual prototypicality,
Aberhart should find success by framing his policy program of Social Credit as the
concretization of these broader group emphases on individualism, fairness, prosperity,
and cynicism towards outside interference.
Next, Peter Lougheed, in becoming leader of the Progressive Conservatives, was
able to defeat the 36 year dynasty of Social Credit by articulating a policy agenda better
suited to the needs of a more diverse, urban, and industrialized Alberta (Hustak 1979;
Bell 1993). As with Aberhart, we should expect Lougheed to establish his prototypicality
and legitimize his policy agenda on the same set of broad characteristics, understandings,
and values by which Albertans define themselves and evaluate political phenomenon.
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Chapter 5 – William Aberhart and Social Credit, 1935

5

Introduction

William “Bible Bill” Aberhart, leader of the Social Credit movement and Premier from
1935 to 1943, ranks among the most studied provincial political leaders (see for examples
Macpherson 1953; Irving 1959; Elliot and Miller 1987; Finkel 1989; Bell 1993; Stingel
2000; Banack 2016). Scholars have been puzzled by the way in which this preacher and
school principal without prior political experience was swept into power on the esoteric
monetary doctrine espoused by the Social Credit Party. Aberhart, as an aspiring leader,
was selected above his competitors to be endowed with the formal leadership of the
Alberta premiership. The question to consider is why did this happen?
This chapter seeks to determine whether Aberhart’s success can be accounted for
through identity leadership theory. In particular, it will utilize aspects of Aberhart’s
leadership appeal to determine if support can be found for two hypothesized
relationships: that, first, Aberhart established himself and based his appeal in his being a
prototypical member of the Albertan group identity and, second, the he framed his policy
agenda as the concretization of a coherent set of Albertan group understandings and
values. In this regard, this chapter comprises the following elements. First, it briefly
discusses the career of William Aberhart, the basis of his aspirational leadership, and the
components of his policy agenda. Second, it provides a brief sketch of the broader
economic, social, and political context surrounding Aberhart’s election in 1935. Third, it
considers the scholarly frameworks that have been developed to understand Social
Credit’s success. Finally, Aberhart’s activities as an aspirational leader are analyzed in
light of the two core hypotheses.
Overall, in analyzing the characteristics of Aberhart’s leadership appeal, this
chapter concludes that identity leadership theory as developed in this thesis lacks
explanatory value in accounting for the particular success of Premier Aberhart. More
precisely, while I locate support for hypothesis two in this case study, with respect to
hypotheses one there is little evidence that Aberhart effectively conveyed himself as a
prototypical group member. We now turn to consider this unusual politician.
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5.1 The Leader and The Appeal: William Aberhart and
Social Credit
This section provides an overview of William Aberhart, notes his aspirations for formal
political leadership, and summarizes the characteristics of the policy agenda he advocated
for. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive and nuanced picture
of Aberhart’s personality in addition to the complexities of Social Credit as a broad
school of economic analysis. Instead, aspects of this unusual politician and the Social
Credit doctrine more broadly are discussed in so far as they are necessary to fully analyze
the way his leadership appeal came to be structured, performed, and articulated.
Prior to the Great Depression, William Aberhart apparently had no plans to
become a political leader. Born and raised in Southern Ontario, Aberhart – like many of
his eventual followers – had emigrated to Alberta as an adult seeking after a new
livelihood (Elliot and Miller 1987, p.23). In Aberhart’s case, it was an offer to be the
principal of Crescent View High School in Calgary, an occupation he would perform
until his election as Premier (Elliot 2004, p.127). However, the majority of Aberhart’s
passion, energy, and attention was directed to his religious activities. By the time of the
stock market crash in 1929, he had built a following as a lay preacher at the Westbourne
Baptist Church. He espoused “born again” Christian fundamentalism and near-obsession
with end-time prophesy (Banack 2016, p.116). He was also responsible for the
organization of the Calgary Prophetic Bible Conference which was held every Sunday for
“the purpose of discussing the fundamental doctrine of the Word” and involved
addressing large public audiences (Finkel 1989, p.29). Beginning in 1925, the conference
began radio broadcasts of Aberhart’s sermons, establishing himself as a major broadcast
figure. By the time of his entry politics his radio sermons were reaching 300,000 people
(Mann 1955, p.22). Finally, Aberhart had also managed to find the time to open the
Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute, a fundamentalist seminary where – in addition to his
work as a principle and preacher – he served as dean (Elliot and Miller 1987, p.80).
Consequently, it is hard to discern any long-established motivations for seeking
political leadership on the part of Aberhart. Instead, by all indictors, his focus was
entirely directed to his broader religious mission which, given his emphasis on
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premillennialism, tended to downplay the value of devout Christians becoming involved
in political movements.32 Nevertheless, in reviewing his religious activity, Aberhart’s
proclivities towards leadership are evident. Within organizations, he repeatedly displayed
authoritarian tendencies as expressed by a personal need for control and centralized
decision-making around his own person (Elliot and Miller 1987). At the same time,
however, Aberhart’s efforts were assisted by his workaholism, demonstrated
organizational ability, and his effective oratorical skills as a preacher (Finkel 1989).
Elements of Aberhart’s work as a religious leader also suggest a personal
awareness of how to convey an attractive persona to gain support from his audience.
Though it is far too presumptive to insinuate that Aberhart consciously knew the
conditions of a successful leader appeal, his writings indicate he was a seasoned
professional. For instance, in a series of pastoral leadership manuals, he admonished
seminarians to convey a “magnetic personality” consisting of “personal attributes which
draw people to the speaker and incline them to sympathize with or rally around him”
(citied in Day 1990, p.3). Aberhart further suggests that a “mechanical or unconscious
response” can be derived from the audience from, first, the fact that the “proposed course
of action is shown to be in harmony with the [audience’s] instinctive and acquired
tendencies” and, second, that the speaker in their “general attractiveness and particular
earnestness” brings “his whole personal influence to bear on the audience” (citied in Day
1990, p.4).
More than anything, it appears that Aberhart’s initial foray into provincial politics
was motivated by a genuine desire to ensure a better living standard for Albertans. His
biographers often suggest that it was the destitution of the Great Depression that aroused
his sympathy and resolve to do something to address the province’s problems, pointing to
a particular moment when one of Aberhart’s students resorted to suicide (Elliot and
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For this reason, a significant degree of research on Aberhart has attempted to discern whether his
theology and political ideology were consistent with each other, falling into discernable camps on both
sides (see Mann 1955; Irving 1959; Elliot 1978; Banack 2016). This, including the nuanced theological and
intellectual discussion it requires, is far beyond the scope of this thesis to cover fully. As a result, it will not
seek to determine the extent to which Aberhart’s religious thought was connected to his political ideology.
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Miller 1987; Elliot 2004). The means by which concluded that the Social Credit Party
was the solution to the province’s problems, rather than any other political alternative
circulating at the time, is considered by several scholars to be a matter of coincidence. In
particular, it is believed to have been introduced to Aberhart by one of his educational
colleagues at a particularly salient moment (Elliot and Miller 1987; Elliot 2004; Finkel
1989).
The phrase “social credit” refers to an economic theory developed by a British
military engineer, Major C.H Douglas. As summarized by Irving it was a “a monetary
theory which both ‘explains’ the inner workings of the capitalistic financial system and
offers a remedy for its unsatisfactory functioning in periods of depression” (1959, p.6).
Overall, its main claim is that modern industrial capitalism had failed to provide
sufficient purchasing power to producers, making capitalist economies both inefficient
and prone to suffering from economic depressions (Elliot and Miller 1987). In advancing
this view Douglas relied on his “A + B” theorem which concluded that given the fact that
the sales price for products included the cost of labor, the raw materials, interest charges,
profit and other expenses, workers – who only received the pay equivalent to the cost for
their labor – could not afford all of the products they made (Finkel 1989). Consequently,
Douglas argued, funds to make up the difference – enacted through state-issued
individual credit – would produce a more efficient economic system, ensure greater
material prosperity, and prevent the cycle of depression (Elliot and Miller 1987).
In understanding Douglas’s ideology it is important to emphasize that this
framework was not comprised of a wholesale attack on the notion of free enterprise itself.
Rather, it is comprised of the claim that capitalist economics as practiced at the time
failed to properly utilize industrialization’s full potential in creating material prosperity
and individual freedom. Douglas directed most of his criticism towards the exploitative
behavior of financial interests that selfishly keep the current system in place (Finkel
1989). As a result, he advocated for a system in which, rather than through a process of
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democratic legitimacy, Social Credit was to be largely enacted by a body of “experts”
(Wesley 2011).33
Social Credit ideas, although a British import, had become established among
Albertans by the mid-1920s. Indeed, by the point of Aberhart’s political entry, the idea
had been popular within among prominent members of the United Farmers of Alberta
(UFA) and a small, but dedicated association of intellectuals dedicated to advancing
Douglas’s ideas (Finkel 1989). Nevertheless, it was Aberhart who was responsible for the
movement’s popular appeal with his promise that each resident would receive a monthly
twenty-five-dollar stipend by the government of Alberta (Finkel 1989, p. 30).
It is unclear the extent to which Aberhart understood, or knew how to implement,
the theory as it had been articulated by Douglas. Indeed, throughout his leadership
appeal, he never coherently and cohesively articulated the way the social dividend would
work, or the means by which it would be implemented, suggesting instead that this would
be determined by experts once the party was in power (Elliot and Miller 1987). This
entailed the main source of criticism directed towards Aberhart by his contemporaries
and still maintained by contemporary scholars (Macpherson 1953; Irving 1959; Finkel
1989; Elliot and Miller 1987; Stingel 2001). First, Douglas’s broader economic analysis
that justified Social Credit policies continues to be widely regarded to be highly flawed
and inherently fallacious (Stingel 2001). Second, given Canada’s federal structure, the
province was in no position to legally enact Social Credit policies, leading Douglas
himself to disparage Aberhart’s efforts on a provincial level as pointless (Elliot and
Miller 1987, p.141). Nevertheless, it is important to include other elements of Aberhart’s
broader policy agenda, particularly the unique ideological components he himself
introduced. As observed by Finkel (1989), he departed from the more right-wing Douglas
in his rhetorical emphasis on class division, the state’s ultimate authority over the market,
state regulation of pricing, and limiting the incomes of the rich.

This was also indictive of a more paranoid, conspiratorial side to Douglas’s thought. Increasingly, he
would come to place more and more emphasis on a broader international Jewish conspiracy, infecting the
movement with an entrenched element of anti-semitism (Stingel 2000).
33
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For the most part, Aberhart’s activities in advancing the cause of Social Credit
were informal and based on policy. In effect, he first approached the movement in his
capacity as a religious figure, incorporating social credit ideas into his radio broadcasts
and building an infrastructure of study groups through his social network at the Calgary
Prophetic Bible Institute (Elliot and Miller 1987; Bell 1993). More and more of his
activities became dedicated to furthering the growth of the movement, including regular
speaking tours throughout the province and the production of policy memorandums.
Quite remarkably, he continued to work as a full-time principal, delivered weekly
sermons, and administered over the bible institute throughout this period.
Aberhart’s biographers conclude that forming a new political party to contest the
next election was not his original plan. Rather, he initially believed that Social Credit’s
policies could be enacted by any of the province’s existing political parties, particularly
the United Farmers of Alberta, after a concentrated effort at lobbying and increasing
public support (Elliot and Miller 1987). It was only upon being rebuffed on multiple
occasions that in late 1934 Aberhart’s movement channeled its energies towards electoral
contestation by formal registering as Alberta Social Credit, adopting a constitution, and
deciding to run candidates. Apart from the plan to enact the Social Credit monetary
system, the party’s platform included a wide range of other policies including the
elimination of borrowing from outside the province, legislation for the relief of debtors,
securing new export markets, lowering freight rates, assistance for drought areas, and
revising the system of grading produce (Elliot and Miller 1987, p.195). The organization
was, on paper, a fully democratic and grassroots organization in which authority was
vested in a representative central council. Formally, the party had no leader (Finkel
1989). Nevertheless, in practice it was clear that Aberhart controlled the party in an
authoritarian manner. As the face and main source of support for the party, he controlled
the party’s policy program and personally selected its candidates (Elliot 2004).
Ultimately, then, regardless of the movement’s novelty and the insurmountable
problem of fiscal jurisdiction, the support it gained in the 1935 election was
overwhelming. Receiving just over 54% of the popular vote, the party won 56 of the 63
seats in the legislature (Rennie 2004). Aberhart, in disavowing his leadership and
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partisanship, had in fact not actually run for any seat. Nevertheless, it was immediately
apparent who would lead the government as Premier, prompting Aberhart to immediately
be acclaimed in a by-election (Elliot and Miller 1987).
How then does this analysis account for Aberhart’s success as a party leader? The
unique aspects surrounding this case – his lack of political experience, his religiosity, his
novel and somewhat odd policy agenda – has preoccupied the minds of several
generations of scholars. In the next section we turn to determine if Aberhart’s success can
be helpfully understood through the lens of identity leadership theory. However, before
doing so, it is first necessary to concisely discuss the broader political, economic, and
social context of the province at the time. This not only provides the details for the
specific society that elected Aberhart, but – in order to properly evaluate the usefulness of
social identity theory – it forms an important basis on which to assess Aberhart’s
prototypicality and group-based appeals.

5.2 The Context: Alberta of the Great Depression
In understanding the broader context of Aberhart’s successful exercise of political
leadership, it is first and foremost helpful to consider Alberta’s experience with the Great
Depression. The essential part of his proposed policy agenda was the way in which social
credit ideology was communicated as the means to solve the problems related to the
province’s economic destitution. Consequently, this section discusses the specific context
of depression-era Alberta, with particular attention given to the way the context’s broader
economic, political, and social problems were interpreted in light of the broader group
portrait articulated in the previous chapter. Overall, this section will overview the way in
which Alberta’s economic position, set of grievances against Ottawa, and broader
individualist settler image created a moment of significant crisis.
In this period, Alberta can be described as a recently settled, predominately rural,
and highly religious society that was economically reliant on agricultural exports. It was
an environment of relative novelty and population growth, as people from other parts of
Canada and the world continued to arrive in the province to start a new life. In this way,
the population of approximately 150,000 people in 1905 grew to over 770,000 people by
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1931 (Rennie 2004). This rapid growth entailed significant provincial government
expenditures that, in addition to amassing substantial debt, spent profusely on the
infrastructure necessary for rapidly growing communities (Rennie 2004). Data from this
period reflects the degree to which agricultural exports dominated Alberta’s economy.
Given that there were 100,000 farms in a population of Alberta’s size, just under half of
the province’s population were directly employed by agricultural production (Stingel
2000). The remaining non-agricultural labor was predominately generated by, and
worked in accordance with, this sector. Overall, less than a quarter of the population
worked in the service, commercial, and financial sectors (Finkel 1989).
Alberta’s economic wellbeing was therefore orientated around one common
extractive economic process. Land, manufacturing, and product-based assets were be
purchased from Eastern sources. Following this, agricultural product would be grown,
extracted, and then transported by rail to continental and international markets. The
problem was the degree to which “one common denominator among the settlers was that
they were not masters of their own fate” (Young, 1978, p.1). On the one hand, the profit
of agricultural exports was reliant on the unpredictable demand of foreign grain markets
which, while producing definite “boom” periods, inevitably led to “busts”. While this
impacted agricultural producers directly, it was also felt by workers in other sectors. It
was common, for instance, for homes purchased at inflated prices in boom periods to
quickly decline in value, leading owners to make payments high above the property’s
mortgage principle (Stingel 2000). There was also the unmanageable nature of the
environment itself. Starting in 1916, a multi-year drought in the south east of the province
prompted the largest farm abandonment in Canadian history, resulting in the desertion of
several small towns (Rennie 2004).
But, most importantly, was the way that economic and financial power was
maintained by Eastern-controlled interests. Given that most Albertans of the time were
recent settlers, a large proportion of the population took loans from Eastern-based
financial institutions to purchase their homes and property (Elliot and Miller 1987). This
was particularly the case for agricultural producers, to whom what seemed like an
exploitative relationship occurred on a yearly cycle. Given that their profits followed

93

from the harvest, prior to the start of the season farmers were often required to borrow to
pay for product and manufacturing equipment, which – given Canadian-US tariffs, were
more expensive. And, in selling their product, farmers were required to pay an array of
expenses to the grain dealers and railway transportation. Nevertheless, the point was that,
regardless of the broader forces that negatively impacted Albertans, the central Canadian
forces remained constant and in place despite bust periods. Tariffs on manufacturing
equipment and other products went on, and railway freight rates remained the same
despite the fact that the agricultural exports themselves generated less revenue (Conway
2014). In particular, debt and interest payments became the “crop that never fails”
(Stingel 2000, p.9).
In the Great Depression these aspects hit a breaking point, as the rapid decline in
global grain markets entailed overwhelming economic destitution (Finkel 1989). Before
turning to a discussion of this condition, it is important to also provide an overview of the
way the province’s feelings of grievance towards central Canada and support for reform
movements developed. Alberta was created in 1905 only after a protracted struggle
between provincial politicians and the federal government in which the former, regardless
of their partisan affiliations, banded together for greater provincial control (Janigan
2012). Following this, a series of scandals in the 1910s ingrained the sense that the
mainline provincial parties were “eastern-controlled” (Pal 1992; Rennie 2004; Barrie
2006). For this reason, the political energy of the province had been directed to novel,
reform-based movements. The first of these, the Non-Partisan League (NPL), emerged in
1917 on the policy program of non-partisan “business government” and public ownership
of farm machinery manufacturing, railways, coal mines, packing houses, insurance
companies, and banks (Finkel 1989). But it was the United Farmers of Alberta’s (UFA)
landslide victory in 1921 that acted as the period’s culmination of anti-Eastern
resentment. The party, under three Premiers, would maintain a hold on power until 1935
(Rennie 2004).
In 1921, the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), which originated as a farmer
advocacy organization, entered electoral politics on the promise to eschew traditional
forms of party and parliamentary administration, advocating instead for “group
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government” and direct democracy (Pal 1992). Nevertheless, over time – particularly
under the Premiership of John Brownlee (1925-1934) – the party eventually conformed to
traditional forms of parliamentary structure and centralized administration, and, in terms
of policy, became an inherently prudent, cautious, and somewhat reactionary government
(Rennie 2004).
In this way, the Great Depression, with these entrenched feelings considered,
served as a moment of collective crisis: that, as interpreted through a social identity lens,
we find that Albertans as a group were deeply unsatisfied and unsure of what to do. First,
there was the economic fallout. By 1933, the profit of the province’s agricultural products
was only slightly above a third of what it had been in 1927, prompting a 92% decline in
the agricultural economy throughout the prairies that left many destitute (Stingel 2000,
p.8). In the cities of Calgary and Edmonton 14% of residents were on some form of relief
(Finkel 1989, p.17). Second, already accustomed to directing grievances to the federal
government and other central Canadian institutions, Albertans found that the broader
political and economic system to which they were subject had made things worse by
continuing to charge tariffs, freight rates, and loan payments. Third, was a provincial
government that, rather than articulating a path forward, appeared to be aloof and
reactionary. As put by Foster (2004, p.99), Albertans “suddenly found themselves
searching for legitimate leadership at the same time as they faced the most drastic
commodity price collapse in Canadian history.” Aspects of this, it should be mentioned,
were part of the broader problem with public debt that the government had to deal with.
Nevertheless, certain actions worked to challenge the United Farmer’s legitimacy. In
particular. Brownlee’s Premiership would been embroiled in allegations of having had an
affair with a minor (Foster 2004).
The general uncertainty of the period was reflected in a sense of general
restlessness and momentum that had been gained by a set of reform-based movements.
The years leading up to 1935 had seen several protests, strikes, and other demonstrations
by workers and groups of destitute Albertans (Finkel 1989, 2012). The CCF had been
formed in 1932, and the Canadian Communist Party had garnered a larger, more activist
membership (Jacques 2018). Nevertheless, as discussed, it was William Aberhart that
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was ultimately successful in gaining the leadership of the province in 1935. Given that
the broader context has been covered, this analysis can now turn to analyzing the basis
for Aberhart’s success. In the next section it is useful to incorporate the descriptive work
that has already been performed to understand the substantiative aspects of his appeal.

5.3 Traditional Accounts of Aberhart’s Success
What was it about Aberhart’s leadership appeal that made him successful? Here, the
relative uniqueness of his leadership and policy agenda has produced a large, dense, and
contentious literature that attempts to understand the nature of his authority. This has
been in part developed in tandem with additional scholarly efforts to label the social
credit movement, focused on determining whether it is best understood as a form of
reactionist conservatism (Macpherson 1953), a semi-fascist cult of personality (Irving
1959), a left-wing quasi-social gospel (Finkel 1989), or a fundamentalist religious
crusade (Mann 1959). While it is beyond this chapter to comprehensively evaluate and
take sides on each of these theories, they provide an important set of variables relevant to
his success. Overall, they point to the fact that Aberhart’s success cannot be understood
without three essential factors: economic destitution caused by the Depression, the
religiosity of the movement, and his objective skills in leadership and organization.
First, it is self-evident that the economic doctrine of the Social Credit Party was
for most Albertans effective in making sense of the broader economic destitution of the
province, and offering a solution to it (Elliot and Miller 1987; Finkel 1989; Rennie 2004).
Scholars note how Social Credit additionally played into a broader disaffection with
laissez faire capitalism and a well-developed culture of grievance towards central
Canadian institutions (Finkel 1989). Nevertheless, in understanding the specific success
of Social Credit over other reform movements, Macpherson (1964) was the first to
suggest that Social Credit is best understood as the reactionary revolt of the province’s
“independent commodity producers” to the “quasi-colonial” economic structure they
found themselves in. Social Credit was appealing because of its promise of limited
change; that while it addressed the broader structures of economic of exploitation it
would retain private property rights (Macpherson 1964).
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A problem with Macpherson’s analysis, however, is that he overemphasizes the
size and electoral impact of the independent commodity producer demographic. Instead,
as demonstrated by subsequent analysis (McCormick 1980; Bell 1993), Social Credit
received as much support from wage laborers. In this way, support – rather than being
confined to one economic group – was correlated to overall income and class status (Bell
1993). Consequently, Social Credit is better understood as a cross-class movement which,
in being comprised predominately of workers, farmers, and some small business owners,
is understood through the appeal that it held to individuals that were particularly affected
by the economic reversal of the Great Depression (Finkel 1989). The more working-class
appeal of the movement also accounts for why Social Credit’s biggest opposition within
the province came from the urban bourgeoise elite (Elliot and Miller 1987).
The second factor relevant to the success of the appeal of William Aberhart and
Social Credit is its religious aspect. As discussed, Aberhart based much of his early
political activities upon his work as a religious leader, incorporating Social Credit ideas
into his Sunday sermons and radio programs (Elliot and Miller 1987). It was for this
reason that, up until his election in 1935, he continued to entrench his political policy
arguments within a religious framework of understanding and justification (Banack
2016). In articulating the impact of religion in Aberhart’s appeal, early scholars tended to
be disparaging in their analysis, suggesting that Social Credit constituted a fanatical
religious crusade structured around mob psychology (Macpherson 1953; Mann 1955;
Irving 1959). These depictions are, for the most part, exaggerations that overlook both the
diversity of Christian traditions within Alberta and the considerable religious backlash
received by Aberhart, often splitting entire congregations into one of two sides (Finkel
1989; Elliot and Miller 1987). It is also important to emphasize both the broader
importance of religion in all prairie societies at this time and the degree to which
Christian themes were incorporated into the appeals of other aspiring political leaders
(Banack 2016; Marchildon 2016). Nevertheless, both economic and religious
explanations for Aberhart’s success beg the question of what made him particularly
successful as a leader. It is unclear why the Social Credit Party was selected above its
other competitors, such as the CCF, that appealed to precisely the same set of economic
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problems. Also, unestablished is what made Aberhart’s religious appeal – one of many in
a very Christian society – particularly salient.
The final relevant factor is the impact of Aberhart’s skills at leadership and
organization, in addition to the political miscalculations of competitors, in providing the
Social Credit party with a clear advantage. These components of Aberhart’s work as an
aspiring leader cannot be discounted or ignored; it most certainly helped that Aberhart
had a pre-existing following as a religious leader, was a precocious personality, an
incredibly capable communicator, and a hard-working organizer. Nevertheless, as
discussed earlier in this thesis, leadership conferment – understood here as a recognition
– is not contingent on the individual’s attributes. Rather, a proper causal mechanism
needs to demonstrate the process by which Aberhart’s broader leadership appeal,
including his economic solution, religiosity, and personal attributes, was specifically
recognized by Albertans as the most legitimate option. Consequently, the remainder of
this chapter will interpret these characteristics of Aberhart’s appeal through a social
identity lens, evaluating not only its accuracy but its analytical ability in addressing the
study’s broader research question.

5.4 Aberhart Through a Social Identity Lens
This section applies the broader theoretical inferences of identity leadership theory to the
Aberhart case through examining two hypotheses to determine its usefulness as a
framework for leadership. As discussed earlier in this study, identity leadership theory
holds that the researcher can understand and account for the success of leaders through
the way they base their appeal in group processes (Haslam et al. 2020). More precisely,
this occurs in two stages: First, aspiring leaders establish themselves as prototypical
members to gain the legitimacy necessary to articulate a course of action for the group.
Second, this is used to articulate a substantive definition of identity in which, through a
process of concretization and anchoring, the leader utilizes group processes to gain
support for their specific policy agenda. The remainder of this chapter analyzes and
evaluate these hypotheses in light of the case of William Aberhart, and then offers some
conclusions that pertain to the overall usefulness of the approach in explaining this case.
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Methodologically, this analysis will rely on a set of primary sources of Aberhart’s
rhetoric and communication from the time of his testimony to the Legislature of Alberta
on March 19th, 1934 to his election as Premier on August 22nd, 1935. These dates are
selected because, as argued by his biographers (David And Elliot, p.138), it was after the
testimony that Aberhart fully decided to organize Social Credit into a novel political
party. The specific materials analyzed include the following. First, this analysis will
utilize The Douglass System of Social Credit: Evidence Taken by the Agricultural
Committee to the Alberta Legislature, an account of Social Credit’s hearing before the
legislature that was later written and published by Aberhart in mid-1934. Another written
source included will be the Social Credit Manuel which, in being written by Aberhart,
acted as the de facto Social Credit policy platform in 1935. Finally, this analysis will
utilize transcripts from a series of Aberhart’s campaign radio broadcasts in 1935 for two
reasons: first, it allowed Aberhart to directly address a significant portion of the
population and, second, unlike his in-person speeches, their original audio has been
captured and transcribed for posterity.34 Here, I have also included Aberhart’s “Man from
Mars” series which, in being broadcast over the radio during Aberhart’s normal timeslot,
involved the use of a fictious “Man from Mars” who, in being played by an actor, would
make observations of Albertan society and act as an additional means by which Aberhart
could articulate characteristics of the Albertan group identity.35
Throughout his life and especially in this period, Aberhart was an intensely
prolific speaker and writer, making it beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a
comprehensive and in-depth analysis of Aberhart’s entire discursive appeal. This analysis
is also limited by barriers of access to a substantial amount of material pertaining to
Aberhart’s communicative activities from this period. While the Provincial Archives of

34

These radio excerpts were found in the Walter Norman Smith Papers at the Glenbow-Alberta Institute.
These have been made available online through the University of Calgary.
35

The complete original transcript used for these broadcasts has been lost. The best copies currently
available are a handwritten copy completed by Iris Miller in 1954 and are physically available through the
Iris Miller collection at the Glenbow-Alberta Institute. Given my inability to access the full physical copy
document in Edmonton, I have relied on the extensive passages of the document used in Elliot and Miller’s
biography of Aberhart as the source of my excerpts in this analysis.
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Alberta holds physical copies and audio tape recordings of many of Aberhart’s speeches,
issues related to travel, finance resources, and time have rendered their use in this
analysis unfeasible. Additionally, in being undertaken during the Covid-19 pandemic,
this research was also restricted by further limitations on interprovincial travel and
reduced staffing levels in public archives and libraries. Nevertheless, by selecting a
portion of Aberhart’s broader corpus this analysis is still capable of demonstrating
broader themes in Aberhart’s rhetoric. Put more specifically, this is enough material to
determine whether or not Aberhart, in making his appeal for formal leadership, drew on
the broader Albertan group identity.

5.4.1

Hypothesis One: Individual Prototypicality

The first hypothesis of this analysis states: If an aspiring leader is most effective at
conveying themselves as a prototypical member, understood through the way they
articulate the group’s category prototypes as determined by a meta-contrast ratio, they
will then be seen as a legitimate source of authority. If this is accurate, the proceeding
analysis ought to demonstrate this process of prototypicality conveyance in four
discernable stages.
First, Aberhart should be observed to consistently address and direct his rhetoric
towards a specific and discernable group. Given his aspiration for provincial leadership,
this should be some variant on the broader notion of “Albertan.” Second, Aberhart should
then proceed to articulate a set of discernable characteristics of that group that act as
means by which to emphasize their similarities. Given the theoretical framework that has
been developed in this analysis, Aberhart is assumed to have considerable creativity in
determining what those characteristics are in addition to the specific way by which he
articulates it. Nevertheless, they should find grounding in the broader aspects of the
Albertan context that provide a salient means by which to emphasize a source of
similarly, such as the common economic experience or historic experience of alienation.
From here, Aberhart should then thirdly identify a discernable “out-group” that is
characterized in a way that distinguishes them from the identity of Albertans that he
constructs, further emphasizing Albertans’ similarities with each other and distinctions
from others. Finally, on the basis of this defined and articulated set of characteristics,
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Aberhart should convey himself as prototypical by explicitly referring to the fact that he
exemplifies the set of characteristics he has articulated.
As mentioned above in the theoretical framework chapter, this methodological
framework simplifies the identity articulation process. In reality, it is likely that all these
components operate simultaneously and with considerable overlap rather than
sequentially. Nevertheless, in examining Aberhart’s communications as leader we should
be able to extrapolate separate and discernible elements of each.
When it comes to the first stage of the process, it is clear that Aberhart directs his
appeal to a consistent notion of the “people of Alberta.” For instance, The Social Credit
Manuel introduces Social Credit as the subject that has “pressed itself upon the
consciousness of the people of this province” (Aberhart 1935, p.8). The same document
goes on the state that the platform “provides the bare necessities of life to every bona fide
citizen of the Province, and forever frees our loyal citizens from the dread of poverty”
(Aberhart 1935, p.12).
In examining the second stage of the process, the material I have analyzed
demonstrates that Aberhart articulates a specific conceptualization of who the “people of
Alberta” are by emphasizing two main characteristics. First, they are defined by their
common, collective experience of suffering. Aberhart’s speeches and written
memorandum are full of images of stark suffering on the part of farmers and other
workers and blaming a set of circumstances largely beyond their control. For instance, on
a radio broadcast from November 27, 1934, the Man from Mars observes to Aberhart that
“I find that many of your people are suffering from poverty and starvation. Even little
children cry for the food and clothing that your government ordered destroyed. But their
parents cannot buy the goods because they have no money” (Aberhart, Man from Mars
Broadcast, 27 November 1934). Similarly, in a broadcast on April 28th, 1935, Aberhart
depicts the picture of a women and two children who had “such a worn-out looking face.
Hope was gone…the two little ones were half sobbing and half crying at her knee and she
hadn’t anything to give them” (Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, April 28th 1935).
Throughout these examples, Aberhart is focused above all on the fact that this was not the
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necessary state of affairs, that there was “poverty in the midst of plenty.” An example
includes the question he asked in a 1934 statement before the provincial legislature:
Let us remember that our province is potentially a land of plenty. None of our citizens
should be suffering from want or privation. The granaries are full and goods are piled
high in the storehouses. We have an abundance of foodstuffs that are being wasted, or
wantonly destroyed. Why then should many of our people be in dire need, in suffering
from worry, from privation, and from hopelessness? (Aberhart 1934, p.11).

It was on the basis of this broad economic group condition that Aberhart both
attacks the incumbent administration and positions his particular policy agenda as the
right solution. Consequently, the Social Credit Manuel articulates the fundamental
premise and goal of the policy program as the principle that “no bona fide citizen, man,
women, or child, shall be allowed to suffer for lack of the bare necessities of food,
clothing, and shelter, in the midst of plenty or abundance” (Aberhart 1935, p.8). Here, the
lack of support for Social Credit by incumbent governments and political elites is decried
as being a product of the pejorative “traditional type of mind…which fears to try
anything that has not been proven by actual experience to be well founded” (Aberhart
1935, p.61).
The second major characteristic that Aberhart used to define Albertans was their
overall moral and religious superiority. Here, there is an assumption that the province’s
improvement is largely on account of the intelligence, strength, and initiative of the
people. In concluding one November 13th Man from Mars broadcast, for instance, he
admonishes his listeners to rise above their predicament and forge a path forward: “surely
every citizen of Alberta should have enough common, ordinary horse-sense to know that
there is no need to starve in a full hay padlock…he invariably goes to the core of the
matter and there raises his standard living. We can if we will” (Aberhart, Man from Mars
Broadcast, November 13 1934). This was further interpreted through a particularly
religious lens, in which Aberhart prompts Albertans to support Social Credit on the basis
of their Christian values, arguing that Social Credit was “applied, practical Christianity”
(Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 3 May 1935). His sermons and radio broadcasts came to
interpret more and more Bible stories and passages as consistent with Social Credit. In a
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broadcast on April 30th, 1935, for instance, he draws upon Christ’s parable of the ten
pounds in Luke 19 to not only describe the economic mechanism behind social credit but
insinuate that Christ himself was supportive of the economic theory (Aberhart, Campaign
Broadcast, 30 April 1935). Similarly, in a Easter broadcast of April 19th, 1935, he
compares his political movement to the resurrection of Christ: “The Easter message is a
message of hope. There is deliverance. There is salvation. God can and will work even a
miracle to bring his people into a place of joy and prosperity. Is that not a message for all
believers of Social Credit” (Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 19 April 1935).
From here, an examination of this qualitative material also demonstrates the third
process in Aberhart’s identification of financial interests as a discernable out-group that,
in addition to supplying a specific explanation for the group-based suffering, provided the
group with the means to further clarify who they were by distinguishing themselves from
others. Here, Aberhart emphasizes the degree to which this out-group not only does not
experience the same degree of suffering, but are the active origin of Albertan’s trial.
There is, first, his specific and repeated identification of the “Fifty Big Shots of Canada”
to describe the elitism of the country’s main economic and political institutions
(Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 11 August 1935). Their particular crime was the way in
which they selfishly manipulated and controlled Alberta’s wealth for their own material
gain (Aberhart 1935, p. 13-14). Nevertheless, there remained a broader, more sinister
force in the “financial power” and their “diabolical, slanderous, vicious style of
propaganda work” (Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 11 August 1935).
Aberhart continually pointed out the degree in which, in comparison to the
morally forthright Albertan, eastern-based financiers lacked virtue. In one speech, for
instance, Aberhart labelled all political elites as “fornicators, grafters, and reprobates”
(Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 24 March 1935). But these personal attacks more often
manifested themselves in a particularly Christian framework. In a broadcast, for instance,
Aberhart writes that although God has provided for all of the province’s needs “the
selfish, greedy, ungodly worshipers of the golden god and their henchmen have stolen the
bounties”, adding that “these grafters, these men who have confiscated the power are
depriving people from their very living, starving them to death” (Aberhart, Campaign
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Broadcast, 21 April 1935). In another he suggests that their principles are “like those of
the man who betrayed Christ. Gold was his god and millions have suffered because of it”
(Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 9 April 1935). Aberhart also insinuates that financial
elites are co-conspirators with the devil (Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 24 February
1935).
Overall, then, it is evident that Aberhart articulated a clear picture and concept of
the Albertan group identity comprised of a collective experience of suffering and the
characteristic of moral and religious virtue. In identifying the out group of financial
interests, Aberhart assisted in providing a further means by which the group could clarify
its distinctions from a specified opponent. From here, this analysis can now expect that
this articulated group identity will comprise Aberhart’s legitimacy as an aspiring leader in
that he will be presented as prototypical of this common set of characteristics.
However, when Aberhart himself is considered, it is difficult to determine what
aspect of his experience, personal characteristics, or rhetoric makes him prototypical.
This is particularly the case for his articulation of the Albertan group that is primarily
comprised of a common experience of suffering. While his speeches do convey the fact
that he himself experienced the suffering, potentially to a greater degree, as both an
educator and pastoral leader, it is unclear regarding what aspect of Aberhart’s leadership
conveyed him as particularly evocative of the group’s sense of suffering in a way that
directly contrasted with the out-group he designed. Although not incredibly wealthy,
Aberhart was by all indicators financial stable and, at least in his personal life, relatively
isolated from the worst impacts of the Depression (David and Elliot 1987). He, for
instance, did not directly experience the loss of a livelihood while simultaneously
meeting interest payments. He had no real relationship, positive or negative, to the
financial interests he decried.
Alternatively, Aberhart’s prototypicality on the basis of his religious rhetoric has
more merit. It could be claimed that Aberhart’s legitimacy in this regard was derived
from his proven track-record, personal following, and integrity as a committed religious
leader. And, similarly, the particularly direct language he utilized helped to draw
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attention to the anti-elitist elements of his policy program. Nevertheless, this is
insufficient for two main reasons. First, it seems unlikely that, given the importance of
Albertan’s broader economic experience to Social Credit’s electoral appeal, Aberhart was
able to establish his prototypicality without incorporating the characteristic of a collective
experience of suffering. Second, a broad and vague appeal to Christian values, regardless
of the particular tone of this case, does not distinguish Aberhart’s appeal in the same way
that the reference to exploitation does. In the context of the time, a religious leader
aspiring towards political office who used broad Christian rhetoric was in many ways the
norm of the prairies during this period – other examples could include the social gospel
articulated by Henry Wise Wood and the United Farmers of Alberta in 1921 and Premier
John Brownlee’s Methodism.
Consequently, given that this analysis was unable to find the evidence necessary
to demonstrate Aberhart’s prototypicality within the confines of the methodology used
here I conclude there is no support for the hypothesized relationship as expressed in
hypothesis one. More specifically, while it is evident that part of Aberhart’s appeal was
linked to an articulation of Albertan group characteristics, there is little to demonstrate
that Aberhart was able to present himself as a prototypical member in a way that would
account for his particular selection as a formal leader. We now turn to an analysis of the
second hypothesis.

5.4.2

Hypothesis Two: Concretization

The second hypothesis of this analysis states that: if a leader develops and communicates
a salient understanding of the group identity and future course of action that is consistent
with the their prototypicality while also drawing upon broader and pre-existing
characteristics of the group understanding (the principle of readiness), they are then
more likely to be endowed with formal leadership. In examining the second hypothesis,
we should expect to see two broad methods of communication taken by Aberhart.
First, we should expect to demonstrate that, in communicating his policy agenda,
Aberhart draws upon the broader and pre-existing means by which the Albertan group
identity processes, understands, and makes evaluations of political phenomena. As
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theorized, Aberhart has considerable creativity in determining the particular and specific
means by which these broad, abstract attempts are utilized to justify his policy agenda.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis suggests that he is required to utilize them in order to mount
a successful leadership appeal. Second, we should expect to observe that Aberhart
conveys his policy agenda as the concretization of this particular articulation of this
broader group understanding. Here, his policy agenda should be portrayed as not only
consistent with the broader understanding but communicated as the most legitimate
course of action to be taken forward.
As discussed in the previous section, there is clear evidence that Aberhart’s
appeal was rooted in his articulation of the Albertan group as characterized by its
members’ common experience of suffering at the hands of an inefficient economic
system and an exploitative class of elites. His social credit policy agenda was presented
as the solution to this predicament: by changing the monetary system, social dividends
would not only ensure a greater economic system but challenge the power of these
broader financial forces (Finkel 1989). To what extent was this rhetorically entrenched
within broader, more abstract pre-existing aspects of Albertan group understanding?
This broader group understanding of Alberta was articulated in detail in Chapter
4. Overall, it was claimed to interpret its overall characterization and goal as a settler
community established for the purposes of economic prosperity. Given the early impact
of American settlers, this came to be understood through a particular individualist and
pro-freedom lens. Nevertheless, the economic and realities of the province, particularly
its economic precarity and dominance by central Canadian interests, resulted in a
particular group-level framework that was prone to be suspicious of intervening, foreign
outsiders.
This analysis will isolate three factors. These are both simplifications and purely
conceptual labels; the reality is both far more complex and full of overlap. Nevertheless,
for the purposes of this analysis, we should expect to observe their use in a way that is
empirically discernable. Therefore, the following analysis will be organized by
concentrated discussions of three themes.
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First, we should expect to observe that Aberhart includes rhetorical appeals to the
broader, abstract goal of economic prosperity, in addition to a particular articulation of
the romantic image of the “Last Best West” and the enterprising settler. From here, his
policy agenda should be communicated as the most legitimate means by which the
province can achieve economic prosperity in a way that is fulfilling of this settler image.
Second, we should expect to observe that Aberhart includes rhetorical emphasis
on the values of individualism, self-reliance, and freedom. From here, we should observe
him communicate his policy agenda as being not only consistent with these values, but
conducive towards maximizing it.
Third, we should expect to observe that Aberhart consistently references the
negative impact of intervening foreign outsiders, with particular attention directed to the
fact that their behavior is largely to blame for Alberta’s problems. From here, we should
observe that Aberhart communicates his policy agenda as the means by which to remove
that power and instill a greater degree of power in the hands of Albertans themselves.
Methodologically, this analysis will rely on the same communicative materials
that will be read and observed so as to determine if consistent discursive appeals to these
three themes can be extracted.
First, the emphasis on the province’s potential for material prosperity is
demonstrably an aspect of Aberhart’s leadership appeal. As discussed, the central claim
of Social Credit more broadly is that modern industrialization had created more than
enough to ensure material prosperity. It was only the current economic system,
particularly as it was manipulated by self-interested financers, that produced “poverty in
the midst of plenty” (Aberhart 1935, p.2). Particularly revealing is the way that, rather
than draw upon Douglas’s focus on industrial production, Aberhart identified the
province’s abundance of natural resources as the key to Alberta’s prosperity, as it in this
area that God “has poured out from his rich storehouse of heaven upon mankind”
(Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 21 April 1935).
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Here, certain elements of Aberhart’s rhetoric conjure the images of the province’s
history of settlement. In the Social Credit Manual for instance, Aberhart (1935, p.4)
considers Albertan control over natural resources to be the “cultural heritage” of the
province’s people given the “pioneering work of our forefathers” in settling and
developing the region’s economic potential. Aberhart’s appeal also contains specific
allusions to the romantic “last best west” image of the province. While his appeal is
universal in its outlook and aspirations, Aberhart suggests that Alberta is the originator
and leader of this much broader political and religious movement: “we trust that there
will sweep over this province and over this western land such a wave of reverence…I am
persuaded myself that it is only by the grace and power of God that our people shall be
delivered from the awful conditions that threaten us” (Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast,
March 19, 1935).
But to what extend did Aberhart base his appeal as a concretization of the
individualist and freedom-based Albertan interpretation posited in this thesis? This, as
discussed previously, is a highly controversial element of Aberhart’s broader policy
agenda. Scholars continue to debate the degree to which his movement is better
understood as socialistic, conservative, or quasi-fascist (Macpherson 1953; Irving 1959;
Finkel 1989). Clearly, Aberhart and his movement drew upon language from each, but I
do nonetheless want to argue that this appeal was more oriented as a concretization of a
more individual-oriented group understanding that prioritized values pertaining to
freedom and self-reliance.
This is evidenced by the fact that, despite advocating for a policy program of a
highly interventionist government, Aberhart consistently stressed that his objectives were
conducive to individual freedom and enterprise. In describing the broader “cultural
heritage” of the province’s natural resources, for instance, he argues that its main strength
resides in the way “it gives the individual and opportunity to develop his individuality”
(Aberhart 1935, p.13). Here, the implementation of Social Credit for the purposes’ of
poverty alleviation is justified in the way that it actually increases freedom, as put in one
July broadcast: “this provision of the bare necessities of life will give the individual an
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economic freedom that he has never known before and must of necessity therefore give
him a chance for self-development” (Aberhart, 12 July 1935).
It is also important to draw attention to how Aberhart distinguished himself and
his movement from socialism. While both posited the claim that the contemporary citizen
was in a position of exploitation by financial elites, he claims that whereas the latter
believes that the “State is supreme and the individual must sacrifice all his rights or
privileges for the welfare of the State as a whole”, Social Credit “makes the individual
supreme” (Aberhart 1935, p. 57). To this, he further adds that “individual enterprise must
be encouraged in every way possible”, entailing the breakup of monopolies and the
decentralization of power to maximize individual freedom (Aberhart 1935, p.14).
Finally, as discussed, the third characteristic posits that Albertan group
understanding has a broader tendency to approach, evaluate, and frame the province’s
problems through the lens of a foreign, intervening actor. From an observation of the
material used in this analysis, it is evident that this theme comprises an essential part of
Aberhart’s policy agenda. As demonstrated in this chapter, the activities of financial
elites are consistently blamed as being the primary source of Alberta’s problems
(Aberhart 1935, p. 13-14; Aberhart, Campaign Broadcast, 21 April 1935; 11 August
1935; 19 March 1935). And, here, Social Credit is legitimized as the means to both
remove that power and return control to the “people of Alberta”. In the Social Credit
Manuel, for instance, Aberhart (1935, p.13-14) argues that “the great wealth of our
natural resources” is “being selfishly manipulated and controlled by one or more men
known as the “Fifty Big Shots of Canada.” Here, he suggests that Social Credit as a
policy program recognizes that this wealth “is the property of the individuals who are
bona fide citizens of our province, and should never be allowed to go entirely to the
control of any small group of men.”
To conclude, this section of the chapter sought to apply the second hypothesis to
the case of William Aberhart’s early leadership of the Social Credit movement. It was
hypothesized that Aberhart’s success at attaining formal leadership was the result of his
ability to convey his leadership and policy agenda as both consistent with the broader and
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pre-existing component of the Albertan group understanding in addition to acting as its
concretization so as to legitimize it as the best course of action. From this basis I
articulated three specific characteristics would mark the leaders public appeals: an
emphasis on economic prosperity linked to an abstract image of the Albertan settler; the
importance given to individualism, free enterprise, and freedom; and calls to remove the
influence of an outside interfering agent.
When the results of the analysis of Aberhart’s communications are considered, the
second hypothesis is sufficiently supported. Most characteristics – including the emphasis
on economic prosperity, the value placed on individual freedom, the need to remove
outside control, and a particularly moral attack on outside interference – all comprise
aspects of Aberhart’s appeals, including the fact that his policy agenda is communicated
as the best means by which to advance them. With these findings reported, the chapter
concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of the broader identity leadership
framework, as below.

5.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter attempted to understand the particular success of William
Aberhart’s 1935 appeal for leadership through a social identity lens. This was undertaken
by utilizing a collection of written and oral communications that were analyzed to locate
evidence in support of the two main hypotheses guiding this study. The first hypothesis
proposed that William Aberhart based the initial legitimacy of his appeal in his being
prototypical of an articulated set of characteristics that distinguish the Albertan group. In
the data considered here it is evident that, although Aberhart’s appeal included
articulations of the characteristics of Albertan group, there is no indication that he was
able to establish himself as a prototypical group member. With respect to the second
hypothesis, the evidence supports the expectation that Aberhart legitimized his policy
agenda through the way it was consistent with broader and pre-existing understandings of
the Albertan group identity. Aberhart was found to communicate in ways that reflected
the hypothesized elements of the Albertan group identity.
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Overall, in evaluating the usefulness of social identity theory to understand how
political leaders are able to mobilize support, this approach lacks explanatory power with
respect to this case study. Instead, the analysis seems to suggest that Aberhart was
successful in attaining formal leadership despite the fact that he did not aim to establish
himself as a prototypical member of the Albertan group identity. Given this, the second
stage of this process, while found to be accurate, is rendered empirically imprecise.
Without the metric of prototypicality, this alone does not provide an answer to question
of why Aberhart’s particular use of these broader aspects of the Albertan group
understanding were successful. Furthermore, it provides little precise detail on the degree
to which a leader successfully appeals to broader group-based understandings. Instead,
the main characteristics of Albertan identity formulated in this analysis are broad,
abstract, and vague, entailing that they can be mended so far as to argue that an incredibly
wide assortment of leaders, both successful and unsuccessful, satisfy the hypothesis.
In being elected to provincial office, Aberhart would go on to deal with the
limitations of implanting Social Credit policy within the province. Although he did retain
the support of a significant degree of the public, winning another majority in 1940, he
was never able to incorporate his goals in this regard, as every attempt at legislation was
disallowed by the Federal government (David and Elliot 1987). This didn’t entail that his
administration was a total failure; his work as Premier did leave an admirable record in
productive reforms in education, labor, and social policy (Finkel 1989). Nevertheless, by
the time of his death by heart attack in 1943, Aberhart had grown increasingly unfocused,
paranoid, and authoritarian in his leadership. He was succeeded by his protégé Ernest
Manning who, in discarding the party’s monetary policies, was able to retain a twentyfive-year hold on power by administrating over a middle-of-the road conservative regime
that relied on anti-socialism, laissez faire capitalism, and traditional religious values (Barr
1974; Wesley 2011).
Peter Lougheed, the subject of this thesis’s next case study, was able to articulate
a successful leadership appeal with the provincial Progressive Conservatives in 1971
(Hustak 1979). In analyzing the components of his appeal as theorized by social identity
theory, we should expect to see that Lougheed, in addition to establishing his
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prototypicality of the Albertan group identity, will come to articulate and base his policy
program in the same set of broader principles as Aberhart.
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Chapter 6 – Peter Lougheed and the Progressive
Conservatives, 1971

6

Introduction

Peter Lougheed, leader of the Alberta Progressive Conservatives and premier from 1971
to 1985, is notable for the way he took over a moribund political party and led it to defeat
a thirty-five year Social Credit dynasty (Hustak 1979; Wood 1985; Tupper 2004). At the
time of his first bid for power he was portrayed by the media as the representative of an
emergent Alberta that was younger, urban, cosmopolitan, and more assertive of its place
within Canadian federalism (Bell 1993; Richards and Pratt 1979; Palmer and Palmer
1976). This image stood in sharp contrast to the established Social Credit party which at
this point was associated with a rural, religious and traditional Alberta.
As with last chapter’s case study of William Aberhart’s leadership, this chapter
seeks to determine whether Lougheed’s success can be explained through identity
leadership theory as it has been developed in this analysis (Haslam et al. 2020). As in the
last case, here I analyze the components of Lougheed’s initial leadership appeal in 1971
to determine if there is support for the two core hypotheses. Applied to this premier,
hypothesis one posits that if he based his appeal in his own individual prototypicality of
an articulated group identity he will then have a basis of legitimate authority. The second
hypothesis holds that if Lougheed framed his policy agenda as the concretization of a
coherent set of pre-existing Albertan group understandings and values he will then be
more likely to receive support. This chapter follows the previous one in its basic
structure. First, it provides a brief portrait of Peter Lougheed, the basis of his aspirational
leadership, and the components of his policy agenda. Second, it provides a summary of
the broader economic, social, and political context surrounding Lougheed’s election in
1971. Here, particular attention is directed to the means by which his victory can be
interpreted through the broader group identity theorized in the previous chapter. Third,
this chapter will briefly consider conventional and popular approaches to Lougheed’s
success. Finally, Lougheed’s activities as an aspirational leader will be analyzed to
determine if there is any evidence in support of the two hypotheses. Overall, I conclude
that identity leadership theory as applied in this thesis lacks explanatory value in
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accounting for the particular success of Peter Lougheed. More precisely, Lougheed was
able to successfully gain his leadership position despite no demonstrable evidence that he
based his appeal in being prototypical of an articulated group identity.

6.1 The Leader and The Appeal: Peter Lougheed and the
Progressive Conservative Party
This section provides an overview of Peter Lougheed, his aspirations for formal political
leadership, and the characteristics of the policy agenda he advocated for. Overall, in
Lougheed’s case, these aspects are far less studied that those of Premier Aberhart,
consisting of a few outdated biographies and brief historical profiles (see Hustak 1979;
Wood 1985; Tupper 2004). Nevertheless, from the material available, this analysis can
construct a cohesive picture of Lougheed’s background and broader political agenda in
becoming an aspiring leader.
Lougheed was born in 1928 to a settled and distinguished Calgary family. His
grandfather, James Peter Lougheed, was a successful Conservative Senator and federal
cabinet member. And, while his family suffered financially from the Great Depression,
he grew up in a position of relative normalcy, luxury, and comfort. Beyond this, his
“upbringing and early life experiences were unexceptional” (Tupper 2004, p.205).
Attending the University of Alberta and the Masters of Business Administration program
at Harvard, Lougheed expressed his desire to live a “life of many paths” with work in
both public and private sectors (Tupper 2004, p.206). As such, his early career included
work for Gulf Oil in Oklahoma, a series of executive positions at the Mannix
Corporation, and the establishment of his own law practice.
Nevertheless, in reviewing his pre-political life, Tupper (2004, p.206) writes that
there are no “obvious clues about the source of his ambitions or his strong desire to make
his mark.” Here, some biographers have posited the claim that he was motivated by the
goal of reestablishing the social and economic esteem of his family name (Hustak 1979).
Others, however, point out that there appears no explicit proof or admittance of that
motivation on Lougheed’s part (Wood 1985; Tupper 2004). Instead, in retrospective
interviews, Lougheed has referred to his ingrained value of public service, a vague and
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almost cliché motivation that – even if true – does not advance this analysis any further in
attempting to understand his broader motivations (Wood 1985; Tupper 2004).
Lougheed’s biographers suggest that he had made the decision to run for political
office by the early 1960s and that, although loosely considering himself a Tory, the
particular path to the leadership of the provincial Progressive Conservative party was
motivated by pragmatic calculation (Hustak 1979). By this point, Lougheed had neither
any political experience nor any involvement with partisan activism. To him, running
federally as an MP promised he would spend several years in Parliament’s backbenches,
a job that he believed to be dull, inconvenient, and lacking in accomplishment. Provincial
leadership, in contrast, provided the opposite: a chance to take a position of authority
over an administration’s entire organization, tone, and policy agenda (Hustak 1979).
As argued by his biographers and repeated in many of his interviews, Lougheed
arrived in office with a broader public policy agenda. Commonly referred to as a
“province-building” vision, his agenda envisioned greater control and involvement on the
part of the provincial government within Albertan society and Canadian federalism more
broadly (Hustak 1979; Wood 1985; Tupper 2004). Internally, Lougheed believed that the
province should take greater advantage of the wealth generated by oil extraction to fund
both ambitious government initiatives within Albertan society in addition to encouraging
economic diversification. The latter was seen as a means by which to buttress Alberta
society against its historical reliance on boom and bust cycles, giving province greater
control over its economic future (Tupper 2004). However, this sense of greater control
and initiative on the part of the provincial government also entailed a change in broader
Canadian federalism, in that Alberta – as the prime owner of these resources – ought to
have more resource control, particularly in terms of supply, royalty, trade, and the
direction of revenue. Attached to this was a broader vision of a more assertive and
confident province; in Lougheed’s own words, he wanted Alberta to be not just a “junior
partner” in Confederation but a “leader” (Tupper 2004, p.206).
When Lougheed ran for the party’s leadership in 1965, the provincial Progressive
Conservative party of Alberta was a political force close to irrelevancy; its chances of
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success amounted to “absolutely nothing” according to Hustak’s (1979, p.65)
description. Although forming the official opposition to the province’s early Liberal
administrations after 1905, since the time of the UFA it failed to gain more than a
foothold in the legislature.36 Consequently, by the time of Lougheed’s election as leader,
the party had virtually no membership, organization, or financial resources to utilize. The
party, then, was to Lougheed little more than a “blank slate” from which he could mount
an appeal for the formal leadership of the province (Tupper 2004).
Consequently, then, Lougheed’s early efforts were directed to building the
broader organizational and financial structure of the party. Expecting a PC victory to be
accomplished only after several elections, Lougheed focused on conveying his party not
so much as a radical departure, but as a competent and legitimate alternative to the
incumbent Social Credit administration. Priority was placed on recruiting competent
candidates, avoiding personal attacks on partisan opponents, and developing sound policy
pronouncements (Hustak 1979; Wood 1985; Tupper 2004). In 1967, his first election, he
along with five other PC candidates were elected to the legislature. His role as leader of
the Official Opposition further helped to establish his presence and that of his party
(Tupper 2004), providing an important platform from which Lougheed could both
criticize the government and increase his name recognition. Here, Lougheed and his
caucus deliberately positioned themselves as a “government in waiting”, writing and
introducing their own legislation (Hustak 1979).
In 1971, Lougheed and the Progressive Conservative’s campaign was comprised
of elements of the leader’s broader policy vision and more specific “bread and butter”
considerations. Put together through the campaign slogan of “NOW!”, the Progressive
Conservatives promised economic diversification, a review of the province’s oil royalty
system, a provincial bill of rights, more open government, expanded Medicare, a
revamped auto insurance regime, and greater support for rural communities among other
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For instance, between 1940 and 1952, the party won no seats in the legislature. This changed somewhat
in the 1950s as the party gained a total of three seats in 1955. Nevertheless, by 1963, the last election before
Lougheed took over the leadership, the party was again reduced to nothing.
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policies (Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta 1971). This proved to be
incredibly successful as, in contrast his own expectations, Lougheed was elected Premier;
the PC’s, with about 46% of the popular vote, won 49 of the Legislature’s 71 seats
(Tupper 2004).
As with the previous case study, this chapter aims to ascertain whether
Lougheed’s success can be understood through identity leadership theory. Nevertheless,
before doing so, I will discuss the broader political, economic, and social context of the
province at the time, in addition to the main scholarly efforts to explain Lougheed’s
success. This section provides insight into the Albertan population that elected Lougheed,
forming an important basis of the prototypicality and group-based appeal this analysis
expects him to articulate.

6.2 The Context: The “New Alberta”
In seeking to understand Lougheed’s appeal for leadership, this section provides an
overview of the broader economic, social, and cultural change that had occurred in
Alberta since the time, coming to form a different set of problems, concerns, and
aspirations on the part of the province’s population. From the time of Aberhart to
Lougheed’s first election in 1967, Alberta had undergone substantial economic, social,
and culture change. Overall, the 1947 discovery of oil in Leduc had set the province on a
trajectory of unprecedented industrialization and economic growth (Conway 2004). The
petroleum industry, rather than agriculture, had become the main export-based extractive
commodity on the postwar era on which the population relied upon for economic
wellbeing (Tupper and Gibbins 1992).
This had important consequences for the demographic characteristics of Alberta.
First, the province’s rate of immigration and population grew drastically, entailing that an
area of approximately 790,000 residents in 1941 had grown to just under 1.5 million by
1971 (Palmer and Palmer 1971). These new residents contributed to a broader migration
to the cities, leading to an increasingly urbanized and cosmopolitan population. By the
1970s, just under half of the province lived in cities, professed less religious belief, were
more educated, and held a higher standard of life (Bell 1993). In effect, the traditional
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Alberta that had supported Aberhart – predominately rural, highly religious, and
orientated around agricultural industries – had been replaced by a secular, younger, and
more educated urban society, comprised in particular by a novel middle class whose
livelihoods were oriented around the commercial, manufacturing, and service industries
that had been generated by the petroleum industry (Richards and Pratt 1979).
Throughout these changes, Social Credit under the leadership of Ernest Manning
had maintained a tight control over the government of the province. As briefly discussed
last chapter, Manning had, in succeeding Aberhart as premier in 1943, quickly discarded
the party’s attachment to monetary reform in favor of a “middle-of-the-road regime with
a slight reformist tinge” (Barr 1974, p.56). Up until the time of Manning’s retirement in
1968, the government can be best described as loosely social conservative, characterized
by a rhetorical commitment to free enterprise, individual freedom, traditional religious
values, and anti-socialism (Wesley 2011).
This was an effective and appropriate method of administration for the time. Here,
the government’s efforts at avoiding regulation, encouraging international investment,
and lowering the costs of business had ensured a period of consistent prosperity and
economic growth (Finkel 1989). Nevertheless, the revenue derived from oil royalties
allowed the government to spend generously on infrastructure, healthcare, education, and
other social programs while maintaining the lowest tax rates in Canada (Finkel 1989). In
effect, given both economic security and a relatively generous social safety net, Albertans
were no longer as compelled to turn to radical and reform-based movements as they had
once been.
Nevertheless, by the time of Lougheed’s emergence as leader of the Progressive
Conservatives, there were indications that Social Credit’s dominance was beginning to
weaken. Outside of a general complacency, the party was widely regarded to have
remained tethered to its now-dated origins in a rural and religious Alberta, making it
unable to properly grasp and address the aspirations of the province’s urban residents
(Palmer and Palmer 1971; Tupper 2004). Also evident was a shift in the broader tone
within Canadian federalism towards the end of 1960s. That while Manning’s “isolationist
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boosterism” (Wesley 2011, p.81) may have suited Canada of the 1950s , the rise of
Quebec nationalism, official bilingualism, and the beginnings of the era of ‘mega
constitutional politics’ produced, in the administration of the Trudeau Liberals, a far more
assertive Federal government with a greater willingness to interfere within areas of
provincial jurisdiction (Raymaker 2017).
Given that the broader context has been covered, this analysis can now turn to
analyzing the basis for Lougheed’s success. This chapter, as discussed, is primarily
interested in determining the usefulness of a social identity lens. Nevertheless, before
engaging in that endeavor it is useful to address the scholarly work that has already
sought to understand the substantiative aspects of his appeal. In engaging with this
literature, this analysis can get a better picture of the factors that demonstrably
contributed to Lougheed’s success.

6.3 Traditional Accounts of Lougheed’s Success
What factors account for Lougheed’s success in garnering support for his leadership?
Here, the mainstream scholarly work on this question tends to be positioned around one
broad question: how much of Lougheed’s defeat of Social Credit was the product of an
inevitable historic process linked to the seismic economic, demographic, and social
changes that had taken place in Albertan society? Richard and Pratt (1979, p.148) write
that “Lougheed's victory and the abrupt termination of the Social Credit dynasty
represented an inevitable, albeit considerably delayed, response of the electoral system to
rapid population growth, urbanization, and secularization.” This, as it is emphasized by
Palmer and Palmer (1971, p.123), “was not primarily based on superior campaigning or
on issues” but the fact that Social Credit, “a rural, small town, and lower middle-class
movement, had little chance of surviving in a society which was not only increasingly
urban and middle class but was also one in which urban values had penetrated rural
areas.”
Nevertheless, exactly how it is that the Conservatives under Lougheed, rather than
any other political choice, were the option to which power shifted depends on the specific
analysis. One broad approach, for instance, updates Macpherson’s (1963) argument to
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suggest that the success of Lougheed marked the eclipse of Social Credit’s independent
commodity producer base and the transfer of power to a new dominant economic group,
whether this is understood to be the interests of petroleum producers or a notion of the
secular, urban-based “middle class” (Richards and Pratt 1979; Tupper 2004). The point
here is to emphasize that, rather than the escape from a ‘semi-colonial’ capitalist system,
this new class were shaped by a novel self-confidence that favored a more assertive
provincial government and greater local control over resources (Thomas 1980). This
framework, nevertheless, shares the precise same set of issues with Macpherson’s historic
framework in that it overemphasizes the share of the population this class comprised at
the time (Bell 1993). This explanation is also not consistent with the actual election
results from the period. In reality, Social Credit always had a significant degree of
support in cities to the extent that, even up until 1967, the party was in fact more popular
in these areas than the Progressive Conservatives (Bell 1993).
The other main approach taken by scholars is to examine the degree to which
Lougheed’s appeal was comprised of a necessary mix of change and continuity. This
view holds that in addition to his particular fit to the needs and aspirations of the moment,
Lougheed’s appeal was entrenched in the broader conservative rhetoric of both the Social
Credit tradition and Alberta’s political culture more broadly (Hustak 1979; Wiseman
2007; Wesley 2011). This is to say that Lougheed’s success resides not so much in his
ability to articulate a totally novel policy agenda, but the fact that he conveyed himself as
a credible alternative to the specific rhetoric and policy agenda of Social Credit. The
provincial Liberal party was too closely linked to federal political institutions to be
palatable, and Albertans were too accustomed to an anti-socialist mantra to support the
NDP (Wesley 2011; Takach 2010). Of course, this explanation rests on the claim that the
ideological and rhetorical framework of Social Credit (particularly that of Manning) and
Lougheed were roughly the same, a claim disputed by some analysts (see Wesley 2011).
Nevertheless, the main problem with this broader emphasis on historical
inevitability is that it does not provide a useful answer as to why Lougheed’s specific
ideology, rhetoric, or policy agenda was particularly successful rather than any other
appeal that had been made around that time. First, it could be disputed that the success
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had to be conservative in outlook. As discussed in previous chapters, the province did and
continued to have left-wing elements in its politics (Young 1978). The Liberals also had a
solid base of support throughout the 1950s and 1960s that, in popular vote share, was
roughly similar to that of the PCs (Rennie 2004). Another important questions also
concerns why this had this not been achieved by pre-Lougheed party leaders, particularly
in light of the fact that several of the factors attributed to predetermining his success –
secularization, urbanization, and the growth of petroleum – had by this point already
begun to coalesce.
Consequently, then, a second approach is to emphasize the significant
contingency of the moment. Bell (1993,p.471), for instance, emphasizes the fact that even
by the late 1960s Social Credit was still popular, entailing that “there was no reason to
expect that Lougheed’s efforts to unseat the government would be any more successful
than the attempts made by others since 1940.” Until his retirement, Manning, labelled by
Lougheed himself as “a colossus”, was still – barring “cataclysmic province-wide
changes” – widely regarded as electorally unbeatable (Tupper 2004, p.206). Lougheed, in
fact, did not believe that he would win the 1971 election at the time (Tupper 2004,
p.209).
Instead, they suggest that Lougheed’s success was due to the specific variables of
the time. In particular, there was the contrast between the leadership of Lougheed and of
Henry Strom (Bell 1993). Overall, the claim here is that, since succeeding Manning in
1968, Strom had failed to convey an effective leadership image and overall direction of
his government, leaving the electorate open to the persuasive appeal of a novel,
optimistic, and charismatic leader. In this way, scholars have all been very willing to
describe the failure of Strom’s leadership (Palmer 1971; Barr 1974; Bell 1993; Tupper
2004). But it also important to include the errors made during the campaign itself. Here,
Social Credit not only lacked a strong local organizational impact, but made strategic
mistakes – most notably the decision to not utilize the increasingly relevant medium of
television (Barr 1974).
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Social Credit’s mistakes are contrasted with Lougheed’s individual abilities at
leadership, organization, and campaigning, ranging from the specific to the vague and
trivial. One could emphasize his skills at party organization, candidate recruitment, and
policy development, particularly in regard to the way in which it conveyed the
Progressive Conservatives as a credible, legitimate, and safe alternative (Tupper 2004).
This, includes, for instance, Lougheed’s successful use of television, and his ability to
present himself as a “Kennedy-type” leader of the time (Hustak 1979). It can also mean
broader personality traits – his charisma and confidence. Nevertheless, we are still left
with the broader question of how precisely Lougheed was capable of becoming
associated with these attributes in a way that made him particularly successful at gaining
leadership. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will interpret these characteristics
of Lougheed’s appeal through a social identity lens, with attention to evaluating its
accuracy and analytical ability to answer this question.

6.4 Lougheed Through a Social Identity Lens
This section applies the broader theoretical inferences of identity leadership theory to the
Lougheed case by examining two hypotheses to determine its usefulness as a framework
for understanding the exercise of leadership. As discussed above, identity leadership
theory holds that the researcher can understand and account for the success of leaders
through studying the way they base their appeal in group processes (Haslam et al. 2020).
More precisely, this occurs in two stages: First, aspiring leaders establish themselves as
prototypical members to gain the legitimacy necessary to articulate a course of action for
the group. Second, this legitimacy then is used to articulate a substantive definition of
identity in which, through a process of concretization and anchoring, the leader utilizes
group processes to gain support for their specific policy agenda. We now turn to
considering the hypotheses as they apply to the Lougheed case.
Methodologically, this analysis will rely on a set of primary sources of
Lougheed’s rhetoric and communication from the moment he became Leader of the
Opposition on May 23rd, 1967 to his election as Premier of Alberta on August 31st, 1971.
This will consist of three main pillars: The Progressive Conservative Party’s 1971 policy
platform, Lougheed’s statements in the Legislative Assembly during the period, and an
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assortment of additional public speeches derived from secondary sources. Unlike
Aberhart’s prolific number of written pieces and recorded speeches, the quantitative data
available for this case is much more limited. First, as with Aberhart, although a
significant amount of physical material is available at the Provincial Archives of Alberta,
access was limited by the same temporal, travel, and financial concerns. Second,
Lougheed gave far fewer public speeches than Aberhart and, of those that have been
recorded, the majority have been found in journalistic reports and secondary sources that
contain only quotes or broad themes. Throughout this period, Lougheed’s biographies
and additional secondary sources emphasize the fact that, rather than give high-profile
speeches to large crowds (the kind that would be remembered and recorded in detail), the
majority of Lougheed’s activities as an aspiring leader were comprised of tours of the
province, informal remarks to small assemblies of people, organizational planning, and
policy development (Hustak 1979; Wood 1985; Tupper 2004).
An additional limitation to the material available is also due to the fact that while
Lougheed was highly active in his legislative role, the debates of that time were not
consistently recorded in a provincial Hansard. Instead, this analysis relies on material
gathered from the Alberta Legislative Library Scrapbook Hansard that, while detailed,
provides an incomplete account of the body’s proceedings.37 Nevertheless, the
availability of the party’s concise and detailed policy platform does provide more insight
into this case than was possible for the first one. Here, biographical, and historical
evidence suggests that, while not the sole author, Lougheed was highly involved in its
formulation, entailing that this can be understood as a component of his own personal
appeal (Hustak 1979). It is on the basis of this qualitative material that this section can
now proceed to focused tests of the formal hypotheses of this study.38
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Given the fact that the legislature lacked a Hansard, the Scrapbook Hansard is the product of the
historical collection of newspaper clippings and speech transcripts collected by the legislature’s library
staff over time in order to retain a record of what transpired in the Assembly.
38
The text used comes from the collection of political texts made available at www.poltext.org by The
Center for Public Policy Analysis (CAPP) from Laval University, with the financial support of the Fonds
de recherche du Quebec – societe et culture (FRQSC).
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6.4.1

Hypothesis One: Individual Prototypicality

The first hypothesis guiding this analysis states: If an aspiring leader is most effective at
conveying themselves as a prototypical member, understood through the way they
articulate the group’s category prototypes as determined by a meta-contrast ratio, they
will then be seen as a legitimate source of authority. If this is accurate, the proceeding
analysis ought to demonstrate this process of prototypicality conveyance in four
discernable stages.
First, Lougheed should be observed to consistently address and direct his rhetoric
towards a specific and discernable group. Given his aspiration for provincial leadership,
this should be some variant on the broader notion of “Albertan”. Second, Lougheed
should then proceed to articulate a set of discernable characteristics of that group that act
as means by which to emphasize their similarities with each other. Given the theoretical
framework that supports this analysis, Lougheed is assumed to have considerable
creativity in determining what those characteristics are in addition to the specific way by
which he articulates it. Nevertheless, these characteristics should find grounding in the
broader aspects of the Albertan context that provide a salient means by which to
emphasize a source of similarly, such as the common economic experience or a shared
experience of alienation. Lougheed should then thirdly identify a discernable “out-group”
that is characterized in a way that distinguishes them from the identity of Albertans that
he constructs, further emphasizing Albertans’ similarities with each other and distinctions
from other out-groups like central Canadians, for example. Finally, on the basis of this
defined and articulated set of characteristics, Lougheed should convey himself as
prototypical by explicitly referring to the fact that he exemplifies the set of characteristics
he has articulated.
As mentioned above in the theoretical framework chapter, this methodological
framework simplifies the identity articulation process. In reality, it is likely that all these
components operate simultaneously and with considerable overlap rather than
sequentially. Nevertheless, in analyzing Lougheed’s communications as leader we should
be able to extrapolate separate and discernible elements of each.
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When it comes to the first stage of the process, it is first clear that Lougheed’s
appeal is explicitly directed to a broader concept of “the people of Alberta” as the main
group from which he seeks to gain support from. This is clearly evident in the PC’s party
1971 election platform. His appeal communicates a vision of a “government responsible
to the people” or, as put in a latter section, “government as a service to people” (Alberta
Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.3). The precise same construct is also employed
in Lougheed’s legislative speeches. His 1971 response to the Speech from the Throne, for
instance, contains the exact same phrases: “to be responsive to people” (Lougheed 1971,
p.29). Finally, immediate firsthand reporting of other legislative activities indicate
Lougheed’s frequent appeal to the notion of a broader “Alberta interest” in his speeches,
arguing that the incumbent Social Credit government had failed to properly advance this
interest (Bell 1969, 1971; Frank 1969; Edmonton Journal 1969).
In examining the second stage of the prototypical group process, the qualitative
data I analyzed shows little explicit, substantive, and consistent effort on the part of
Lougheed to base his policy agenda within a specific articulation of the characteristics of
the Albertan group. The Progressive Conservative policy platform, first, remains highly
technocratic and issues-based in outlook. It is primarily characterized by an objective
justification of its policy initiatives, first outlining a set of “challenges” in the policy area,
proposing a set of “new directions”, and providing a concise justification (Alberta
Progressive Conservative Party 1971). Furthermore, rather than appealing to Albertans as
one broad group, the document splits the population into groups of differing interests.39
This general lack of discursive effort to articulate a group identity is further
evident in Lougheed’s legislative and public speeches. Overall, Lougheed consistently
labels himself as the leader of the “alternative government of Alberta” and defends policy
promises on account of their pragmatic usefulness to an immediate Albertan “interest”
(Lougheed 1971, p.2). In acting as Leader of the Opposition, the material observed here
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This includes “the farmer”, “the senior citizen”, “the young Albertan”, “the women of Alberta”, “the
Native People”, “The Citizens of Smaller Centres”, “The Citizens of Metropolitan Centres”, among others.
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indicates that he criticized the incumbent government not so much in accordance with its
lack of coherence with a set of values or abstract needs correlated to a group identity, but
the fact that it does not effectively meet its objective policy purpose, whether economic
growth, public health, efficiency, or government accessibility. In his response to the
1969-1970 provincial budget, for instance, Lougheed attacked the government’s poor
allocation of borrowed funds (Edmonton Journal 1969b). In further speeches regarding
education and healthcare he attacked the government not so much in terms of a common
group identity but rather owing to its inability to remedy bureaucratic inefficiency
(Demarino 1968; Edmonton Journal 1968).
To this broader technocratic nature of Lougheed’s appeal, one exception may
reside in the fact that Lougheed’s discursive material has a consistent future-orientated
tone that expresses a degree of confidence and attention to the province’s political
potential. As reported by Hustak (1979, p.131), for instance, he emphasized in a
campaign speech that in his party “our emphasis is on the future, our determination is
never to be complacent.” Similarly, in interactions with the rest of Canada, the 1971 PC
platform prioritizes its ambition to “bring Albertans into the mainstream of Canadian
political life – preforming a role of national leadership” and ensuring “equity and fairness
in arrangements between both levels of government” (Alberta Progressive Conservative
Party 1971, p.62). It is based on not fully advancing or in failing to live up to this vision
that Lougheed frequently criticizes the government, particularly in the area of
negotiations with the federal government (Bell 1969).
To some extent, this is attributed as a characteristic of the Albertan people
themselves, such as in Lougheed’s response to the 1971 Speech from the Throne in
which he states a “confidence” that the “talents and resources are here in the
province…[so that it] can grow and have the society that we all want” (Lougheed 1971,
p.29). Nevertheless, there is little else to further articulate the degree to which this is a
social or personal characteristic of the Albertan population. Rather, it is presented as a
necessary fix to a much broader policy problem that the province faces. Within the
context of the speech, this statement of confidence is entrenched in stated concerns about
an “uncertain future” that is suggested by “existing tends and historical influences”
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pertaining to economic growth and social ills outlined throughout the statement
(Lougheed 1971, p.30).
Next, in evaluating the third step in the process, it is initially clear that
Lougheed’s campaign communications put significant emphasis on greater provincial
leadership, resource control, and assertiveness. The 1971 Progressive Conservative
Campaign platform, for instance, pledges that a “National Oil Policy is not subject to the
whims of Eastern Canadian political interests” (Alberta Progressive Conservative Party
1971, p.64). Nevertheless, this analysis cannot identify, in the years surrounding
Lougheed’s initial leadership appeal in 1971, an explicit attempt to define a discernable
out-group with which he can distinguish the Albertan group identity. In effect, while
eastern Canada and the federal government are isolated as separate interests, little about
Lougheed’s initial appeal for leadership attempts to articulate a set of characteristics that
act as a means by which they can be contrasted with, and so differentiated from,
Albertans.
Consequently, given that this analysis does not find any evidence Lougheed
aimed to establish prototypicality, within the confines of the methodology used here I
conclude there is no support for the hypothesized relationship as expressed in hypothesis
one. In fact I found Lougheed was successful in attaining formal leadership despite the
fact that he did not attempt to articulate a set of key characteristics of the Alberta group
and base his legitimacy in his prototypicality of that identity. This is an interesting and
useful finding, for it suggests Lougheed mobilized support for his leadership via other
pathways involving policy articulation rather than identity appeals. We now turn to an
analysis of the second hypothesis.

6.4.2

Hypothesis Two: Concretization

The second hypothesis guiding this analysis states: if a leader develops and
communicates a salient understanding of the group identity and future course of action
that is consistent with their prototypicality while also drawing upon broader and preexisting characteristics of the group understanding (the principle of readiness), they are
then more likely to be endowed with formal leadership. In examining the second
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hypothesis within the context of Lougheed’s leadership, we should expect to see two
broad methods of communication taken up by this politician.
First, we should expect that, in communicating his agenda, Lougheed drew upon
the broader and pre-existing means by which the Albertan group identity processes,
understands, and makes evaluations of political phenomena. As a politician with much
agency, theoretically Lougheed possesses considerable creativity in determining the
particular and specific means by which these broad, abstract attempts are utilized to
justify his policy agenda. Nevertheless, this hypothesis suggests that he is required to
utilize them in order to mount a successful leadership appeal. They are necessary
elements to his leadership, in other words. The second broad method of communication
we should expect to observe is that Lougheed conveyed his policy agenda as the
concretization of this particular articulation of this broader group understanding. This is
to say his policy agenda should be portrayed as not only consistent with the broader
Albertan group understanding but communicated as the most legitimate course of action
to be taken forward.
This broader group understanding of Alberta was articulated in Chapter Four. In
summary, the group understanding centered on the province’s identity as a settler
community established for the purposes of economic prosperity. Given the early impact
of American settlers, this came to be understood through a particular individualist and
pro-freedom lens. Nevertheless, the economic and realities of the province, particularly
its economic precarity and dominance by central Canadian interests, resulted in a
particular group-level framework that was prone to be suspicious of the interventions of
foreign actors.
As with the last chapter’s case study of Aberhart, this analysis isolates three
factors. Of course, these are both simplifications and purely conceptual labels; reality is
far more complex. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this analysis, we should expect to
observe their use in a way that is empirically discernable. Therefore, the following
analysis will be organized by concentrated discussions of three themes:
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First, we should expect to observe that Lougheed includes rhetorical appeals to
the broader, abstract goal of economic prosperity, in addition to a particular articulation
of the romantic image of the “Last Best West” and the enterprising settler. From here, his
particular policy agenda should be communicated as the most legitimate means by which
the province can achieve economic prosperity in a way that is fulfilling of this settler
image.
Second, we should expect to observe that Lougheed includes rhetorical emphasis
on the values of individualism, self-reliance, and freedom. From here, we should observe
him communicate his policy agenda as being not only consistent with these values, but
conducive towards maximizing it.
Third, we should expect to observe that Lougheed consistently references the
negative impact of intervening foreign outsiders, with particular attention directed to the
fact that their behavior is largely to blame for Alberta’s problems. From here, we should
observe that Lougheed communicates his policy agenda as the means by which to remove
that power and instill a greater degree of power in the hands of Albertans.
Methodologically, this analysis will rely on the same collection of
communications: the 1971 Progressive Conservative platform, Lougheed’s legislative
statements, and his campaign speeches. I read these carefully to determine if consistent
discursive appeals to these three themes can be extracted.
First, it is evident that Lougheed places his leadership appeal in a broader
emphasis on the province’s potential for greater economic prosperity. In this way, the
1971 Progressive Conservative party platform commits to “move to a new stage of
Alberta economic growth” (Alberta Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.64). Here,
the platform puts an equal amount of emphasis on the importance of agricultural and
petroleum production. Agriculture, for instance, is recognized as “the basic industry of
the province and that the general prosperity is significantly dependent on it” (Alberta
Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.3). This general emphasis on economic growth is
further evident in Lougheed’s legislative speeches that draw attention to the need for
“expanded opportunity for Albertans to participate in Alberta enterprises” and “create
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sufficient opportunities to offset the forecasted continuance of unemployment”
(Lougheed 1971, p.30). Both the 1971 Progressive Conservative platform and
Lougheed’s legislative speeches present a wide array of policies directed to a more
“vigorous” government that will “fully utilize provincial government expenditures and
tax policies to create job opportunities for Albertans” while simultaneously pursuing a
“much more diversified economy, less reliant upon the oil and gas industry (Alberta
Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.66).
Nevertheless, from the qualitative material observed here, Lougheed does not
entrench his appeals to greater economic and material prosperity in any broader allusion
to Alberta’s potential as the “last best west,” nor is there any romanticization of
Albertans’ self-reliant, capable, and rugged nature as the region’s settlers. Instead,
economic growth is handled in technocratic fashion, covered only as an objective policy
problem. Consequently, in evaluating the first theme, we find that while Lougheed
prioritizes the goal of economic prosperity in his leader appeal this is not explicitly
conveyed in a way that demonstrably connects to other elements of the Albertan group
understanding.
Proceeding to the second theme, this analysis finds considerable rhetorical
emphasis within Lougheed’s appeal regarding the value of individual enterprise and
freedom. This seems to be constituted of two overlapping types, one which sees
individual freedom, expression, and control as an inherent moral value, and the other
which sees free-enterprise as conducive towards economic growth. When it comes to the
first, Lougheed seemingly begins by creating a fearsome picture. As he states in one
legislative speech, “As a Progressive Conservative the concept of individual freedom
rates as number one on our list of priorities”; nevertheless, a cited set of trends regarding
bureaucratic government growth and an overall social decline in privacy paints a “a
forecasted decline - I can't think of anything perhaps as disturbing - in individual
freedom” (Lougheed 1971, p.27).
Consequently, individual rights take on a particularly prescient and significant place in
the PC’s 1971 policy platform, which pledges to “ensure that an individual citizen is
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entitled to live a private life, free from…intrusion upon his seclusion or solitude or into
his private affairs” (Alberta Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.5). This is seen to be
concretized by the commitment that a Alberta Bill of Rights that “takes precedence over
every other Statue” will be the first bill introduced by a newly elected Lougheed
administration (Lougheed 1971, p. 29). This is also used to justify a group of policies
that, rather than create “ingrown and autocratic bureaucracy”, promises an “open”,
“responsive”, and “citizen involved” government that provides “protection against the
unjustified actions of the provincial government” (Alberta Progressive Conservative
Party 1971, p.40).
In addition to the emphasis given on individual rights as a value, Lougheed’s
appeal is also entrenched in the broader assumption that a greater emphasis on individual
freedom, self-reliance and free enterprise will create greater economic growth and better
public institutions. For this reason, the 1971 Progressive Conservative party platform
presents the overall promise to create a “government climate favorable to free-enterprise
and – with increased opportunities for individual Albertans their own economic destiny”
(Alberta Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p. 3). This is also evident in Lougheed’s
social policies. In a legislative speech he suggests the introduction of a guaranteed
minimum income as an alternative to the province’s welfare regime given its larger role
for individual decision-making and discretion (Lougheed 1971, p. 26); when discussing
education he mentions that the party would pursue “an analysis of the possibility of
leasing school buildings from private industry” (Alberta Progressive Conservative Party,
p.30). Nevertheless, the aspects of Lougheed’s appeal that would entail greater
government involvement and oversight are communicated as necessary actions to
increase freedom. As stated by Lougheed in one of his campaign speeches, “we stand for
free enterprise – not socialism. We also stand for social reform and individual rights – not
big government control” (citied in Hustak 1979, p.132). Overall, in analyzing the
qualitative material as it pertains to this second thing, we have demonstrably observed the
fact that Lougheed’s appeal not only conveys an assumption of the utility of individual
freedom, but makes the maximization thereof a cornerstone of his policy appeal.
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Finally, as discussed, the third characteristic posits that Albertan group
understanding has a broader tendency to approach, evaluate, and frame the province’s
problems through the lens of a foreign, intervening actor. Historically, although not
exclusively, this has been associated with Central Canada or the Federal government. For
this reason, it suggests that Lougheed is incentivized to not only identify this actor but
communicate his policy agenda as the means by which to remove their influence. In
observing the material that comprises this analysis, this to some extent comprises an
important component of Lougheed’s leadership appeal. For example, The 1971
Progressive Conservative platform identifies “Eastern Canadian political interests” as
having too much control over the direction of Albertan economic and political decisionmaking. (Alberta Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p. 62). Consequently, it suggests
that an overall growth in the involvement of the provincial government, in both internal
affairs and the direction of the Canadian political economy more broadly, is the means by
which to “bring Albertans into the mainstream of Canadian public life” and “assure
equity and fairness in arrangements between both levels of government” (Alberta
Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.62). Within the context of internal Alberta
politics, this includes a policy commitment to “give high priority to provincial
government programs which assist in providing cash income for the average Alberta
farmer” (Alberta Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.7), to institute a “shift in
jurisdiction from the federal to the provincial governments…in the field of adult training
and retaining” (Lougheed 1971, p.26), and create a source of local finance power by
transferring government expenditures into industrial and small-business development
funds (Lougheed 1971, p.28). Externally, this includes a promise to exert a more
“assertive” relationship to the federal government that includes an additional transfer of
expenditures to the department of intergovernmental affairs. In the context of the
Petroleum industry, for instance, Lougheed pledges to “refuse to accept a position that in
this vital Alberta industry the Federal government can negotiate agreements without
consultation and concurrence by the elected representatives of the people of Alberta”
(Alberta Progressive Conservative Party 1971, p.63).
Overall, then, this analysis can conclude that the third broad theme considered
comprises a component of Lougheed’s appeal, entailing a moment in which he based his
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policy agenda as the best means by which to remove outside interference and entrench
greater direct control by Albertans themselves. Nevertheless, it should be stated that
Lougheed’s appeal as observed in this analysis contains no elaboration on why Federal
involvement in Albertan public policy is negative, nor is there an attempt to infer
coercive or sinister intentions on the part of the institutions themselves.
To conclude, this section of the chapter sought to apply the second hypothesis to
the case of Peter Lougheed’s leadership in his early years as head of the Progressive
Conservatives. It was hypothesized that Lougheed’s success at attaining formal
leadership was the result of his ability to convey his leadership and policy agenda as both
consistent with the broader and pre-existing component of the Albertan group
understanding in addition to acting as it’s concretization so as to legitimize it as the best
course of action. From this basis I articulated three specific characteristics would mark
the leaders public appeals: an emphasis on economic prosperity linked to an abstract
image of the Albertan settler; the importance given to individualism, free enterprise, and
freedom; and calls to remove the influence of an outside interfering agent.
When the results of the analysis of Lougheed’s communications are considered,
support for the second hypothesis is found to be mixed and somewhat inconclusive. On
the one hand, several aspects of these characteristics – such as the emphasis on economic
prosperity, the value placed on individual freedom, and the need to remove federal
control – all comprise aspects of Lougheed’s appeals, including the fact that his policy
agenda is communicated as the best means by which to advance them. Nevertheless,
there are other elements of these stated characteristics – such as the utilization of a settler
image and an emphasis on the morally negative aspects of outside federal interference –
that are simply not present in the communications under study here. With these findings
reported, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of the broader identity
leadership framework, as below.

6.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter attempted to understand the particular success of Peter
Lougheed’s 1971 appeal for leadership through a social identity lens. This was
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undertaken by utilizing a collection of written and oral communications that comprised
the material analyzed to locate evidence in support of the two main hypotheses guiding
this study. The first hypothesis proposed that Peter Lougheed based the initial legitimacy
of his appeal in his being prototypical of an articulated set of characteristics that
distinguish the Albertan group. In the data considered here there is no indication that
Lougheed attempted to base an aspect of his appeal in this group process. With respect to
the second hypothesis, that Lougheed then legitimized his policy agenda through the way
it was consistent with broader and pre-existing understandings of the Albertan group
identity, the evidence was mixed. Lougheed was found to communicate in ways that
reflected most, but not all, of the hypothesized elements of the Albertan group identity.
So there is only partial support reported here for the second hypothesis.
Overall, in evaluating the usefulness of social identity theory to understand how
political leaders are able to mobilize support, this approach lacks explanatory power with
respect to this case study. Instead, the analysis seems to suggest that Lougheed was
successful in attaining formal leadership despite the fact that he did not aim to establish
himself as a prototypical member of the Albertan group identity. As with the Aberhart
case study, the second stage of this process, while found to be accurate, is rendered
empirically imprecise. Without the metric of prototypicality, this alone does not provide
an answer to question of why Lougheed’s particular use of these broader aspects of the
Albertan group understanding were successful.
This study has several limitations. The chapter’s analysis is a limited, small-scale
effort to understand whether social identity theory is useful for explaining how political
leaders mobilize support. It is by no means a comprehensive look at the leadership of
Peter Lougheed through a social identity lens. Future research, for instance, could
analyze the degree to which Lougheed’s use of group processes may have come later in
his official tenure. Nevertheless, within the material covered in the span of this chapter,
and in view of the limited evidence I uncovered in support of the two hypothesized
relationships, I conclude that Lougheed appears to have attained the office of premier and
exercised leadership over Albertans without comprehensively entrenching his leadership
in broader group processes. While these finding do not suggest that identity leadership
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does not provide a means by which leaders could further gain support, these results raise
questions as to the degree to which establishing oneself within the group is a necessary
component of every successful leadership appeal. With this second case study being
completed, this thesis will not turn to its overall conclusions.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion
How can political leadership in Canada be better approached and understood? This thesis
has attempted to provide a modest contribution to the broader understanding of political
leadership in Canada, drawing upon outside literatures to examine the question of how
specific leaders are able to communicate successful leadership appeals. Overall, while the
specific theoretical framework that comprises this analysis was found to be ineffective in
accounting for the success of certain leaders, the thesis nevertheless contributes to
broader understanding.
The literature review began by making a key set of conceptual claims. Leadership
was understood as the means by which an individual is endowed by others with the
legitimate authority to disproportionately affect political outcomes. As an important and
worthwhile area of study, this process of personal legitimacy and action – rather than
merely the formal-legal structures of executive political institutions – was held to possess
a significant impact over political outcomes. In effect, then, rather than broader
contextual factors, individual leaders were granted considerable power in shaping the
conditions surrounding their authority, particularly regarding the nature of the appeal,
policy agenda, and the needs and preferences of followers. With these established, it
reviewed and considered an array of approaches developed within the political leadership
literature, categorizing each into one of three frameworks – attributional, transactional,
and contextual accounts.
Here, Identity Leadership Theory (ILT) – a broader approach derived from social
psychology – was posited as a useful theoretical framework, holding that the success of
certain leadership appeals over others can be explained on account of the way that they
utilize group psychological processes (Haslam et al. 2020). It theorized that individuals,
in aspiring towards a position of formal leadership, will communicate that they are a
prototypical member of the group who, through their personal leadership, offer
compelling answers to the group’s understanding of itself, the surrounding world, and the
actions it should take moving forward. This, in accordance with the conceptual claims
made throughout the thesis, was primarily understood to be the product of an individual’s
discursive discretion: a successful appeal is not based on objective personal
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characteristics, but the way the leader, in communicating with the group they seek to
lead, utilizes aspects of their personal characteristics, experiences, and policy agendas as
particularly evocative of group-level understandings. Formulated into a research design,
it established the hypotheses that, first, the successful leader should demonstrably base
their appeal in their own individual prototypicality of an articulated group identity and,
second, frame their policy agenda as the concretization of a coherent set of pre-existing
group understandings and values.
This causal relationship was tested through a set of two qualitative case studies of
two Alberta Premiers: William Aberhart and Peter Lougheed. This method was justified
by its strengths in providing the researcher with a more detailed, “thick” analysis of the
context studied. The choice of Alberta was selected both for its supposed leader-based
culture and the widely accepted notion of its broader political culture. In proceeding to an
analysis of the province’s political, economic, and cultural factors through a social
identity lens, it was determined that the Albertan group identity is comprised of a key set
of dominant themes: that, in effect, its formative years as a settler society reliant on
export commodities has produced an individualist collective cognitive framework
oriented around the goals of prosperity, fairness, freedom, and the rejection of an
interfering outside agent.
In examining this through the studies of each Premier, it was demonstrated that
this theory and its set of hypotheses are not supported by the empirical evidence. Rather,
it was observed that, while the findings of the second hypothesis were mixed, both
leaders were successful even though there is no evidence to suggest either effectively
established themselves as prototypical members.
Given the general tone and perception of politics in Alberta, this is a surprising
finding. Throughout scholarly, journalistic, and popular depictions of the province,
Premiers are widely considered to benefit from explicitly identarian appeals to justify
their authority and policy agenda in office. Once in power, for instance, Lougheed would
counter the federal government on resource policies by positioning himself as the
“selfless superhero” of the Albertan people by his charged language in First Ministers
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conferences, his direct television addresses to the public, and his rhetorical division of the
Alberta population into the province’s loyal “doers” and contrarian “knockers” (Tupper
and Gibbins 1992). Also evident is the much broader series of symbolic actions or
statement’s that have always been annual routines for all leaders, the most predominant
of which is the Calgary Stampede and its expectation that all provincial and federal
leaders exhibit their Stenson’s and plaid shirts.
How then are these findings to be understood, both from the vantage point of
Alberta and political leadership more broadly? The main implications of these findings
appear to demonstrate that while appeals to identity are certainly an aspect of leadership,
it does not comprise a core or essential part of the broader process of gaining and
exercising authority over a given group. Put more specifically to this thesis’s purposes, it
does not provide a factor that can explain or account for the success of certain leaders
over others. Nevertheless, the question remains as to what degree identity-based appeals
remain relevant and important; that, perhaps although not a sufficient condition to a
successful leader appeal, the use of some discursive allusion to the “people” one seeks to
lead is a necessary condition for authority. In this way, future research in this area can
direct its attention to better understanding the ways in which these group-based appeals
are formed and expressed to legitimize individual leadership, policy change, and
collective movements.
This is particularly the case once one considers the limitations of this analysis.
Although it has demonstrated the fact that a social identity framework cannot, at least on
its own, account for a successful leader appeal, it covers only a minor aspect of the way
in which the general process of group-based appeals impact leaders and the leadership
process. Within Alberta, for instance, it is still worthwhile to engage in the ways groupbased appeals were utilized by Premiers throughout their time in power to legitimize
specific policy agendas, in addition to the way that other aspiring leaders used these
appeals unsuccessfully. Alberta is also only one province among many - the way in
which these concepts operate in other Canadian contexts remains to be seen, particularly
in regard to the potential for more comparative research.
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Although this theoretical framework and corresponding set of hypotheses were
unsuccessful in providing an explanation for successful leader appeals, this thesis was
nevertheless successful in its broader purpose. As outlined in the introduction, this thesis
noted that its main goal was to provide a contribution to the much broader scholarly
effort to better understand Canadian political leadership itself, particularly by drawing
upon concepts, theories, and frameworks developed by the international political
leadership literature. Overall, it has contributed to broader disciplinary understanding by
demonstrating the very problematic empirical limitations of Identity Leadership Theory
as a sufficient condition for leadership, preventing future researchers from embarking
upon this fruitless path of inquiry. Instead, future scholarly attention in Canada can be
directed to further exploring untested aspects of the broader political leadership literature
and their applicability to the Canadian context.
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